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1. 1111rodliClioll 
1. Introduction 
Market-oriented health care reforms are high on the political agenda in many 
countries. The main purpose of many reforms is to increase the insurers' 
incentives for efficiency and their responsiveness to consumers' preferences. A 
common element is the introduction of capitation payments through which the 
insurers are (largely) financed by the regulator1• With these payments the 
insurers should provide or purchase a specified set of health care services for 
their members during a certain period, mostly one year. In some countries the 
capitation payments constitute the entire revenue of insurers, but in most 
countries the insurers are allowed to quote an additional premium to their mem-
bers. In the latter case the regulator usually requires an insurer to quote the 
same additional premium to each member that chooses the same insurance 
modality. A common problem in all countries is the implementation of adequate 
capitation payments. Ideally the capitation payments should account for predict-
able variations in individual health care expenditures as far as these are caused 
by differences in health status while they should retain an insurer's incentives 
for efficiency. Currently employed capitation payments are mainly based on 
demographic variables which are relatively poor predictors of individual annual 
health care expenditures. Therefore, capitation payments based on demographic 
variables only, provide insurers with a strong incentive for preferred risk selec-
tion (Newhouse et aI., 1989; Ash et aI., 1990; Anderson et aI., 1990; Van Vliet 
and Van de Ven, 1992). Preferred risk selection refers to an insurer's selection 
of those individuals that it expects to be profitable. It is also called cream 
skimming or cherry picking. In principle demographic capitation payments can 
be improved upon substantially by taking more and better risk factors into 
account. However, the implementation of such improved capitation payments 
does not appear to be straightforward. Currently the most promising risk 
I Where this study uses the term 'insurer', it can be a sickness fund or so-called 'care 
insurer' as in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, an integrated health plan such as health 
maintenance organizations in the United States or a (group of) health care providers such as 
General Practitioner-fundholders or Primary Care Groups in the United Kingdom. Commonly 
the regulator is the government but it may also be an employer or a group of employers, 
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adjusters are measures of prior costs and diagnostic information from either 
previous hospitalizations or previously prescribed drugs (Clark et aI., 1995; 
Ellis et aI., 1996; Lamers and Van Vliet, 1996; Weiner et aI., 1996). However, 
it is unclear whether the application of such improved capitation payments will 
reduce insurers' incentives for selection to negligible levels. Some have argued 
that even with the application of near-perfect capitation payments, selection 
might remain highly profitable (Newhouse et aI., 1989). 
In case that - for whatever reason - crude capitation payments can not be 
improved in practice, several authors have suggested to pay the insurers partly 
on the basis of capitation payments and partly on the basis of actual costs 
(Gruenberg et aI., 1986; Newhouse, 1986; Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992). 
Various names can be found for such payment systems: 'mixed payment 
systems', 'blended payment systems', 'partial capitation', '(outlier) pooling', 
and ' risk sharing'. In this study the latter term will be used. Risk sharing 
implies that the insurers are retrospectively reimbursed by the regulator for 
some of the expenditures of some of their members. Assuming budget-neutral-
ity, it can be seen as a mandatory reinsurance program for the insurers, where 
the regulator acts as the reinsurer. With risk sharing the regulator might give up 
some of the insurers' incentives for efficiency in exchange for a reduction of 
their incentives for selection. As far as we know, a systematic analysis of the 
consequences of various forms of risk sharing in a regulated competitive 
individual health insurance market has not yet been performed. 
Given this background the main purpose of this study is to compare the 
consequences of various forms of risk sharing as a supplemellf to demo-
graphic capitation paymellfs in a regulated competitive individual health 
insurance market. In particular the focus is on the reduction of insurers' 
incellfives for efficiency in exchange for a reduction of their incelltives for 
selection. This tradeoff will be abbreviated as the tradeoff between selection 
and efficiency. 
The main contribution of this study is the development of a conceptual frame-
work for optimizing the tradeoff between selection and efficiency and the 
empirical analyses of risk sharing as a supplement to demographic capitation 
2 
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payments. It is interesting to compare the results of risk sharing with those that 
improving demographic capitation payments may yield. As a first step towards 
this type of research, this study also compares the consequences of risk sharing 
with the consequences of prior costs as an additional risk adjuster. In the latter 
case there is also a tradeoff between selection and efficiency. This chapter first 
describes the background to this snldy and the rationale for risk sharing more 
elaborately. Then the research questions are mentioned. Finally the international 
relevance is discussed as well as other ways to reduce the insurers' incentives 
for selection. 
1.1 Regulated competition 
In an unregulated market for health insurance, premiums per contract will be 
based on expected costs (equivalence principle). For individual health insurance 
this implies that the premium for an 80-year-old person w.ould be on average 
about ten times the premium for a 20-year-old person, and that a chronically ill 
person would have to pay many times what a healthy person in the same age-
group pays. Furthermore insurers might refuse to cover high-risk individuals for 
whom an appropriate premium can not be calculated and/or they might exclude 
pre-existing medical conditions from coverage. In most countries these conse-
quences of the equivalence principle are considered unacceptable because of the 
serious access problems they would create. The purpose of much regulation in a 
competitive health insurance market is to guarantee access to coverage for high-
risk individuals for an affordable price (premium). Such regulation should 
involve: the definition of a benefits package and rules with respect to enrolment 
and premiums. 
This study assumes that the regulator specifies a benefits package that covers 
acute care such as short -term hospital care, physician services and prescribed 
drugs'. The insurers are allowed to offer different modalities of the benefits 
package provided that each modality covers all types of care specified in the 
1 For a study that analyzes capitation payments for various types of long-ternl care, see Van 
Barneveld et al. (1997). 
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benefits package. The insurance modalities of the specified benefits package 
may differ only with respect to the list of contracted providers of care and with 
respect to the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to cover the costs. 
Such a condition could be that a referral card from a general practitioner is 
needed for the reimbursement of the costs of a consultation with a medical 
specialist in a hospital. The flexibility in the description of the specified benefits 
package should pave the way for setting up alternative health care insurance and 
delivery arrangements, such as health maintenance organizations and preferred 
provider organizations. 
In most countries that currently apply capitation payments, it is mandatory for 
the consumers to buy a modality of the specified benefits package. However, 
this study is also relevant in the case of voluntary health insurance. In the latter 
case the capitation payments and the risk sharing apply only to those individuals 
that voluntarily buy a modality of the specified benefits package. 
It is assumed that the regulator specifies a periodiC open enrolment requirement. 
This means that each insurer has to accept anyone who wants to enrol for the 
specified benefits package during a certain enrolment period. 
This study assumes that the insurers are largely financed via capitation pay-
ments. To calculate the capitation payments the regulator must have a practical 
definition of so-called 'acceptable expenditures' within the context of the 
\ 
specified benefits. package. Such a definition is also necessary if capitation 
payments are supplemented with risk sharing. 
A person's capitation payment equals the predicted costs within the risk group 
to which the person belongs (i.e. the normative costs of the person in question) 
minus e.g. a fixed amount or a certain percentage. The thus created deficit is 
closed by an additional premium that each person pays directly to the chosen 
insurer. Each insurer is free to set its own additional premium. Therefore, the 
level of the additional premiums is subject to competition and ultimately the 
insurer determines its own revenues. However, it is assumed that the regulator 
requires an insurer to quote the same premium to all members choosing the 
same insurance modality. The additional premiums reflect the difference 
between capitation payments and actual costs, thus creating incentives for the 
insurers to be efficient. An insurer is more efficient than a competitor if it is 
4 
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able to serve the same population with the same quality of care for lower costs 
or with a higher quality of care for the same costs. Consequently, where this 
study uses the term 'efficiency', technical efficiency or so-called efficiency in 
production is meant, not allocative efficiency. 
The consumers are free to choose from different insurers, choosing the insur-
ance modality they like most. The premium paid will reflect the cost -generating 
behaviour of the contracted health care providers. It is expected that this will 
create an envirolmlent in which: 
- consumers are being rewarded for choosing efficient insurers and choosing 
efficient providers; 
- providers are being rewarded for efficient provision of care; 
- insurers are stimulated to contract efficient providers and to be responsive to 
consumers' preferences (Van de Ven and Schut, 1994). 
Besides preferred risk selection, another major potential problem in a regulated 
competitive individual health insurance market is quality skimping. Quality 
skimping or so-called stinting is the reduction of the quality of care to a level 
below the minimum level that is acceptable to society. Newhouse et a!. (1997) 
propose risk sharing as a solution for the selection problem as well as the 
quality skimping problem. However, in the present study risk sharing will be 
analyzed as a potential solution for the selection problem only. The reason is 
that selection is caused by inadequate capitation payments whereas quality 
skimping may even emerge in the case of 'perfect' capitation payments. 
Financial incentives for quality skimping are caused by insufficient pressure 
from consumers on insurers to contract good quality care when the consumers 
choose an insurance modality. Van de Ven and Schut (1994) have argued that 
with respect to most types of acute care, competing health insurers will have 
incentives to improve the quality of care if the selection problem is solved 
sufficiently. The authors mention two types of care for which the problem of 
quality skimping may be relevant even in the case of 'perfect' capitation 
payments: care that is often used by persons who do not have the mental ability 
to make a tradeoff between price and quality themselves; and care that most 
people are not interested in because they have a very low probability of needing 
5 
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it during the next contract period. The present study assumes that the regulator 
uses a separate regulatory regime for such types of care (e.g. long-term care for 
demented elderly) apart from the competitive regulatory regime for acute care. 
Inadequate capitation payments may lead to overcompensation and underco-
mpensation of insurers. This 'fairness' problem arises if, for whatever reason, 
preferred risks are not distributed evenly among the insurers. In that case 
insurers with relatively many preferred risks are overpaid while others are 
underpaid, so there is not a 'level playing field' for all insurers. As a result 
efficient insurers might lose market share to inefficient insurers. The extent of 
this 'fairness' problem depends on the distribution of preferred risks among the 
insurers. If these are distributed evenly, then even if the capitation payment is 
the same for each individual ("flat capitation payments") there would be no 
overcompensation or undercompensation of insurers. However, the selection 
problem would be as great as possible. On the other hand, if the selection 
problem is solved sufficiently, it seems likely that the 'fairness' problem is also 
solved adequately. 
This study focuses on preferred risk selection by insurers. A necessary condi-
tion for this type of selection to occur is that an insurer has an information 
surplus vis i\ vis the regulator. That is, an insurer has more information about 
the risks of individuals than the regulator uses in its payment system. Another 
type of selection is adverse selection. Adverse selection is caused by a con-
sumer information surplus vis i\ vis the insurers, i.e. consumers have more 
information about their risks than the information that insurers (are allowed to) 
use for discerning risks groups and setting premiums (Pauly, 1984). Given 
demographic capitation payments and the premium rate restrictions, it is likely 
that risk sharing reduces both the insurers' incentives for preferred risk selec-
tion and the consumers' opportunities for adverse selection. Nevertheless, if the 
insurers' incentives for selection are reduced to such an extent that preferred 
risk selection is unprofitable, there may remain some consumers' opportunities 
for adverse selection, but their extent is unknown'. The distinction between 
J These opportunities for adverse selection remain outside the scope of the present study. 
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preferred risk selection and adverse selection is vague when insurers try to 
attract preferred risks by offering different insurance modalities of the specified 
benefits package. However, besides offering different insurance modalities, 
insurers have several other tools for preferred risk selection at their disposal. 
The problem of preferred risk selection and potential solutions are discussed in 
chapter two. 
1.2 Purpose of risk sharing 
This study assumes that the regulator's purpose with risk sharing is to reduce 
insurers' incentives for selection while preserving their incentives for efficiency 
as much as possible. Of course the better the capitation payments, the less need 
for risk sharing. A clUcial assumption in this study is that the capitation 
payments are calculated in the same way as in the situation without risk sharing. 
Furthermore it is assumed that the regulator requires risk sharing to be budget-
neutral at the macro level and that it is mandatory for all insurers to contribute 
to the financing of the risk pool. The latter requirement is necessary because 
otherwise some insurers might not want to participate in the risk sharing 
arrangement. Various forms of risk sharing are possible. These will be 
described in detail in chapter three. 
In related studies the purpose of risk sharing appears to be different or to 
include more aspects than the present study (Keeler et aI., 1988; Beebe, 1992; 
Newhouse, 1992; Newhouse et aI., 1997; Schokkaert et aI., 1998; Keeler et aI., 
1998). In the present study it is lIot the purpose of risk sharing: 
- To reduce the insurers' incentives for quality skimping. 
Newhouse et al. (1997) have proposed risk sharing as a solution for the 
selection problem as well as for the problem of quality skimping. The present 
study assumes that it is the competition itself - not the payment system for the 
competing health insurers - that, in the long lUn, has to lead to the desired 
volume and quality of care. 
7 
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- To reduce the insurers' financial risk. 
An insurer's financial risk is related to the unpredictability of health care 
expenditures and the size of its portfolio. As a result of pure chance, the 
financial result of an insurer may vary over the years. Beebe (1992) has 
analyzed an outlier pool, which is one form of risk sharing, in the context of 
the capitation of at-risk health maintenance organizations in the Medicare 
program in the United States. The author concludes that an outlier pool could 
provide some protection against the risk of an unpredictable high proportion of 
high-cost users at a relatively modest cost. However, for relatively large 
insurers chance is not a problem at all and relatively small insurers can deal 
with this problem via voluntary risk-rated reinsurance techniques. There are two 
differences between risk sharing and such traditional reinsurance techniques: 
risk sharing is mandatory and the price for an insurer is not (fully) related to 
the risk of its members for whom some risk is shared, whereas traditional 
reinsurance is voluntary and risk-rated. 
- To reduce the consumers' opportunities for adverse selection. 
In the simulation of Keeler et al. (1998) an important outcome measure for each 
payment system is the so-called "payment fairness". This is the ratio of the 
payment to an insurer to the costs of providing the insurer's members with the 
care they would receive at the yardstick insurer. As the authors state: "to the 
degree this ratio falls short of 1.0, the insurer suffers from adverse selection, 
and premiums will include a surcharge for its risk mix (and conversely)". As 
mentioned before, the present study focuses on preferred risk selection by 
insurers. Any remaining opportunities for adverse selection after the problem of 
preferred risk selection has been solved adequately, remain outside the scope of 
the present study. 
- To account for possible correlation between risk factors that should be 
included in the capitation formula (e.g. age, sex and indicators of health status) 
with variables that should not be included (e.g. regional overcapacity of 
hospitals and/or physi-cians or propensity to consume health care services). 
Schokkaert et al. (1998) have argued in favour of risk sharing for this reason. 
The present study assumes that the capitation payments are based on an average 
8 
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amount of health care supply and an average propensity to consume. The 
consequences of inefficiency should be reflected in an insurer's additional 
premium per insurance modality. Consumers with a preference for more than 
average health care use given their health status, may choose a more generous 
insurance modality while paying a higher additional premium. 
- To average out pricing errors. 
In the context of the capitation of health care providers, Newhouse (1992) 
assumes that hospital and physician prices will not equal those of a competitive 
equilibrium. Even if the intent were to approximate an optimal price, systems as 
the prospective payment system for paying hospitals in the United States4 will 
make errors. In the light of such errors, the author argues that it will improve 
welfare to adopt a mixed mode of reimbursement. The present study assumes 
that it is the competition itself - not the payment system for the competing 
health insurers - that, in the long run, has to lead to good price signals. 
In the context of the prospective payment system for paying hospitals in the 
United States, Keeler et al. (1988) have analyzed insurance aspects of diagnosis 
related groups outlier payments. Their paper characterizes the outlier payment 
formulae that minimize risk for hospitals under fixed constraints on the sum of 
outlier payments and minimum hospital coinsurance rate. They mention that in 
addition to reducing financial risk to hospitals, outlier payments have three 
other main goals: giving additional money to hospitals that treat sicker and more 
expensive patients than average; reducing access problems for patients who can 
be identified by hospitals as likely to need very expensive treatment; and, 
conditional on admission, reducing incentives to provide less care for the very 
sick than society would wish them to have. Therefore, in their study the 
purpose of risk sharing includes more aspects than the present study. 
~ The so-called prospective payment system for paying hospitals in the United States 
consists of normative payments for a certain admission given that the admission has occurred. 
In the context of the capitation of insurers, such a payment is commonly referred to as a 
retrospective capitation payment (see chapter two). 
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1.3 Research questions 
The study is divided into two parts. In the first part a conceptual framework for 
optimizing the tradeoff between selection and efficiency will be developed. The 
second part contains empirical applications of the developed methodology. 
In chapter two the problem of selection by insurers and the measurement of an 
insurer's incentives for selection will be discussed. Specifically the following 
research questions will be addressed: 
la. What tools can an insurer use for selection? 
1 b. What are the negative effects of selection? 
lc. How can selection be prevented? 
1d. What indicators can be used for measuring an insurer's incentives for 
selection? 
In the third chapter forms of risk sharing will be described. The questions 
guiding chapter three are: 
2a. Which forms of risk sharing have been suggested in the literature? 
2b. What are the results of previous empirical studies on risk sharing? 
2c. Which conceptual framework can be used to describe forms of risk shar-
ing? 
2d. What is the difference between risk sharing and capitation? 
Chapter four describes the tools that an insurer can use to improve the effi-
ciency of care and the savings that could be achieved. Moreover, it discusses 
the measurement of an insurer's incentives for efficiency. 
3a. What tools can an insurer use to improve efficiency? 
3b. What are the savings that could be achieved by an insurer? 
3c. What indicators can be used for measuring an insurer's incentives for effi-
ciency? 
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The purpose of chapter five is to combine the elements of the preceding 
chapters into a conceptual framework for optimizing the tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency. The question addressed in chapter five is therefore: 
4. Which conceptual framework can be used for optimizing the tradeoff 
between selection and efficiency? 
The second part of the study consists of empirical illustrations. Given a demo-
graphic capitation formula, the consequences of various ',nain forms of risk 
sharing will be analyzed. After a description of the data, the methods and the 
incentives for selection under demographic capitation payments in chapter six, 
chapter seven addresses the following questions: 
5a. What are the consequences of several variants of the main forms of risk 
sharing for an insurer's incentives for selection and efficiency? 
5b. Which form of risk sharing yields the best tradeoff between selection and 
efficiency? 
Chapter eight analyzes capitation payments that are, besides demographic vari-
ables, based on prior costs. The results are compared with those of risk sharing 
in chapter seven. 
6a. What are the consequences of several variants of prior costs as an addi-
tional risk adjuster for an insurer's incentives for selection and efficiency? 
6b. Do prior costs as an additional risk adjuster yield a better tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency than risk sharing as a supplement to demographic 
capitation payments? 
For the empirical analyses a stratified data set is available with information at 
individual level for several consecutive years of about 47,000 Dutch sickness 
fund members ("Zorg en Zekerheid"). The data set contains administrative 
information on background variables of the insureds (like their age and sex) as 
well as their annual health care expenditures for several types of acute care (like 
short-term hospital care, physician services and prescribed dmgs) and the 
11 
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diagnoses from their hospital admissions in the form of the relevant code from 
the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Edition, Clinical Modification. 
For a subset of about 10,500 members, health survey data are also available. 
Although the data set is not very large, it contains the necessary detailed 
information for a thorough analysis of risk sharing as a supplement to demo-
graphic capitation payments in a regulated competitive individual health insur-
ance market. 
1.4 International relevance 
This study is relevant for at least ten countries that are implementing or 
considering to implement competitive health care reforms that include similar 
regulations as those that are assumed in this study. In the late 1990s competing 
sickness funds or so-called 'care insurers' receive capitation payments in: 
- Belgium (Schokkaert et aI., 1998); 
- the Czech Republic (McCarthy et a!., 1995); 
- Germany (Files and Murray, 1995); 
- the Netherlands (Van de Ven et a!., 1994); 
- Ireland; 
- Israel (Chinitz, 1994); 
- Switzerland (McCarthy et a!., 1995). 
In Russia some experiments with capitation payments have been conducted 
(Sheiman, 1994; Isakova et a!., 1995). 
In the Medicare program in the United States competing at-risk health mainten-
ance organizations have been receiving capitation payments since the early 
1980s. The capitation payments are based on the Average Adjusted Per Capita 
Costs formula. In 1997 this formula was still based on age, sex, welfare status 
and institutional status only (Newhouse et a!., 1997). 
Risk sharing as a supplement to capitation payments is also relevant for the 
Medicaid program and for private (group) health insurance in the United States 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). 
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Risk sharing is also relevant for a competitive provider market, in which 
competing (groups of) providers receive a capitation payment to provide or 
purchase a specified set of services for a group of members, such as the system 
of fundholding for general practitioners in the United Kingdom in the 1990s 
(Matsaganis and Glennester, 1994; Sheldon et aI., 1994). 
All countries mentioned use a rather cmde capitation formula, mostly based on 
demographic variables only, combined with flat-rate additional premiums. 
Besides trying to improve their capitation formula, these countries might 
consider to implement some form of risk sharing. In fact, some countries have 
already implemented a form of risk sharing (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom). Such countries might consider to change their specific form 
of risk sharing if other forms are shown to yield a better tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency. 
Of course there are also several important differences between the health care 
reforms in the countries mentioned above. For instance, differences in the 
population that is included (all ages or the elderly); the exact types of care 
covered in the benefits package (including or excluding types of long-term care) 
and the contract period (one year or one month). The present study focuses on a 
regulated competitive health insurance market that covers a general population 
for types of acute care only. Furthermore the study focuses on a contract-period 
of one year. 
1.5 Other solutions 
Within the context of this study, the problem of selection by insurers can be 
addressed via procompetitive regulation, improving the capitation payments, and 
introducing risk sharing as a supplement to the capitation payments. Other 
solutions are mentioned in this section, but they are outside the context of this 
study. 
Financial incentives for selection can be removed by providing full reimburse-
13 
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ment of an insurer's expenditures or by refraining from any regnlation. In the 
first case an insurer would have nothing to gain by selection but it would also 
have nothing to gain by improving efficiency. Because the main reason for 
market-oriented health care reforms is to increase the insurers' incentives for 
efficiency, this option is outside the context of this study. 
Because incentives for selection are (mainly) caused by regulation (Pauly, 
1984), refraining from regulation removes (most) incentives for selection. 
However, without regulation, a free competitive individual health insurance 
market with its associated access problems will arise. For the latter case Van de 
Ven et al. (1999) concluded that risk-adjusted subsidies may be an effective tool 
to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals without having the 
adverse effects of (regulation-induced) selection. As long as the subsidies are 
imperfectly risk-adjusted, risk sharing could then be used as a tool to reduce 
access problems. However, the present study only considers a regulated 
competitive individual health insurance market with capitation payments and 
flat-rate additional premiums. Consequently, the present study focuses on risk 
sharing as a tool to reduce the selection problem. 
Preferred risk selection can be mitigated by relaxing the premium rate restric-
tions to some extent, by standardizing the benefits package and by stimulating 
group insurance. The premium rate restrictions could be changed by allowing 
an insurer to quote a premium per insurance modality that varies between a 
certain minimum and a certain maximum value. In that case an insurer can use 
(a part of) its information surplus vis it vis the regulator for premium differen-
tiation which will lower its incentives for selection. 
A mandatory insurance for a fully standardized benefits package would imply 
refraining from different insurance modalities and from selective contracting. As 
a result, an insurer would not be able to attract preferred risks by the design of 
different insurance modalities. However, an insurer could also use other tools 
for selection and a fully standardized benefits package may be hard to imple-
ment. Even if fully standardized benefits could be implemented, it may have 
several adverse effects: a reduction of an insurer's tools for efficiency, a 
rcduction of an insurer's possibilities to be responsive to consumers' preferences 
and - depending on the generosity of the fully standardized benefits package - it 
14 
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may increase moral hazard. On the other hand, standardizing the benefits 
package could have the advantage of making the market more transparent and 
reducing consumers' search costs. The present study assumes a specified 
benefits package that can be offered in different insurance modalities provided 
that such a modality covers all types of care specified in the benefits package. It 
can either be mandatory for the consumers to buy a modality of the specified 
benefits package or they may buy such a modality on a voluntary basis. 
Stimulating group insurance may create possibilities for consumers to realize 
cross-subsidies between low-risk and high-risk individuals within a group, 
thereby lowering insurers' incentives to select. However, cross-subsidies 
between consumers that participate in group insurance arrangements and 
consumers that have individual health insurance can not be realized in this way. 
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Part one: 
Conceptual framework 

2.1 Tools for selection 
2. Selection 
In this study selection refers to an insurer's selection of those individuals that it 
expects to be profitable. This chapter first describes the tools that an insurer can 
use for selection (section 2.1) and the negative effects of selection to society 
(sectioil 2.2). The third section places risk sharing between the insurers and the 
regulator in the context of alternative strategies that the regulator can follow to 
prevent selection. Previous research mainly focused on one strategy to prevent 
selection: improving (demographic) capitation payments by adding more and 
bettel: cost predictors. Recent studies on risk adjusting capitation payments will 
be summarized and discussed. Section 2.4 focuses on the measurement of an 
insurer's incentives for selection. In order to study the tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency, it is necessary to have good indicators of an insurer's 
incentives for selection. Section 2.5 contains the conclusions. 
2.1 Tools for selection 
Several studies have described tools that an insurer can use for selection despite 
an open em'olment requirement (e.g. Newhouse, 1982; Luft and Miller, 1988; 
Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992; Newhouse, 1994). Generally a distinction is 
made between selection at enrolment of new members and selection at disenrol-
lment of members. 
At enrolment selection can take place as follows: 
- An insurer can contract with a specialty mix of different quality and reputa-
tion, for instance good paediatricians and obstetricians and less well trained 
cardiologists, oncologists or diabetes-specialists. An insurer can also contract 
with providers who have no interpreters, who practice in 'healthy' districts, and 
whose facilities have no disabled access. 
- An insurer can attract preferred risks by design of insurance modalities. For 
instance, an insurer could offer a modality with a low premium that offers reim-
bursement of the costs of care provided by a small group of selectively con-
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tracted health care providers that are subject to strict utilization management and 
a modality with a high premium that unconditionally reimburses the costs of 
care provided by any provider. 
- A third possibility is the design of supplemental health insurance policies. For 
example extensive maternity benefits might attract relatively healthy families. 
Dental benefits might attract profitable persons if it is found that those who still 
have their teeth use less hospital care than those with dentures. 
- An insurer can attract preferred risks by offering (a package deal of health 
insurance and) other forms of insurance bought mostly by relatively healthy 
people, such as travel insurances. 
- If an insurer uses a sales agent, this person can advise relatively healthy 
people to buy health insurance from the insurer in question and relatively 
unhealthy people to join another insurer. 
- An insurer can attract preferred risks by selective advertising and direct 
mailing. 
- An insurer can attract preferred risks by offering group-contracts to (large) 
employers with relatively healthy employees. 
At disel11'ollment selection can take place as follows: 
- The contracted health care providers can make members leave an insurer. 
Health care providers, who have a contract with an insurer that contains 
elements of financial risk sharing, have similar financial incentives for selection 
as the insurer has. On the one hand providers may have more opportunities for 
selection than insurers because they probably have better information about the 
health status of their patients and because they can use more subtle tools, such 
as keeping a patient in uncertainty about the correct diagnosis, making a patient 
wait for an appointment or in the office, being discourteous or advising a 
patient to consult another provider because that is the one with the best reputa-
tion of treating the disease involved. On the other hand providers may be more 
reluctant than an insurer to perform selection activities because of more 
powerful ethical restraints. 
- An insurer can encourage non-preferred risks to leave by providing them with 
poor service such as delayed payments of reimbursement. 
- An insurer can give their non-preferred risks a 'golden hand shake'. Both an 
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insurer and a member who forms a non-preferred risk might come up with the 
proposal that the member receives a part of the expected future losses from the 
insurer if it chooses another insurer during the next open enrolment period. 
Summarizing an insurer can use several (subtle) tools for selection. The 
negative effects of selection are described in the next section. 
2.2 Negative effects of selection 
The adverse effects of selection to society are threefold. First an insurer has a 
disincentive to be responsive to the preferences of non-preferred risks. As a 
result it may give poor service to chronically ill people and may prefer not to 
contract with providers of care who have the best reputation of treating chronic 
illnesses. This situation gives providers a disincentive for acquiring the reputa-
tion of being the best provider for treating certain chronic illnesses. In the case 
of any risk sharing between an insurer and its contracted health care providers, 
the latter also have financial incentives to attract profitable patients and deter 
patients who generate predictable losses. This may lead to poor provider service 
and poor care for chronically ill people. Thus one possible outcome is poor 
service and poor care for chronically ill. Because insurers are allowed to quote 
a flat-rate additional premium per insurance modality, another outcome is also 
possible. An insurer that specializes in good care for chronically ill has to quote 
a high additional premium. So the other possible outcome is that chronically ill 
have to pay a high additional premium for good care and good service. 
Second selection might be more profitable than improving the efficiency of 
care. So at least in the short run, when an insurer has a restricted amount of 
resources available to invest in cost-reducing activities, it may prefer to invest 
in selection rather than in improving efficiency. In the long run, of course, 
improving efficiency is always rewarding, independent of the level of selection. 
Efficient insurers who, for whatever reason, are reluctant to perform selection 
activities, might lose market share to inefficient insurers that are successful in 
selection. 
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Third while an individual insurer can gain by selection, for society as a whole, 
selection is a zero-sum game. Therefore any resources used in performing 
selection activities can be seen as social welfare losses. 
In sum if selection occurs, it is counterproductive with respect to supposedly 
positive effects of competition, that is, improving the efficiency of care and 
becoming more responsive to consumers' preferences. Therefore it is necessary 
to prevent selection in a regulated competitive individual health insurance 
market. The next section places risk sharing between the insurers and the 
regulator in the context of alternative strategies to prevent selection. 
2.3 Prevention of selection 
The regulator may follow three strategies to prevent selection in a regnlated 
competitive health insurance market with capitation payments that are mainly 
based on demographic variables and with flat-rate additional premiums: 
(I) Using procompetitive regulation. 
(2) Improving the capitation payments. 
(3) Introducing risk sharing between the insurers and the regulator. 
This section discusses the first and second strategy to prevent selection. In the 
remainder of this study, the third strategy is analyzed. 
2.3.1 Procompetitive regulation 
Procompetitive regulation may limit an insurer's tools for selection. Such 
regulation may include the qualification of insurance contracts, ethical codes for 
insurers and monitoring systems. 
Qualification of insurance contracts 
The capitation payments may be given to insurers for qualified insurance 
contracts only. The requirements for qualification of contracts between an 
insurer and its members may relate to the quality of the contracted health care 
providers, the location and accessibility of contracted facilities, procedures for 
making and handling complaints, the contract language and the pricing and 
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selling of contracts. The last point could mean that marketing and enrolment 
efforts should be approved by the regulator. One can imagine the following 
requirements: 
- Health insurance modalities are not allowed to be sold tied-in with supple-
mental health insurance policies, other types of insurance or other products. 
- Direct interaction between an insurer's sales representative and a potential 
member in the enrolment period is not allowed. 
- Members that want to switch from one insurer to another deal with a special 
agency that notifies the insurers of those who have (dis)enroled for the coming 
contract-period. This may prevent efforts such as signing up enrolees at dances 
for seniors. 
Ethical codes for insurers 
Based on government-regulation 01' self-regulation, ethical codes for insurers 
could be developed. Such codes could relate to similar issues as the qualifica-
tion of insurance contracts. Another example could be an agreement on the 
undesirability of 'golden hand shakes' as a way to disenrol high-risk persons. 
Monitoring systems 
The regulator might set up monitoring systems that could signal undesirable 
developments. For instance, the health care use and costs of those who switch 
from one insurer to another could be analyzed. In addition, these people can be 
asked why they switched, how they felt about their former insurer and its con-
tracted health care providers. 
The effects of procompetitive regulation are hard to evaluate. Especially 
because an insurer can use such subtle tools for selection, procompetitive 
regulation by itself can not be considered to be a promising strategy to prevent 
selection. 
2.3.2 Improving the capitation payments 
Previous research mainly focused on improving the capitation payments as a 
way to prevent selection. This subsection first lists the desirable properties of 
(additional) risk adjusters. Second the difference between prospective and retro-
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spective risk adjustment is described. Third recent empirical studies on impro-
ving demographic capitation payments are sununarized and discussed. 
Desirable properties of risk adjusters 
Epstein and Cumella (1988) have described desirable properties of risk 
adjusters. These properties are: 
- validity: the risk adjusters should predict differences in individual (amlllal) 
health care expenditures that are caused by differences in health status; 
- reliability: the risk adjusters should be measured without measurement errors; 
- manipulation: the risk adjusters should not be subject to manipulation by 
insurers, providers or consumers; 
- feasibility: obtaining the risk adjusters should be administratively feasible 
without undue expenditure of time or money; 
- (perverse) incentives: the risk adjusters together with the estimated weights 
should not provide incentives for inefficiency; 
- privacy: the risk adjusters should not conflict with the right of privacy of 
providers and consumers. 
Prospective versus retrospective risk adjusters 
Commonly the term risk adjustment refers to prospective risk adjustment, but 
Luft (1986) and Enthoven (1988) have suggested that risk adjustments may also 
be done retrospectively. Prospective risk adjustment means that only inforIna-
tion that is available at the beginning of the contract period is used to calculate 
the capitation payments. Retrospective risk adjustment means that information 
from the contract period is used also, for instance, whether someone died. (Van 
Vliet and Lamers, 1999). Both methods have in common that the resulting 
capitation payment for an individual is independent of the actual costs of that 
individual in the contract period. The last two decades much research has 
focused on prospective risk adjustment. The reason for focusing on prospective 
and not on retrospective risk adjustment is that capitation payments can be seen 
as (partly) premium-replacing payments and premiums are calculated ex-ante. 
Ellis et al. (1996) compared prospective with retrospective risk adjustment 
models. Both types of models appeared to be equally powerful in predicting 
health care expenditures for subgroups based on health care utilization in the 
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previous years. Thus both types reduce incentives for selection equally well. 
However, retrospective models establish poorer incentives for diagnostic coding 
and appropriate provision of medical care than prospective models. Payment 
weights are generally larger in retrospective models, providing greater incen-
tives for inappropriate coding of diagnoses. Moreover the higher payment 
weights are attached to acute medical conditions, which could potentially be 
harder to audit and verify than chronic conditions. Also certain potentially 
avoidable, but very high-cost, acute diagnoses that are sometimes indicators of 
poor quality of care are paid more in a retrospective model. In short the authors 
concluded that retrospective models may be less appropriate as payment models, 
but particularly useful where payment incentives are of less concern, such as 
physician profiling. Finally one may argue that if a retrospective risk adjustment 
system can be developed and applied in practice, it should be possible to change 
this system into a prospective one. The only requirement seems to be the 
availability of the necessary data for two consecutive years instead of one year 
only. Based on these findings and arguments, the present study does not 
consider retrospective risk adjustment. 
Recellf empirical studies 
Recent empirical sUldies have focused on various risk adjusters that could be 
used in addition to demographic variables. These risk adjusters can be classified 
as follows: measures of prior costs, diagnostic information from either previous 
hospitalizations, previous outpatient care or previously prescribed dl1lgs, health 
survey information and mortality. Next the focus is on the predictive power of 
models that include such risk adjusters in addition to demographic variables in 
comparison with models based on demographic variables only. 
- Prior costs 
Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1992) analyzed a panel data set of some 35,000 
Dutch privately insured individuals of all ages. The R'-value of their capitation 
formula based on age, gender and region was 0.024. Including prior costs as a 
continuous variable as an additional risk adjuster yielded an R'-value of 0.072. 
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Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1993) also estimated a prior cost model where prior 
costs is included as a continuous variable. They used data on some 200,000 
Dutch privately insured individuals of all ages. The prior cost model had a R'-
value of 0.117 which was substantially higher than the R'-valuc of their 
demographic model (R'=0.032). 
Lamers and Van Vliet (1996) estimated a so-called high prior cost model in 
which prior costs are included as a continuous variable, as far as these costs 
exceed a certain high threshold. They used a panel data set of some 50,000 
Dutch sickness fund members. The threshold was chosen as the 99th percentile 
of the empirical distribution of the health care expenditures. This yielded a 
threshold value of about Dfl. 20,000'. The high prior cost model yielded an 
R'-value of 0.093 whereas the demographic model yielded 0.031 only. 
- Diagnostic injormation jrom prior hospitalizations 
Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1993) compared various alternative capitation 
formulae based, among others, on diagnostic information from previous 
hospitalizations. They estimated models that are related as closely as possible to 
the diagnostic cost group model snggested by Ash et a!. (1989), and the 
payment amount for capitation systems model suggested by Anderson et a!. 
(1990). Although the latter model had a higher R'-value (0.083 versus 0.066), 
the authors prefer the first model because both clinical and economical criteria 
are employed in their development. 
Ellis and Ash (1995) examined a number of extensions and refinements to the 
basic diagnostic cost group model developed by Ash et a!. (1989). They 
showed, among other things, that although discretionary hospitalizations ideally 
should not be considered, their exclusion reduced the predictive power of the 
model substantially. Therefore, efforts should be made to select carefully which 
diagnoses are excluded. Depending on the exact definition of high-discretion 
diagnoses, the R'-value may drop, for instance, from 0.052 to 0.038. 
, In t999 one Dutch florin (or guilder) was worth about 0.45 Euw and about 0.5 U.S. 
dollar. 
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Ellis et al. (1996) developed, estimated and evaluated risk-adjustment models 
that utilize diagnostic information from both inpatient and ambulatory claims to 
calculate capitation payments. Hierarchical coexisting condition models achieved 
greater explanatory power than diagnostic cost group models by taking account 
of multiple coexisting conditions. All models predicted medical costs far more 
accurately than the current Adjusted Average Per Capita Costs formula. The R2_ 
values varied between 0.055 and 0.090 in comparison with 0.010 for the 
Adjusted Average Per Capita Costs formula. 
Lamers and Van Vliet (1996) examined whether the incorporation of inpatient 
diagnostic information over a multi-year period can increase the accuracy of a 
demographic capitation formula. They showed that the longer the period over 
which diagnostic information (in the form of diagnostic cost groups) is used for 
calculating capitation payments, the better is the predictive accuracy. For 
example the R'-value of the one-year diagnostic cost group model was 0.064, 
the two-year diagnostic cost group model yielded a value of 0.070, and the 
three-year diagnostic cost group model yielded 0.077. 
- Diagnostic information of prescribed drugs 
Clark et al. (1995) developed a revised version of the chronic disease score, 
covering a wider range of medication than the original chronic disease score 
developed by Von Korff et al. (1992). The chronic disease score is a set of 
dummy variables that indicate a pharmacy prescription during a six month 
period for a medication or medication class representing particular chronic 
diseases. The revised chronic disease score model predicted 10% of the 
variance in total health care expenditures of adults (18 years or older) enroled in 
a health maintenance organiza-
tion in the next six month period. Age and gender alone predicted 3 %. The 
authors also estimated an ambulatory diagnostic group model using clusters of 
ambulatory diagnostic codes formed on the basis of expected resource use. This 
model yielded a R'-value comparable with the revised chronic disease score 
model. 
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Lamers (1999a) also used the revised chronic disease score to incorporate the 
use of prescribed drugs in a capitation formula. The author used a panel data 
set of about 56,000 Dutch sickness fund members and compared the predictive 
accuracy of a demographic model and a so-called pharmacy cost group model. 
The demographic model yielded an R'-value of about 0.04 and the pharmacy 
cost group model about 0.09. She concluded that information on chronic 
conditions derived from claims of prescribed drugs is a promising option for 
improving the capitation payments. 
- Health survey injormation 
Hornbrook and Goodman (1995) examined whether a relatively brief (36 items) 
self-administrated social survey instrument can usefully forecast future real per 
capita health expense using several dimensions of perceived and functional 
health status. The R'-value of their simplified survey/demographic model was 
0.046 whereas the demographic model on its own yielded an R'-value of 0.012. 
The most elaborate survey/demographic model yielded an R'-value of 0.049. 
The authors concluded that self-reported health status is a useful and powerful 
risk measure for adults. 
Gruenberg et al. (1996) used data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey to compare several models predicting Medicare costs. A demographic 
model yielded an R'-value of 0.007. A comprehensive model incorporating 
demographic, diagnostic, perceived-health and disability variables fitted the data 
well for a variety of beneficiary subgroups defined by their health and func-
tional status (R' = 0.060). 
- Mortality 
Van Vliet and Lamers (1999) showed that mortality as additional risk adjuster 
would improve the capitation payments at best marginally. This conclusion 
holds irrespective of the various ways of employing mortality as a risk adjuster: 
at the individual or at the insurer level, prospective or retrospective. This 
finding and practical problems of employing mortality in this context led the 
authors to conclude that further research could better be directed at other risk 
adjusters. 
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Ellis and Ash (1995) showed that mortality rates are highly correlated with 
diagnostic cost groups, with substantially higher rates in higher numbered 
groups. The diagnostic cost group classification thus is picking up a substantial 
proportion of the costs of members who are dying in a given year without 
directly making adjustments based upon death. 
- Combinations of promising risk a(ljllsters 
Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1993) estimated a combination of their diagnostic 
cost group model (R'=0.066) and prior costs model (R'=0.1l7). The combina-
tion yielded an R'-value of 0.12. This finding suggests that diagnostic cost 
groups and prior costs largely capture the same portion of predictable variance 
in health care expenditures. However, looking at the predictable profits and 
losses for different subgroups, the authors concluded that both models are 
inadequate on their own and that diagnostic cost groups as well as prior costs 
seem indispensable for determining adequate capitation payments, provided of 
course that no other predictive information becomes available. 
Clark et al. (1995) showed that the combination of their revised chronic disease 
score model and their ambulatory diagnostic group model has only marginally 
greater predictive power than either one alone. This suggested that the informa-
tion on prescribed drugs used in the chronic disease score and the ambulatory 
diagnoses capture the same part of the predictable variations in future health 
care expenditures. 
Lamers and Van Vliet (1996) estimated a combination of their diagnostic cost 
group model (R' =0.064) and their high prior cost model (R'=0.093). The 
combination yielded an R'-value of 0.105 which again suggests that diagnostic 
cost groups and prior costs largely capture the same part of predictable vari-
ance. 
Weiner et al. (1996) integrated two diagnostic risk adjustment systems. The first 
is the ambulatory care group case-mix measure for use among the non-elderly 
population (Weiner et aI., 1991; Starfield et aI., 1991). This measure is based 
on ambulatory diagnostic groups. The second is the payment amount for 
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capitated sy-stems, an inpatient-oriented risk adjuster for the Medicare aged 
population (Anderson et aI., 1990). The authors developed two new methods to 
calculate capitation payments. Both methods predicted expenditures far better 
than the Adjusted Average Per Capita Costs formula. Their so-called AOG-
MOC model predicted 6.3 percent of total variance at the individual level and 
their so-called AOG-Hosdom model predicted 5.5 percent. The latter model 
included a binary variable (hospital dominance) indicating the presence of one 
or more codes that are serious enough to usually be treated on an inpatient 
basis. The Adjusted Average Per Capita Costs formula predicts 1.0 percent 
only. 
Maximum R' 
Newhouse et al. (1989) and Van Vliet (1992) have estimated that about 20 
percent of the variance in individual annual health care expenditures is predict-
able by means of factors reflected in past spending. Insurers could potentially 
predict somewhat more than the 20 percent, but how much more is unclear. It 
should be noted that, according to the assumptions in the present study, this 
figure is calculated for a general population that is covered for types of acute 
care. However, they are based on data of the 1970s and 1980s. The maximum 
R'-value may have increased since then. More recently, using the same method 
as Van Vliet (1992), Lamers (1999b) found a maximum predictable R'-value of 
0.33. 
Conelusion 
Based on the results with respect to the predictive power, it can be concluded 
that currently the most promising risk adjusters are (high) prior costs and 
diagnostic information from either previous hospitalizations or previously 
prescribed dmgs. 
Implementing capitation payments that are partly based on such risk adjusters 
will substantially increase the predictive power of a demographic capitation 
formula. However, it will still be considerably lower than the estimates of the 
maximum predictive power that could be achieved. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether the application of such improved capitation formulae will reduce the 
insurer's incentives for selection to negligible levels. 
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Discllssion 
Although demographic capitation payments may be improved substantially, in 
many countries it appears to be very difficult to implement such improved 
capitation payments in practice. The only exception is the United States where 
some programs have implemented diagnosis-based risk adjustment and where 
the Medicare program will implement diagnosis-based risk adjustment as of 
January, 2000 to pay at-risk health maintenance organizations for their mem-
bers. An explanation is that in many countries risk adjustment is in a very early 
stage of development and that the most pathbreaking research results are recent. 
Another explanation is the difficulty to obtain the relevant data in practice. 
Nonetheless it can be expected that (recent) research results will be implemented 
in the future. However, there is a growing consensus in the literature that, 
given the crude capitation formulae that are currently applied in practice and the 
awareness that it will be velY complex and expensive to calculate close to 
perfect capitation payments, any capitation formula should be accompanied by 
some form of risk sharing between the insurers and the regulator. Before 
describing forms of risk sharing in the next chapter, the next section describes 
indicators of an insurer's incentives for selection. 
2.4 Measuring incentives for selection 
Section 2.4.1 presents overall indicators of an insurer's incentives for selection. 
These indicators summarize its incentives for selection into one figure and are 
useful under the assumption that an insurer tries to attract all (highly) preferred 
risks and to deter all (highly) non-preferred risks. In section 2.4.2 it is assumed 
that an insurer tries to attract or deter specific subgroups. In that situation for 
each relevant subgroup an indication of an insurer's incentives to select may be 
appropriate. 
2.4.1 Overall indicators 
In the literature various overall indicators of selection have been used: R'-
values, Grouped R'-values, the mean absolute result and the mean absolute 
predicted result. 
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Most studies on risk adjustment report R'-values of different capitation for-
mulae. Let AC be the actual costs of a member, E(AC) the mean actual costs 
and PCR'G the predicted costs by the regulator (i.e. the normative costs). In 
empirical studies usually the mean normative costs equal the mean actual costs. 
An R'-value equals the proportion of predicted variance in health care costs at 
the individual level": 
(2.1) R' = 1 - SS(model)/SS(total) , 
where SS(model) is E(PCREG - AC)' and SS(total) is E(AC - E(AC)'. 
A reason that most studies report R'-values is that they can be compared with 
an estimate of the maximum predictable variance in individual health care 
expenditures. A disadvantage of R'-values is that they are a quadratic function 
of actual profits and losses. Thus large profits and losses are weighted more 
heavily than small profits and losses. However, it is by no means clear that 
insurers weight different values of profits and losses this way. Therefore, a 
better starting point seems to express incentives for selection as a linear 
function of profits and losses. 
Where this study reports R'-values, it is mainly for comparison with other 
studies. 
Ellis and Ash (1995) as well as Rosenkranz and Luft (1997) use so-called 
Grouped R'-values as an indicator of an insurer's incentives for selection. The 
Grouped R'-value is an analog of conventional R'-values. The purpose of this 
indicator is to summarize the predictive power of a capitation formula in terms 
of its ability to predict the costs of groups of enrolees. The Grouped R' for a 
partition of a population into k subgroups is defined as: 
(2.2) Grouped R' = 1 - GSS(model)/GSS(total) , 
where GSS(model) is EJ~I k n;*(PCREG•j - AC/, nj is the number of members in 
(j To simplify the notation a subscript i for each member is omitted. 
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subgroup j, and PCREG,j and AC1 are the mean nonnative costs and the mean 
actual costs of subgroup j respectively, GSS(total) is Ej=l' n/(ACj-E(AC)', 
The prime motivation for this indicator given by Ellis and Ash (1995) is that in 
practice health maintenance organizations receive reimbursement for entire 
groups of enrolees, Rosenkranz and Luft (1997) state that assessing models in 
terms of their ability to predict individual expenditures is inappropriate if one 
needs to measure risk differences only among employers, However, in an 
individual health insurance market, as is assumed in the present study, the 
capitation payments are tied to individuals because enrolment takes place at 
individual level. Therefore the present study does not report any Grouped R'-
values, 
Ettner et al. (1998) use the mean absolute result as an indicator of incentives for 
selection, 
(2,3) MAR = (lin) * EIPCREG-ACi, 
The mean absolute result is a linear function of actual profits and losses 
whereas predictable profits and losses are of interest. As far as we know, a 
lower bound for the mean absolute result has not been estimated, Therefore it is 
difficult to compare and interpret the mean absolute result for different capita-
tion formulae. Where this study presents mean absolute result values, it is 
mainly for comparison with other studies. 
A more useful measure is the mean absolute predicted result. Let PCINS be the 
predicted costs by the insurer for a member. Given the costs predictions of the 
insurer and the regulator, preferred risks can be defined as those for whom the 
predicted costs by the insurer are lower than the predicted costs by the regula-
tor. Others are non-preferred risks. The mean absolute predicted result equals: 
It is assumed that an insurer tries to improve its own cost prediction as much as 
possible. Unless stated otherwise, the predicted costs by the insurer are based 
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on various predictors of health care expenditures that are not included in the 
calculation of the costs predictions of the regulator together with the predictors 
that are included. 
The mean absolute predicted result takes into account all predictable profits and 
losses for an insurer. It could be argued that small predictable profits and losses 
are irrelevant for an insurer because of its costs of selection and the (statistical) 
uncertainties about the net benefits of selection. If this assumption is right, 
small predictable profits and losses could be ignored. Ignoring small predictable 
profits and losses in the calculation of the mean absolute predicted result yields 
a so-called weighted mean absolute predicted result. 
(2.5) WMAPR = (lin) * 1:; w * I PCREG - PCINS I, 
where w equals one for those individuals for whom the predictable profit or loss 
can not be ignored and w equals zero for others. The weighted mean absolute 
predicted result seems an appropriate refinement of the mean absolute predicted 
result under the assumption that an insurer tries to attract highly preferred risks 
and to deter highly non-preferred risks. 
In a theoretical analysis, Newhouse et al. (1989) have shown that there is a 
nonlinear relation. between the predicted variance by the regulator and the mean 
absolute predicted result. Based on this finding, Newhouse (1996) concludes 
that: ' the formula for adjusting for heterogeneity must be close to perfect to 
reduce greatly the incentives to select'. The appendix of this chapter extends the 
theoretical analyses of Newhouse et al. (1989) by deriving a relation between 
the R' of the regulator and the weighted mean absolute predicted result. Then it 
presents an application for a general popUlation. The results suggest that, 
without ignoring small predictable profits and losses, the problem of selection is 
overestimated, especially under relatively good capitation formulae. An empiri-
cal analysis supported this conclusion (see also chapter eight of this study, and 
Van Barneveld et aI., 1999a). 
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An alternative way to calculate the mean absolute predicted result is given in 
Equation (2.6): 
(2.6)MAPR = f,*IMPR,! + f,*IMPR21, 
where f, is the fraction preferred risks, f2 is the fraction non-preferred risks and 
MPR, is the mean predicted result for the preferred risks and MPR2 is the mean 
result for the non-preferred risks. 
In the case that the mean predicted result for both subgroups equal the mean 
actual result, this may be written as: 
(2.7) MAPR = f, * I MRd + f2* I MR21. 
where f, and f2 are defined similar as above and MR, (MR2) is the mean actual 
result for the group of preferred (non-preferred) risks. If risk sharing is used as 
a supplement to capitation payments, calculating the mean absolute predicted 
result is not straightforward. As an overall indicator for an insurer's incentives 
for selection we will then use Equation (2.7). Ignoring small predictable profits 
and losses in the case of risk sharing can be done by dividing the members into 
highly preferred risks, highly non-preferred risks and others. Subsequently, the 
index one applies to the group of highly preferred risks and the index two to the 
group of highly non-preferred risks. 
2.4.2 Specific indicators 
The selection activities of an insurer may focus on various subgroups. Sub-
groups with a good socia-economic status might be attracted via the design of 
(supplemental) health insurance policies, a package deal of health insurance and 
other products, selective advertising and direct mailing. Therefore it seems 
relevant to distinguish some subgroups based on socio-economic variables such 
as education, profession, income, family composition and nationality. Further-
more it seems relevant to distinguish subgroups on the basis of indicators of 
'prior use' and 'prior costs' which are likely to be available in the administra-
tive data of an insurer. Based on this kind of information, an insurer and/or its 
contracted health care providers may provide non-preferred risks with poor 
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quality/service, thereby encouraging them to disenrol. For other non-preferred 
individuals enrolment can be discouraged by the qualitylreputation of the insurer 
and/or its contracted health care providers. 
In several studies so-called predictive ratios (PR) are used as an indicator of an 
insurer's incentives for selection with respect to various subgroups (e.g. Ellis et 
aI., 1996; Weiner et aI., 1996). The predictive ratio equals the mean normative 
costs of a subgroup divided by the mean actual costs of this subgroup. A 
predictive ratio greater than one means that the subgroup constitutes preferred 
risks because the normative costs are higher than the actual costs. 
Similarly, a predictive ratio smaller than one means that the subgroup consti-
tutes non-preferred risks. Other studies used so-called cost ratios (CR) as 
indicators of incentives for selection. A cost ratio equals the inverse of the 
predictive ratio (e.g. Van Vliet and Van de Ven, 1992; Lamers and Van Vliet, 
1996). 
Because the normative costs now appear in the denominator of the ratio, it is 
difficult to interpret the results when comparing different capitation formulae. 
The present study simply uses the mean result for relevant subgroups (MR;) as 
indicator of an insurer's incentives to select: 
(2.10) MR j = ACj - PCREa .j . 
In the case of risk sharing, the normative costs are replaced by the normative 
costs plus the insurer's risk sharing reimbursement minus the insurer's price of 
the risk sharing. 
An interesting question is: how does the regulator value an overall reduction of 
predictable profits and losses versus a selective reduction of certain predictable 
36 
2.4 Measuring incentives for selection 
profits andlor losses? Looking at the negative effects of selection, one could 
argue that it is more important to reduce the relatively high predictable losses 
for the relatively small group of non-preferred risks than to reduce the relatively 
small predictable profits for the relatively large group of preferred risks. Given 
relatively high predictable losses, an insurer has strong disincentives to improve 
efficiency for types of care that are often used by chronically ill and to be 
responsive to their preferences. Because all insurers have this disincentive, the 
purpose of market-oriented health care reforms is endangered directly. 
Given relatively small predictable profits, an insurer has incentives to attract 
healthy individuals and to provide them with good service. It is mainly the 
social welfare losses that is the negative effect in this situation. This effect only 
indirectly endangers the purpose of market-oriented health care reforms. 
Therefore, a selective reduction of the largest predictable losses might be more 
important from the regulator's point of view than an overall reduction of all 
predictable profits and losses. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the problem of preferred risk selection in a 
regulated competitive individual health insurance market. The following issues 
have been addressed: an insurer's tools for selection; the adverse effects of 
selection to society; the regulator's options to prevent selection and the mea-
surement of an insurer's incentives for selection. 
An insurer can use many (subtle) tools for selection at enrolment of new 
members as well as at disenrolhnent of members. Tools for selection include: 
the service of an insurer, the quality, reputation and service of its contracted 
health care providers, the design of insurance modalities as well as of supple-
mental health insurance policies, selective advertising and direct mailing. 
The adverse effects of selection to society are threefold. First for chronically ill, 
the access to good health care may be hindered. Second efficient insurers might 
lose market share to inefficient insurers. Third any resourCes used in perform-
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ing selection can be seen as social welfare losses. Therefore the prevention of 
selection is critical to the success of a regulated competitive individual health 
insurance market. 
The regulator may follow three strategies to prevent selection if the capitation 
payments are based on demographic variables only and the additional premiums 
are required to be the same for each member that chooses the same insurance 
modality. First the regulator may use forms of procompetitive regulation such 
as the qualification of insurance contracts, developing ethical codes for insurers 
and developing monitoring systems that could signal undesirable developments. 
Given the many (subtle) tools that an insurer can use for selection, one may 
wonder whether procompetitive regulation on its own is a promising strategy to 
prevent selection. 
Second the regulator can try to improve the demographic capitation formula. 
Many (recent) studies have shown that demographic capitation payments can be 
improved substantially. However, the implementation of such improved capita-
tion payments appears to be very difficult. Recent empirical studies showed that 
currently the most promising risk adjusters are: measures of prior costs and 
diagnostic information from either previous hospitalizations or previously pre-
scribed drugs. Although the application of capitation formulae that are partly 
based on this type of information may reduce an insurer's incentives for 
selection substantially in comparison with a demographic capitation formula, 
there is a growing consensus in the literature that any capitation formula should 
be accompanied by some form of risk sharing. 
Finally the regulator may introduce risk sharing between the insurers and the 
regulator as a supplement to the capitation payments. In the present study this 
approach will be analyzed. The next chapter focuses on the description of 
various forms of risk sharing. 
In the literature various overall indicators of incentives for selection have been 
used: R'-values, Grouped R'-values, the mean absolute result and the mean 
absolute predicted result. It has been argued that the latter indicator is more 
lIseful than the others. Because the Grouped R'-value was developed for 
situations that involve group insurance, this indicator will not be used in the 
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present study. R'-values and the mean absolute result are used mainly for 
comparison with other stuclies. As a refinement of the mean absolute predicted 
result, it was suggested to ignore the small predictable profits and losses. These 
may be irrelevant for an insurer because it has to take into account its costs of 
selection and the (statistical) uncertainties about the net benefits of selection. If 
this is right, the so-called weighted mean absolute predicted result is a better 
indicator than the mean absolute predicted result. 
Newhouse et al. (1989) have shown that there is a nonlinear relation between 
the R'-value and the mean absolute preclicted result and that the nonlinearity is 
in the wrong direction from the regulator's point of view. Based on this 
theoretical finding, Newhouse (1996) concluded: 'the formula for adjusting for 
heterogeneity must be close to perfect to reduce greatly the incentives to select'. 
In the appendix of this chapter, the theoretical analysis has been extended to a 
relation between the R' and the weighted mean absolute predicted result. An 
application to a general population suggested that, without ignoring small 
predictable profits and losses, the problem of selection is overestimated, 
especially in the case of relatively good capitation formulae. Thus different 
assumptions about the relevance of small predictable profits and losses are likely 
to lead to different judgements of relatively good capitation formulae, such as 
those partly based on prior costs, on diagnostic information from previous 
hospitalizations or on diagnostic information from previously prescribed drugs. 
The analysis also suggested that this is not the case for relatively crude capita-
tion formulae such as those based on demographic variables only. For such 
capitation formulae the incentives for selection are large irrespective of the 
relevance of small predictable profits and losses for selection. 
Besides overall indicators of an insurer's incentives for selection, the present 
study uses the mean result for various subgroups as an indicator of an insurer's 
incentives to select such subgroups. 
All indicalOrs of an insurer's incentives for selection are based on the gross 
potential benefits of selection. Of course, the actual selection activities may also 
be influenced by other factors such as: the market share and working area of an 
insurer, the level of competition in the health insurance market and the market 
for health care provision, the monitoring activities of the regulator and the role 
of employers. 
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Suppose that the regulator and an insurer use equation (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) 
respectively to calculate a cost prediction for each individual: 
(A.2.1) 10g(AC) = X,*f'l,+E, 
(A.2.2) 10g(AC) = X,*f'l,+X,*{3,+E, 
where AC is lognormally distributed health care expenditures, X, contains the 
risk adjusters included in the capitation formula by the regulator, X, represents 
additional risk factors used by the insurer, and E, and E, are normally distributed 
error terms with mean zero. The vectors X, and X, are assumed to be 
orthogonal and X, *{3, and X, *f'l, have means I', and 0 and standard deviations a, 
and a, respectively. Define a' = a,'+a,'+a,' (a3' is the variance of E,). 
The unconditional expectation of the actual costs equals: 
(A.2.3) E(AC) = exp(I', +0,5*a'). 
The predicted costs for an individual with characteristics X, and X, equal 
(A.2.4) for the regulator and (A.2.5) for the insurer respectively. 
(A.2.4) PCREG = E(ACI X,) = exp(X,*f'l, +0,5*(a,' + a,')). 
(A.2.5) PCINS = E(AClX,; X,) = exp(X,*f'l,+X,*{3,+O,5*a,'J. 
Given the fraction of predicted variance of both equations at the linear level 
(R'REG, R"NS)' and the coefficient of variation (cv), Van Vliet (1994) showed 
that a,' can be calculated as: 
(A.2.6) a,' = 10g[(R'INs*cv'+ i)/(R'REG*CV'+ i)]. 
The insurer expects a profit for a certain individual of more than 0', % of its 
4i 
Appendix chapter 2 
predicted costs (PCINS) if1: 
Thus: [E(AC/X,)-E(ACjXI; X,)]/E(ACjX,; X,) > <x/IOO, which implies: 
Using equation (A.2.4) and (A.2.5), this implies: 
X, *(3, < O.5*lT,' + log(oI)' 
The proportion of individuals for whom the insurer expects a profit of more 
than <XI % of their predicted costs (PCINS) is therefore given by: 
P«X, *(3,)/lT, < O.5*lT, + log(oI)/a,) = 4>(O.5*lT, + log(oI)/a,). 
The expected costs (given XI and X,) for these profitable individuals can be 
calculated as: 
exp(I'I +O.5*(aI' +a3'))*E(exp(X, *{3,/ (X, *(3,)/lT, < O.5*a, + log(o,)/a,) = 
exp(I'I +O.5*(aI' +IT/))*exp(O.5*a,')* 
4>( -O.5*lT, + log(oI)/a,)/4>(O.5*lT, + log(oI)/a,) = 
E(AC)*4>( -O.5*a, + log(oI)/a,)/4>(O.5*a, + log(oI)/lT,). 
7 For the special case that <1] and (xz both are zero, this analysis has been presented by Van 
Vliel in Ihe appendix of Van de Ven el al. (1994). 
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The second equal-sign is based on the formula for expectations of truncated 
lognonnals (Johnson and Katz, 1970, p. 129). 
The mean predictable profit per individual of this subgroup equals: 
E(AC)*[I - <1.>( -0.5*a, + log(o,)la,)/<I.>(0.5*a, + 10g(0,)la, )] 
because the average nonnative costs for this group equals the mean actual costs. 
This is due to the assumption that X, and X, are orthogonal, thus the profitable 
individuals constitute a representative sample of the total population with respect 
to the variables included in X,. 
In a similar way the following formulae with respect to those individuals for 
whom the insurer expects a loss of more than a, % of their predicted costs 
(PCINs) can be derived: 
(PC'NS-PCREG)/PCINs >a,1100 where 0< =a,< 100, 
[E(AqX,;X,)-E(ACIX,)]/E(Aqx,;X,) > a,/lOO which implies: 
E(AqX,;X,) > E(ACIX,)*o" where 0, = 100/(100-a,). 
(A.2.9) PUNPROF(R"NS;R'REG;a,) = <1.>( - 0.5*a, -log(o,)la,) 
(A.2.1O) MPL(R"NS;R'REG;a,) = 
E(AC)*[<I.>(0.5*a, -log(o,)la,)/<I.>( -0.5*a, -log(o,)la,) -I] 
Given R"NS, R'REG' a, and a" the weighted mean absolute predicted result 
equals: 
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{E(AC)*[<I>(0.5*O',+log(oI)/O") + <I>(0.5*O',-log(oI)/O") - 1] + 
E(AC)*[ <1>(0.5*0', + log(o,)/O',) + <1>(0.5*0', -log(o,)/O',) - III 
E(AC) * ([<I>(0.5*O',+log(oI)/O") + <I>(0.5*O',-log(OI)/O") + 
<1>(0.5*0', + log(o,)/O',) + <1>(0.5*0', -log(o,)/O',) - 2]}. 
The mean absolute predicted result equals: 
E(AC)*{ 4*<1>(0,5*0',) - 2}. 
An application of this theoretical analysis is presented in Figlll'e A.2.1. In this 
example the mean costs are Dfl. 2,000 which is about the mean cost pel' 
member in the Dutch public health insurance market. The coefficient of 
variation is four, which value has been found in data sets containing health care 
expenditures of Dutch sickness fund members (Lamers and Van Vliet, 1996, 
Van Barneveld et a!., 1996). The R'-value of the insurer is assumed to be 0.20. 
The R'-value of the regulator is varied between 0 and 0.208• By changing the 
relevant parameters in the analysis, one can apply it to other settings. The 
mean, the coefficient of variation and the predictability of health care expendi-
tures may depend heavily on the benefits package, the population that is 
included, and the contract period. Figure A.2.1 presents the (weighted) mean 
absolute result as a function of the R'-value of the regulator. The relation is 
nonlinear and the nonlinearity is in the wrong direction from the regulator'S 
point of view (Newhouse, 1994). The first improvements in the capitation 
8 This analysis has also been perfOlmed with the R2-value of the insurer equal to 0.25. This 
sensivity analysis yielded similar results, 
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(Weighted) mean absolute predicted result 
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Figure A.2.1. The relation between the R'-valne of the regulator and the 
(weighted) mean absolute predicted result (R'rNs=O.2) 
formula lead to relatively small reductions in the mean absolute predicted result 
whereas later improvements lead to relatively large reductions. For example, 
the first five percentage points increase in the R2-value of the regulator lead to a 
reduction of the mean absolute predicted result from about Of!. 1,800 to about 
Of!. 1,440, whereas the last five percentage points increase in R2-value lead to 
a reduction from about Of!. 720 to Of!. O. Of course, from the regulator's point 
of view, the opposite would be preferable. 
If the regulator uses a capitation formula based on demographic variables only, 
the fraction predicted variance will be about 0.03 [Van Vliet and Van de Ven 
1993; Lamers and Van Vliet 1996]. This leads to a reduction of the mean 
absolute predicted result to about Of!. 1,530 only. Globally speaking, in 
comparison with f!at capitation payments, demographic capitation payments 
reduce incentives for cream skimming by 15%. Thus Figure A.2.1 confirms 
that demographic capitation formulae leave ample room for selection. 
Adding diagnostic information from hospitalizations in the previous year as a 
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risk adjuster generally doubles the R'-value [Van Vliet and Van de Ven 1993; 
Lamers and Van Vliet 1996]. However, because of the nonlinearity, the 
reduction of the mean absolute predicted result is not twice as much. Including 
diagnostic information from hospitalizations of the previous year (R' ~ 0.06) 
leads to a reduction of the mean absolute predicted result to about Oft. 1,350. 
Addition of the risk adjuster '(high) prior costs' next to demographic variables 
could increase the fraction of explained variance of the capitation formula to 
about 0.1 [Van Vliet and Van de Ven 1993; Lamers and Van Vliet 1996]. In 
Pigure A.2.1, this leads to a reduction of the mean absolute predicted result to 
about Oft. 1,100. 
Because of the nonlinearity, even with the application of 'near-perfect' capita-
tion payments, the gross revenues of selection might still be high. In Pigure 
A.2.1, the application of a capitation formula with an R'-value of, say, 0.18 
leads to a reduction of the mean absolute predicted result to about Ofl. 360. 
This has led Newhouse [1996] to conclude that: 'the formula for adjusting for 
heterogeneity must be close to 'perfect' to reduce greatly the incentives to 
select' . 
Pigure A.2.1 also presents the weighted mean absolute predicted result with 0'1 
and 0', both 33 %. The Figure shows that the relation between the R2-value of 
the regulator and the weighted mean absolute predicted result is less nonlinear 
than the relationship between the R'-value of the regulator and the mean 
absolute predicted. result9. Given the choice that 0'1 and 0', are both equal to 
33 %, the relation does not start in the point (0; 1,800) but in the point (0; 
1,700). About four percent of the predictable profits and losses are ignored. 
Then an increase in the R'-value of the regulator further reduces the weighted 
mean absolute predicted result and, in this example, the relation is almost 
linear. It follows that with the mean absolute predicted result, the extent of the 
selection problem might be overestimated, especially in the case of relatively 
high values of the fraction predicted variance by the regulator. POl' instance, if 
the R'-value of the regulator would be 0.15, then under this example, the 
f) In an additional analysis not presented here, the change in the fOIDI of the relationship 
appeared to be mainly caused by the introduction of (X2' That is the fact that small predictable 
losses for non-preferred risks arc ignored. 
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weighted mean absolute predicted result is reduced to about Df]. 540 whereas 
the mean absolute predicted result reduces to Df]. 720 only. If the first value is 
right, the mean absolute predicted result yields an overestimation of more than 
30%. 
Of course, it is not exactly clear what the best choices for (x, and (x, are. 
However, the nonlinearity that Newhouse [1996] mentions, is based on the 
assumption that (x, and (x, both are zero. This choice appears to lead to an 
overestimation of the selection problem especially in the case of capitation 
formula with high R'-values. 
Although this theoretical analysis is useful to get a quick indication of the 
(weighted) mean absolute predicted result under different capitation formulae, it 
also has some drawbacks. First, given the assumptions, there is a unique 
relationship between the (weighted) mean absolute predicted result and the R'-
value of the regulator. In practice, the assumptions may not hold. In particular 
the assumption of normally distributed error terms in equations (A.2.1) and 
(A.2.2) may be violated. Second, large predictable profits or losses can only be 
defined in relative terms (i.e those predictable profits or losses that exceed a 
certain percentage of the predicted costs by the insurer). It is not possible to 
define large predictable profits or losses in absolute terms. These drawbacks 
have motivated us to perform an empirical analysis as well. The results of this 
empirical analysis supported the conclusion of the theoretical analysis (see 
chapter eight of this study, and Van Barneveld et aI., 1999a). 
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3. Forms of risk sharing 
The previous chapter argued that the combination of demographic capitation 
payments alld flat-rate additional premiums is likely to lead to selection prob-
lems. If - for whatever reason - improving demographic capitation payments is 
impossible, another way to reduce the insurer's incentives for selection is to 
supplement such capitation payments with a form of risk sharing between the 
insurers and the regulator. Risk sharing implies that the insurers are 
retrospectively reimbursed by the regulator for some expenditures of some of 
their members. This chapter first describes forms of risk sharing that have been 
suggested in the literature and two studies that have analyzed a certain form of 
risk sharing empirically. Then a conceptual framework for the description of 
forms of risk sharing is developed. The third section presents four forms of risk 
sharing that will be analyzed further in this study. This is followed by a brief 
description of the differences between risk sharing and capitation. Finally some 
conclusions are drawn. 
3.1 Previous studies 
3.1.1 Suggested forms of risk sharing 
Newhouse (1986) and Newhouse et al. (1989) argued that besides trying to 
improve capitation formulae, consideration should be given to a blend of 
capitation with actual costs. For example, an insurer might receive three-
quarters of its nonnative costs while one-quarter of its payments might be based 
on its actual costs. The author left for funu'e research the topic of determining 
optimal weights in this blend. This topic is addressed in chapter five of the 
present study. 
As a refinement the author(s) suggested that the weight on actual costs may 
vary between the members of an insurer. For example a higher weight on actual 
costs for those members in risk-groups with higher variances in health care 
expenditures. 
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In a recent paper Newhouse (1996) argues that the essence of the selection-
efficiency tradeoff is captured by the costs the insurer bears at the time of use 
or the so-called amount of 'supply-side cost sharing'. In its simplest form 
supply-side cost sharing is a linear combination of fee-far-service ('no supplier 
cost sharing') and capitation pricing ('full supplier cost sharing'), but non-linear 
schemes are possible too. The author argues that neither corner solution is 
likely to be optimal. 
Gruenberg et al. (1986) described various pncmg strategies for capitated 
delivery systems. One option they mentioned is to introduce an amount of risk 
sharing between the at-risk health maintenance organizations and the Health 
Care Financing Administration. The latter can be seen as the regulator. Some 
forms of risk sharing deal directly with the aggregate costs of insurers. In the 
reinsurance literature such a mechanism is known as stop-loss (Bovbjerg, 1992). 
An alternative is the use of an individual stop-loss approach. Insurers would be 
at risk for a small percentage of those expenditures that exceed the threshold, in 
order to maintain some incentives for efficiency. In the reinsurance literature an 
individual stop-loss arrangement is known as excess-of-loss (Bovbjerg, 1992). 
Wallack et al. (1988) elaborated on a so-called risk-corridor approach and an 
individual outlier approach. The risk corridor concept is quite flexible. It would 
modify payments to an insurer by an amount that depends upon whether 
aggregate costs (for all 6r for a subset of services) lie outside a specified 
corridor. The size of the corridor and the division of profits and losses both 
inside and outside the corridor can be varied. An extreme example of the risk 
corridor approach would be achieved when the size of the corridor is brought to 
zero, in which case all profits and losses are shared according to some specified 
formula. The establishment of a risk corridor for hospital service costs and 
paying for other services prospectively was presented as a prototype of this 
form of risk sharing. 
The outlier approach would reimburse insurers for some portion of individuals' 
costs above a cost outlier threshold, or after a specified medical event (for 
instance a stroke). The latter example would create a so-called 'condition-
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specific' risk sharing arrangement'o. As a prototype of their outlier approach, 
the authors presented the following variant: pay 80 percent of an individual's 
costs for hospital care that exceed $5,000 (or about ten hospital days) per year. 
Other services and administrative functions would remain under capitation. 
Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992) suggested to let an insurer itself decide 
within certain boundaries - for which members, or for which types of care, or 
to what extent it wants to share the risk with the regulator. According to the 
authors, the refusals of potential high risk members and the exclusions of pre-
existing medical conditions, as occurring in a free market for health insurance, 
can be simulated by allowing an insurer to decide himself which risks it wants 
to insure and to what extent. 
Van de Ven et al. (1994) took up the suggestion to let an insurer itself decide 
for which members it wants to share the risk with the regulator. They described 
a system of risk sharing for high-risks, called "mandatory community-rated 
high-risk pooling". Under this system each insurer would be allowed to share 
all (or some) expenditures of a specified fraction of its members with the 
regulator. To finance the arrangement, a contribution should be paid that 
depends only on the number of members. In advance of each year the insurers 
inform the regulator which of their members will be designated for risk sharing 
that year. This group of members may change every year. The payments that an 
insurer receives for these members may take several forms. It could apply to 
certain costs above a threshold, or to a certain percentage of those costs. 
An alternative suggestion was to share all (or some) expenditures for, say, the 
one percent members with the highest costs. 
The conclusion is that various forms of risk sharing have been suggested for 
quite some time now, and that risk sharing can take many forms. 
10 Condition-specific risk sharing differs slightly from retrospective capitation payments (see 
chapter two). 
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3.1.2 Empil'ical results 
Beebe (1992) examined a payment system that combines the Adjusted Average 
Pcr Capita Costs-formula with an individual outlier payment mechanism as 
suggested by Gruenberg et al. (1986)". The outlier risk sharing proposal 
would establish a risk pool funded by an amount equal to two percent of the 
current payments. This would be the cost equivalent of raising payments from 
95 percent of the Adjusted Average Per Capita Costs to 97 percent. Thus the 
proposal is not budget-neutral from the regulator's point of view. The regulator 
would pay 45 percent of the cost in excess of $50,000 for each enrolee whose 
costs exceed that amount. The remaining 55 percent of the costs above $50,000 
would be borne by the health maintenance organization so that there would 
remain an incentive for efficiency. All other aspects of the current system 
would remain unchanged. The author simulated the effect of this specific 
proposal and variations of it on program costs relative to the current costs. It 
was concluded that an outlier risk sharing method for health maintenance 
organizations could provide some protection against the risk of an /lnexpectedly 
high proportion of high-cost users at a relatively modest cost. Unfortunately an 
indication of the reduction of the incentives for selection was not given. A 
problem mentioned is that health maintenance organizations would have to 
install systems that would assign costs to ambulatory care, inpatient physician 
care, and, possibly, to hospital care in some cases. To alleviate data problems it 
is suggested to share the risk ~f specific services for which data are more 
readily available, such as hospital stays. These could be covered at something 
greater than the 45 percent rate and provide the same overall degree of protec-
tion. 
Van Barneveld et al. (1996) analyzed a system of risk sharing for high-risks as 
suggested by Van de Ven et al. (1994). We investigated two aspects of the 
addition of this form of risk sharing to age/sex-based capitation payments. First 
we calculated the percentage of the total costs that would be shared between the 
II More recently Ellis et al. (1996) and Weiner et al. (1996) have also analyzed outlier risk 
sharing. However, the main focus of these studies was on diagnosis-based risk adjustment (see 
chapter two). 
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insurers and the regulator. The higher this percentage, the lower the incentives 
for efficiency in general. Second we investigated to what extent the addition of 
risk sharing for high-risks reduces predictable profits and losses for various 
non-random subgroups. This gave an indication as to what extent it reduces the 
incentives for selection. We concluded that sharing the risk of less than 4% of 
the members would be most meaningful. Such a level of risk sharing for high-
risks as a supplement to age/sex-based capitation payments may substantially 
reduce the incentives for selection. Without risk sharing for high-risks, the 
maximum predictable losses per member for the analyzed subgroups with at 
least I % of the members was about Dfl. 14,000. Risk sharing for high-risks for 
2 % and 4 % of the members reduced this loss by 67 % and 80% respectively. 
An important question is whether the reduction of the incentives for selection 
comes at the expense of substantially reduced incentives for effiCiency. It seems 
that this is not the case, because an insurer remains at risk for the costs of those 
persons with unpredictable high expenditures - which comprise the majority of 
all high costs - and because the group of members for whom the risk is shared 
is relatively small. In our analysis, the insurers remained fully at risk for at 
least 75 % of their expenditures on average. Based on these findings we con-
cluded that risk sharing for high-risks is a promising supplement to capi.tation 
payments. 
Sununarizing two forms of risk sharing have been analyzed empirically. Beebe 
(1992) has analyzed outlier risk sharing in the context of the Medicare program 
in the United States. Van Barneveld et al. (1996) have analyzed risk sharing for 
high-risks in the context of the Dutch public health insurance market. A 
systematic comparison of the consequences of various forms of risk sharing in a 
regulated competitive individual health insurance market has not yet been 
performed. The next section describes potential forms risk sharing. 
3.2. Potential forms of risk sharing 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the essential elements of risk sharing 
and the choices that can be made. Because risk sharing can be seen as a 
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mandatory reinsurance program for the insurers in which the regulator acts as 
the reinsurer, the essential elements of risk sharing are similar to those of a 
reinsurance contract (see e.g. Carter, 1979). Let us assume that the period to 
which the risk sharing applies is one year for all members for whom some risk 
is shared. Besides this period, Table 3.1 presents four other essential elements 
(Van Barneveld et a\., 1999b). 
Table 3.1 Foul' essential elements of a form of risk sharing 
(I) The group of members for whom some risk is shared 
(2) The types of care for which the risk is shared 
(3) The extent of the risk that is shared 
(4) The price that insurers have to pay to share some risk 
3.2.1 The members 
If the members for whom some risk is shared are known in advance of the 
contract year, we can speak of prmpective risk sharing. If these members 
become known during the contract year, the risk sharing can be called retro-
spective. An extreme case is risk sharing for all members. Then the distinction 
between prospective risk sharing and retrospective risk sharing is irrelevant. 
In the case of prospective risk sharing, the regulator may stipulate for which 
members some risk will be shared, for instance members with a certain medical 
condition (AIDS patients, cancer patients, transplantation patients) or with high 
prior costs. This can be called prospective cOlldition-specific risk sharing. Under 
this form of risk sharing the percentage of members for whom some risk is 
shared will probably not be the same for all insurers. Another possibility is that 
an insurer is free to select a fixed percentage of its members whose costs then 
are (partially) shared. This form of risk sharing will be referred to as risk 
sharillg for high-risks (RSHR). With risk sharing for high-risks, the fraction of 
members for whom some risk is shared may be set the same for each insurer or 
it may vary over the insurers (Van Barneveld et a\., 1996). In the latter case, 
the percentage would depend, preferably, on the risk that an insurer represents 
as far as this risk is not reflected in the capitation payments. However, the 
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option of varying percentages of designated members will not be explored in the 
empirical analysis because the present study focuses on the insurers' incentives 
for selection and not on the consequences of risk sharing at insurer level. 
Moreover it seems likely that the question of how to differentiate the percen-
tages of members that insurers are allowed to designate will be difficult to 
answer. 
An alternative for prospective risk sharing can be retrospective risk sharing. As 
with prospective risk sharing, the regulator may stipulate which members are 
eligible for risk sharing, for instance members that have or develop a certain 
(medical) condition in the contract year [(new) AIDS patients, (new) cancer 
patients, (new) transplantation patients] or members who died during the year. 
This can be called a retrospective condition-specific risk sharing. Again the 
regulator can also leave it up to the insurers to select a fixed percentage of their 
members for risk sharing. This type of retrospeetive risk sharing will be called 
risk sharing for high-costs (RSHC). As with risk sharing for high-risks, it is 
possible to differentiate the percentage of members for whom some risk is 
shared per insurer which could improve the effects of risk sharing at insurer 
level. However, for the same reasons as mentioned above with respect to risk 
sharing for high-risks, this form of risk sharing for high-costs will not be 
explored in the empirical analysis. 
Condition-specific risk sharing, whether prospective or retrospective, requires a 
list of (medical) conditions that make members eligible for risk sharing. It is 
likely that such forms of risk sharing create discussions over which (medical) 
conditions make members eligible for risk sharing (Swartz, 1995). Condition-
specific risk sharing could conflict with privacy rights of members and there 
may be a possibility of manipulation, namely by 'inflating' diagnoses to make 
members eligible for risk sharing (Swartz, 1995). The extent of the latter 
problem can be mitigated by using only (medical) conditions with relatively low 
discretion as well as a good monitoring system". 
Risk sharing for high-risks and risk sharing for high-costs can be seen as 
12 DisclIssions on condition-specific risk sharing are similar to those on diagnosis-based risk 
adjustment. 
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alternatives for prospective and retrospective condition-specific risk sharing 
respectively. Under risk sharing for high-risks and for high-costs, it is up to the 
insurers themselves to decide for which of their members they want to share 
some risk, so discussions over eligibility can be avoided. The regulator only has 
to specify the percentage of members that each insurer is allowed to designate 
for risk sharing. Given a certain average percentage of designated members per 
insurer, it could be that the group of members for whom some risk is shared 
under risk sharing for high-risks is similar to the group of members under 
prospective condition-specific risk sharing. In that case the insurers' incentives 
for selection as well as for efficiency will be similar. The same holds for risk 
sharing for high-costs in comparison with retrospective condition-specific risk 
sharing. 
For the reasons mentioned above, it can be concluded that risk sharing for high-
risks and risk sharing for high-costs have better administrative feasibility and 
are less vulnerable to manipulation than condition-specific risk sharing, while 
the consequences for the insurers' incentives for selection and efficiency can be 
similar. Therefore condition-specific risk sharing will not be analyzed empirical-
ly in the second part of the study. 
3.2.2 The types of care 
The types of care for which the risk is shared could be set the same for each 
member that is designated or it could vary between these members (Wallack et 
a!., 1988). In the latter case, the regulator has to stipulate which types of care 
can be distinguished in the risk sharing and the insurers have to register their 
(designated) members' expenditures per type of care. Fm1hermore the regulator 
will have to determine the price of risk sharing that an insurer has to pay, for 
each of these different types of care. 
If insurers would be allowed to decide themselves for which types of care the 
risk is shared, prospective risk sharing might simulate - to some extent - the 
exclusion of pre-existing medical conditions. However, a distinction between 
several types of care within the specified benefits package does not seem to go 
well with a flexible description of the benefits package. This is a major element 
of many competitive health care reforms and should provide insurers with tools 
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for cost-effective substitution of care. A form of risk sharing that makes a 
distinction between several types of care might stimulate undesirable substitution 
of care. This could happen if the risk for relatively expensive types of care is 
shared and the risk for relatively inexpensive types of care is not. Furthermore 
such a form of risk sharing might be ' gamed' by the insurers if they register 
health care expenditures of one type of care (for which expenditures are shared) 
under another type of care (for which expenditures are not shared). In sum risk 
sharing with a distinction between several types of care within the specified 
benefits package may provide perverse incentives to insurers, and will be rather 
difficult to register and to monitor. For these reasons the remainder of this 
study assumes that the risk sharing applies to all types of care within the 
specified benefits packageIJ. If the risk for all types of care within the spec-
ified benefits package is shared, risk sharing for high-risks might simulate - to a 
certain extent - the refusals to sell insurance to high-risk applicants for whom an 
appropriate premium (capitation payment) can not be calculated. 
3.2.3 The extent 
The extent of risk sharing may be the same for all members that are designated 
for it or it may vary between these members (Newhouse, 1986). In the latter 
case it may be the regulator that decides the extent of risk sharing or it can be 
left to the insurers themselves. Such flexible forms of risk sharing would 
require that the regulator determines a price for every possible extent of risk 
sharing. This might be a difficult task. For this reason it is assumed that the 
extent of risk sharing is the same for all members for whom some risk is 
shared. 
The risk sharing applies to an individual level and not to an aggregate level 
(Gruenberg et a/., 1986). Risk sharing on an aggregate level could resemble 
stop-loss reinsurance. This form of risk sharing would primarily concern the 
aggregate financial result of insurers. Because the present study focuses on 
tradeoffs between incentives for selection and efficiency and not on the conse-
Il An argument in favor of risk sharing for specific types of care within the specified 
benefits package is that in some circumstances, insurers have no tools to improve efficiency for 
certain types of care. For this reason in the Netherlands the sickness funds have been given 
little financial responsibility for production-independent hospital costs since 1996. 
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quences of risk sharing at insurer level, this form of risk sharing will not be 
analyzed empirically. In the present study risk sharing reimbursements will be 
based on the actual costs of individual members for whom some risk is shared. 
Then the risk sharing may apply to all costs of a designated member, may be 
limited to the member's costs above his normative costs, or may be limited to 
the costs above a certain threshold. In each of these variants risk sharing may 
apply to a certain percentage of the cost involved. Of course it is possible to use 
more than one threshold in combination with different percentages of the costs 
involved. However, to avoid UlUlecessary complications, the empirical analyses 
are restricted to only one preset threshold (if any) together with one percentage 
of the costs involved. If the risk sharing applies to all members and all expendi-
tures above a certain threshold are shared, the risk sharing is called outlier risk 
sharing (ORS). It resembles excess-of-loss reinsurance (Bovbjerg, 1992). If the 
risk sharing applies to all members and a certain percentage of all expenditures 
is shared, the risk sharing is called proportional risk sharing (PRS). This form 
of risk sharing resembles quota-share reinsurance (Bovbjerg, 1992). 
3.2.4 The price 
The financing of a risk sharing arrangement can take several forms. Risk 
sharing may be financed externally, internally or via a combination of both. 
External financing means that there is some flow of money towards the whole 
, 
payment system,. for instance from the govermnent. For example Beebe's 
(1992) outlier pool was assumed to be financed this way. With such a flow of 
money, risk sharing is not budget-neutral from the regulator's point of view. 
However, in this study it is assumed that the regulator requires risk sharing to 
be budget -neutral at the macro-level. This can be achieved by using an internal 
financing mechanism i.e. the risk sharing is financed via mandatory contribu-
tions from all insurers in the market. This way the risk sharing only shifts 
(limited) amounts of money from some insurers to others. In practice the price 
that an insurer has to pay to the regulator can be calculated at the end of the 
year, when the proportion shared expenditures is known. In the empirical 
analyses it will be assumed that the nonnative costs, on which the capitation 
payments are based, are reduced proportionally to finance the risk sharing. A 
disadvantage of this financing method is that it is not necessarily budget-neutral 
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for each of the risk groups that are distinguished in the capitation formula. This 
may create some new selection problems. However, for limited extents of risk 
sharing, there is no reason to assume that a refinement of the financing method 
would alter the conclusions of this study (see chapter seven). 
3.3. Foul' forms of risk sharing 
This section first summarizes the choices that have been made with respect to 
the essential elements of risk sharing. Then four forms of risk sharing are 
presented more formally by introducing some parameters. An important aspect 
of risk sharing is the proportion shared expenditures. This is the proportion of 
all expenditures that is retrospectively paid for by the regulator. The higher this 
proportion, the lower an insurer's incentives for efficiency. Based on an 
assumption with respect to the distribution of individual health care expendi-
tures, an indication of the relation between the parameter(s} of the forms of risk 
sharing and the resnlting proportion shared expenditures is presented. Finally 
some implementation issues of the four forms of risk sharing are discussed. 
3.3.1 Summary of choices 
For the empirical analyses in the second part of the study, the following choices 
have been made: 
(I) Each insurer is allowed to select itself agiven percentage of its members; if 
the members have to be designated before the start of the year, it is called risk 
sharing for high-risks. If the members can be designated at the end of the year, 
it is called risk sharing for high-costs. The fraction of members is set by the 
regulator. A special case is risk sharing for all members. 
(2) The risk sharing applies to all types of care within the specified benefits 
package. 
(3) Insurers are entitled to a certain percentage of the costs of a designated 
member as far as these costs are above a certain threshold. 
(4) The risk sharing is budget-neutral from the regulator's point of view and it 
is mandatory for each insurer to contribute to the financing of the risk sharing. 
The risk sharing is financed via a proportional reduction of the normative costs. 
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For a brief description of the forms of risk sharing, the next subsection intro-
duces four parameters. 
3.3.2 Risk sharing parameters 
Given the choices of the previous subsection, the forms of risk sharing studied 
here can be described by four parameters (Van Vliet, 1997): 
p: The fraction of members that an insurer is allowed to designate for risk 
sharing. Of course, this fraction varies between zero and one. A special case is 
a fraction of one, when the risk sharing applies to all members. 
D: Dummy variable that indicates whether the designation of members whose 
expenditures are (partly) paid by the regulator, can be done at the start of a 
year (D =0) or at the end of the year (D = 1). 
T: The threshold above which the costs of designated members are (partially) 
reimbursed. Of course, the threshold is greater than or equal to zero. A special 
case is a threshold of zero, when the risk sharing applies to all costs of the 
designated members. 
a: The fraction of the costs of designated members - possibly above a threshold 
- that is reimbursed. Of course this fraction varies between zero and one. A 
special case is a fraction of one, when all costs of designated members -
possibly above a threshold - are shared. 
The following values of three parameters imply no risk sharing at all: p equals 
zero; and/or T is infinite; andlor a equals zero. The influence of the three 
parameters is roughly as follows: the higher p or a and the lower T, the more 
extensive the risk sharing. If p equals one, T equals zero and a equals one, the 
most extensive form of risk sharing arises, i.e. the situation of full cost reim-
bursement. Further limiting the possibilities such that each form of risk sharing 
has essentially one parameter only, yields four main forms of risk sharing. 
Table 3.2 presents these four forms. By choosing different parameter values for 
a certain form of risk sharing, one may get different variants of this form. 
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Table 3.2. Description of four forms of risk sharing 
Name p D T a 
Risk sharing for high-risks (RSHR) p 0 0 1 
Risk sharing for high-costs (RSHC) p 0 1 
Outlier risk sharing (ORS) 1 1 T 
Proportional risk sharing (PRS) I 0 a 
Slight modifications would be: risk sharing for high-risks 6r high-costs with proportional cost 
based payments (0< a < 1); outlier-cost based payments (O<T< (0); or with proportional 
outlier-cost based payments (O<T< 00; O<a< I), Outlier risk sharing 6r proportional risk 
sharing may be combined to get proportional outlier-cost based payments (O<T< 00; O<a< 1). 
Of course, other combinations of the four main forms are possible as well, 
Because risk sharing for high-risks is a prospective form of risk sharing, for 
this form it is clear that the usefulness of risk sharing strongly depends on the 
capitation formula employed. The question is whether insurers are able to 
identify members for whom they expect to be underpaid given the capitation 
formula. Given a demographic capitation formula, insurers can easily do this by 
using the claims history of their members. The proportion shared expenditures 
then provides a clear indication to the regulator of how bad its capitation 
formula really is. If in the future, the regulator is able to improve its capitation 
formula, it will become more difficult for the insurers to select members for 
whom they expect to be underpaid and their costs will decrease. Therefore, 
given the fraction of members for whom some risk is shared, an improvement 
of the capitation formula will lead to a reduction of the proportion shared 
expenditures under risk sharing for high risks. Under the three retrospective 
forms of risk sharing, an improvement of the capitation formula will not lead to 
a reduction of the proportion shared expenditures. 
3.3.3 Proportion shared expenditures 
An important aspect of risk sharing is the proportion shared expenditures. In the 
case of proportional risk sharing, the proportion shared expenditures equals the 
weight on the actual costs. Under risk sharing for high-risks or high-costs, the 
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proportion shared expenditures equals the costs incurred by the designated 
members expressed as a fraction of the costs of all members. In the case of 
outlier risk sharing, the proportion shared expenditures equals the costs incurred 
above the threshold expressed as a fraction of the total costs. 
Under the assumption that the probability density function of individual health 
care expenditures consists of a combination of an alternative distribution (yes/no 
costs) and a lognormal distribution (with parameters I" and a) for those mem-
bers with positive costs, Van Vliet (1997) derived the following formulae for 
the proportion shared expenditures (PSE)14: 
(3.1) RSHR: PSE = 1-<I>(<I>-l(1-p)-p*a). 
(3.2) RSHC: PSE = 1-<I>(<I>-l(1-pi1r)-a). 
(3.3) ORS: PSE = (I-<I>(c-a» - T*7f*(I-<I>(c» with c=(iog(T)-I')/a. 
The parameters I' and a of the lognormal distribution can be calculated with 
equation (3.4) and (3.5) given the mean costs (E(AC», the probability of 
positive costs (7f) and the coefficient of variation (cv). 
(3.4) E(AC) = 7f*exp(,t+0.5*a') and 
(3.5) a' = 10g[7f*(cv'+ I)]. 
Under the assumption that the average costs are Dfl 2,000, the coetficient of 
variation is 4 and the probability of positive costs is 0.8 and the correlation 
between the costs in two consecutive years is 0.3, Figure 3.1 gives an indica-
tion of the proportion shared expenditures under risk sharing for high-risks and 
for high-costs till' various fractions of designated members. The higher the 
fraction of designated members, the higher the proportion shared expenditures. 
The Figure shows that, given a certain fraction of designated members, risk 
sharing for high-risks yields a smaller proportion shared expenditures than risk 
sharing for high-costs. For instance, with 2% designated members, risk sharing 
for high-risks yields a proportion shared expenditures of about 5 % whereas risk 
14 Under risk sharing for high risks it is assumed that an insurer designates those members 
with the highest costs in the previous year and p is the first-order autocorrelation of the costs, 
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Figure 3.1 The proportion shared expenditures under RSHR and RSHC given 
the fraction of designated members (E(AC)=DI1. 2,000; cv=4; 1T=O.8 and 
p=0.3) 
sharing for high-costs yields a proportion shared expenditures of about 35 %. 
The reason is that under risk sharing for high-risks, members are designated in 
advance of the year whereas under risk sharing for high-costs this is done at the 
end of the year. 
Figure 3.2 gives an indication of the proportion shared expenditures under 
outlier risk sharing given various threshold amounts. The higher the threshold, 
the lower the proportion shared expenditures. 
For instance, a threshold of Dfl. 10,000 yields a proportion shared expenditures 
of about 0.3, a threshold of Dfl. 35,000 yields a proportion of about 0.1. 
Figure 3.3 gives an indication of the fraction of members whose costs exceed a 
certain threshold in a year. Under outlier risk sharing, these persons are the 
designated members. The higher the threshold, the lower is the fraction of 
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~~~--~~~~--~ Figure 3.2 The proportion shared expenditures nnder outlier risk sharing given 
the threshold (E(AC)=DI1. 2,000; cv=4; 1T=0.8) 
designated members. About 5 % of the members have health care expenditures 
above Dfl. 10,000. About 2% of the members exceed the threshold of Dfl. 
20,000 and about 1 % exceed Dfl. 30,000. 
The proportion shared expenditures provides a rough measure of the reduction 
of an insurer's incentives for efficiency caused by the addition of risk sharing. 
The higher the proportion shared expenditures, the lower an insurer's incentives 
for efficiency in general. However, given a certain proportion shared expendi-
tures, the different forms of risk sharing may have different effects on an 
insurer's incentives for efficiency. Therefore the measurement of an insurer's 
incentives for efficiency under risk sharing will be further investigated in the 
next chapter. 
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Figure 3.3 The fraction of designated members under outlier risk sharing given 
the threshold (E(AC)=Dfl. 2,000; cv=4; 11=0.8) 
3.3.4 Implementation issnes 
This subsection describes some implementation issues of the four forms of risk 
sharing. 
With respect to the money flows between insured members, insurers and the 
regulator, risk sharing can be implemented as follows: 
- All members that choose the same insurance modality pay the same additional 
premium directly to the insurer of choice. 
- The regulator calculates the capitation payments as in the situation without risk 
sharing. The insurers receive these capitation payments as in the situation 
without risk sharing. 
- At the end of the year each insurer informs the regulator about the costs of its 
members designated for risk sharing. The regulator calculates for each insurer 
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its gross risk sharing reimbursement. Furthermore the regulator calculates for 
each insurer the price that it has to pay to finance the risk pool. The net risk 
sharing reimbursement for an insurer is calculated as gross risk sharing reim-
bursement minus this price. An insurer with positive net risk sharing reimburse-
ment receives this amount from the regulator and vice versa. 
In comparison with the situation without risk sharing, each insurer has to make 
a list of its designated members. Furthermore each insurer must provide, 
depending on the exact form of the risk sharing reimbursements and the price of 
risk sharing: the costs of individual designated members 6r the total costs of the 
group of designated members. 
Implementing risk sharing for high-risks requires rules of how to deal with 
enrolment and disemolment during the year whereas with the other forms of 
risk sharing this is not necessary. Several options are possible. 
(I) The most simple option would be that at the start of the year each insurer 
designates the percentage of its members for whom it is allowed to share the 
risk. Members who switch to another insurer during the year keep their status 
of designated or non-designated member. The same holds for those members 
who die during the year. 
In the second and third option insurers will be able to designate (a fraction of) 
members who enrol during the year and who form a predictable loss. 
(2) A second option would be that designated members who switch to another 
insurer or die during the year can be replaced by new members only. Because 
only newly emoling members can still be designated for risk sharing, it is not 
possible that insurers designate those members with (almost certain) high costs 
in the year, without being able to predict this at the start of the year. 
(3) A third option would be to allow designation for risk sharing on the contract 
renewal date which can be any day of the year. Members that are designated 
for risk sharing are designated for one year. This option requires that the 
regulator registers the starting date of the risk sharing per designated member. 
In comparison with the other two options, it will be more difficult to keep track 
of the percentage of designated members per insurer and their costs. 
If an insurer has designated more members than it is allowed to - this is only 
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possible in the second and third option - this can be corrected for by lowering 
the costs of its designated members pro rata. 
With respect to (dis)enrolment during the year, it should be noted that if the 
contract renewal date is the same for each member, the potential implementation 
problems of risk sharing for high-risks are greatly reduced. 
Risk sharing requires that each insurer registers the costs of individual mem-
bers. In some circumstances this may pose difficulties because such cost data 
are not readily available for all types of care within the specified benefits 
package. Beebe (1992) suggested to base risk sharing on those types of care for 
which cost data are already available, but the present study assumes that risk 
sharing does not make a distinction between several types of care within the 
specified benefits package. Implementation problems caused by the omission of 
necessary cost data may be alleviated by the use of standard prices in conjunc-
tion with utilization data. 
3.4 Risk sharing versus capitation 
The following classification of payments to insurers might be helpful to under-
stand the difference between risk sharing and capitation. Assume a contract 
period of one year and assume that the capitation payments as well as the risk 
sharing apply to this year. 
With prospective capitation, the payments to an insurer depend on cost predic-
tions. These cost predictions are based on variables whose values are known at 
the start of the year. The cost predictions depend on the way these variables are 
incorporated in the capitation formula and on their estimated weights. For a 
specific member with a medical problem that needs treatment during the year, 
any treatment savings will increase the insurer's profit in that year. Depending 
on the exact form of the capitation formula, the capitation payment for the 
member involved in the next year might be 'high'. However, the member's 
insurer can not be sure that next year it will receive this 'high' payment, 
because he might switch to another insurer or might die. With risk sharing, the 
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reimbursement of an insurer is not based on predicted costs but on the actual 
costs of its designated members. For a designated member with a medical 
problem that needs treatment during the year, any treatment savings will lower 
the insurer's reimbursement for that year. Therefore, risk sharing lowers the 
insurers' incentives for efficiency. 
Table 3.3. Risk sharing versus capitation 
Payments independent of 
actual costs in the year 
Payments based on 
actual costs in the year 
For members known 
at the start of the year 
Prospective 
capitation 
Prospective 
risk sharing 
For members known 
at the end of the year 
Retrospective 
capitation 
Retrospective 
risk sharing 
With prospective risk sharing an insurer knows at the start of the year which 
members are designated that year. With retrospective risk sharing, this becomes 
known during the year or at the end. 
\ 
An interesting example of capitation is capitation payments that are (partly) 
based on prior costs. Such capitation payments are still different from risk 
sharing because risk sharing reimbursements are based on actual costs in the 
present year. However, an important similarity is that in both cases, a selection-
efficiency tradeoff takes place. Then the question arises: which method will 
yield the best tradeoff? Newhouse (1994) has put forward that - with the 
exception of those who die or change plans - prior use and actual use do not 
markedly differ in their incentive effects. For instance, prior costs with an 
estimated weight of 0.3 in the capitation formula would establish similar 
incentive effects as proportional risk sharing with a weight of 0.3 on actual 
costs. Chapter eight of the present study contains an empirical analysis that 
addresses the question whether this premise is troe if both incentives for 
selection and efficiency are taken into account. Moreover chapter eight COIll-
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pares prior costs as an additional risk adjuster with the other forms of risk 
sharing. 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter summarized forms of risk sharing as well as previous empirical 
studies on risk sharing as a supplement to capitation payments. It was concluded 
that risk sharing can take many forms and that a systematic comparison of 
various forms of risk sharing as a supplement to capitation payments in a 
regulated competitive individual health insurance market has not yet been per-
formed. Potential forms of risk sharing were described. Because all forms of 
risk sharing are reinsurance-like mechanisms in which the regulator acts as the 
reinsurer, the essential elements of risk sharing are similar to those of a 
reinsurance contract. Besides the period to which the risk sharing applies 
(usually one year), a description of risk sharing should include at least the 
following four topics: the group of members for whom some risk is shared; the 
types of care for which the risk is shared; the extent of the risk that is shared; 
the price that insurers have to pay to share some risk. 
For the empirical analyses in the second part of this study, the following 
choices are made: 
- An insurer is allowed to select itself a certain percentage of its members for 
risk sharing either at the start of a year or at the end of a year. A special case is 
risk sharing for all members. 
- Risk sharing applies to all types of care within the specified benefits package. 
- An insurer is entitled to receive a certain percentage of the costs of a desig-
nated member as far as these costs are above a certain threshold. 
- It is mandatory for an insurer to contribute to the financing of the risk pool. 
It is assumed that the normative costs are reduced proportionally to finance the 
risk pool. The size of the reduction is set afterwards such that the risk sharing 
is budget-neutral from the regulator's point of view. 
Two forms of risk sharing that apply to all members of an insurer are outlier 
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risk sharing and proportional risk sharing. Under outlier risk sharing insurers 
are fully reimbursed for a member's costs above a threshold. In the reinsurance 
industry this is called excess·of·loss. Under proportional risk sharing an insurer 
receives at the end of the year a % of the difference between the total actual 
costs it has incurred and the total normative costs of its members. Because it is 
assumed that the risk sharing is financed via a percentage of the normative costs 
per member, proportional risk sharing equals a blended payment system as 
proposed by Newhouse (1986). 
Given the choices that were made with respect to the essential elements of risk 
sharing, four forms of risk sharing were distinguished: risk sharing for high· 
risks, risk sharing for high·costs, outlier risk sharing and proportional risk 
sharing. These forms of risk sharing can be described formally with four 
parameters: 
· p: The fraction of members that an insurer is allowed to designate for risk 
sharing. 
· D: Dummy variable that indicates whether the designation of members for risk 
sharing is done at the start of a year (D =0) or at the end (D = I). 
· T: The threshold above which the costs of designated members are (partially) 
reimbursed. 
· a: The fraction of the costs of designated members· possibly above a thresh· 
old· that is reimbursed. 
The following values imply no risk sharing at all: p equals zero, T is infinite, a 
equals zero. The higher p and a and the lower T, the more extensive the risk 
sharing. If p equals one, T equals zero and a equals one, the most extensive 
form of risk sharing arises, i.e. the situation of full east reimbursement. 
By choosing different parameter values, one may get different variants of a 
specific form of risk sharing. Optimizing the tradeoff between selection and 
efficiency not only includes the determination of the optimal form of risk 
sharing, but may also deal with determining the optimal variant of a certain 
form of risk sharing. 
Important aspects of the four forms of risk sharing are that the designated 
members pay the same premium as others and typically would be unaware that 
their insurer has designated them for risk sharing. 
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Risk sharing implies payments to insurers based on the actual costs of their 
designated members. Therefore risk sharing differs from capitation which 
implies payments to insurers that are independent of the actual costs of their 
members. As capitation payments can be prospective and retrospective, risk 
sharing can also be prospective (risk sharing for high-risks) and retrospective 
(risk sharing for high-costs). Under outlier risk sharing or proportional risk 
sharing, this difference is irrelevant because for all members some risk is 
shared. 
Risk sharing implies a reduction of an insurer's incentives for efficiency. A 
rough measure of this reduction is given by the proportion shared expenditures. 
The higher this proportion, the lower an insurer's incentives for efficiency. But 
given a certain proportion shared expenditures, different forms of risk sharing 
may have different effects on an insurer's incentives for efficiency. Therefore 
the next chapter develops better indicators of (the reduction of) an insurer's 
incentives for efficiency under risk sharing. 
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4. Efficiency 
A negative effect of risk sharing is that it reduces an insurer's incentives for 
efficiency. Remember that in this study efficiency refers to efficiency in produc-
tion or so-called teclmical efficiency. That is an insurer is more efficient than a 
competitor if it is able to serve the same population with the same quality of 
care for lower costs 6r with a higher quality of care for the same costs. Because 
the potential problem of quality skimping is outside the context of this study, an 
insurer's incentives for efficiency will be measured by its incentives for cost 
containment. If the capitation payment is the same for each individual, an 
insurer keeps the entire revenue of cost reducing activities itself. Thus flat 
capitation payments maximize an insurer's incentives for efficiency. For the 
same reason an insurer's incentives for efficiency are as great as possible under 
demographic capitation payments. Previous empirical studies on risk sharing 
did not quantify an insurer's incentives for efficiency (Beebe, 1992) or used the 
proportion shared expenditures as a rough measure of the reduction of an 
insurer's incentives for efficiency (Van Barneveld et aI., 1996). The main 
purpose of this chapter is to develop better indicators of an insurer's incentives 
for efficiency under risk sharing. 
Section 4.1 and 4.2 argue that an insurer can use several tools for improving 
efficiency and that the application of such tools may yield large savings. Section 
4.3 proposes some methods to measure an insurer's incentives for efficiency 
given a certain form of risk sharing or given prior costs as an additional risk 
adjuster. Section 4.4 summarizes the conclusions. 
4.1 Tools to improve efficiency 
Hillman (1991) distinguished two basic mechanisms - rules and incentives - to 
shape physicians' practice patterns in managed care. According to the author 
clinical rules have assumed various names as managed care evolved: treatment 
protocols or algoritlmls, regulations, administrative constraints, practice 
guidelines or parameters, prospective utilization review, utilization management, 
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'cookbook' medicine, and simply 'controls'. Nevertheless all embody the same 
basic concept: direct instruction on how a physician should or should not act in 
specific clinical circumstances. In addition to rules regarding clinical decisions, 
other rules, including new legal and ethical constraints on referral behaviour, 
and ownership of medical facilities, have altered physicians' behaviour. 
The use of incentives is seen as a more subtle approach to influencing physici-
ans' clinical decisions. Incentives are generally financial in nature and expose 
physicians to some risk or reward for certain patterns of behaviour. 
Other approaches to influencing physicians' clinical decision~ in managed care 
are also mentioned, such as feedback to physicians about their prescribing 
behaviour compared to a norm followed by education to change their prescrib-
ing. 
Weiner and de Lissovoy (1993) reviewed past and current trends in the United 
States market for nontraditional health benefit plans. They concluded that 
complete consensus on the use of the term 'managed care' does not exist. 
Nevertheless they mentioned several methods used to manage the patient's care. 
These include preadmission certification, mandatory second opinion before 
surgery, certification of treatment plans for discretionary nonemergency 
services, primary care physician gatekeepers and nonphysician case managers to 
monitor the care of particular patients. 
, 
Enthoven (1994) described a normative model for the market structure for third-
party purchasing of health care. In his model an important role is played by so-
called accountable health plans. These are organizations that contract to pay for 
and deliver a uniform list of comprehensive health services, and to participate in 
a national system of uniform health outcomes reporting. The author mentioned 
that an accountable health plan can do a great deal to improve quality and cut 
costs. Among other things: 
- It can seek to align the incentives of doctors, and others, and the interest of 
patients in high quality economical care. Its management can use judgment and 
various indicators of performance, to seek best to reward effectiveness and 
useful effort, how best to pay different types of doctors for different activities. 
- It can gather data on diagnoses, treatments, outcomes and resource use, study 
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variation in practice patterns, and inform and advise its doctors about cost-
effective practices. 
- It can match numbers and types of doctors to the needs of the emoled popula-
tion, to assure good access to primary care, a rational referral process, and 
busy, proficient specialists. 
- It can manage processes of care with a view to minimizing total system costs. 
Miller and Luft (1994) performed an extensive literature analysis to compare the 
health care utilization, expenditure, quality of care, and satisfaction since 1980 
of enrolees in managed care and indemnity plans. According to the authors, 
plans differ greatly in physician practice management features such as provider 
selection, information feedback techniques, utilization management procedures, 
provider reimbursement and risk-sharing methods, and physician organization. 
Furthermore the extent of integration of the intermediary with delivery system 
providers varies greatly. 
According to Armstrong (1997) there are quality and cost benefits to be gained 
by the application of disease management to an increasing list of predominantly 
chronic conditions. In the case of these specific, high-cost diseases, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the introduction of education, better preventive care 
and improved self medication might serve to reduce emergency treatment and 
hospital admission and so substantially reduce costs. Within the United States 
this appears to be the case with asthma and diabetes. Other conditions for which 
disease management principles are already being successfully applied, include 
congestive heart failure, depression, breast cancer, low back pain, arthritis, 
headache, gallstones and AIDS. 
These studies show that health insurers can use many tools to improve the effi-
ciency of care. To give an indication which tools are actually being used by 
managed care plans in the United States and to which extent, two studies are 
summarized that have addressed this question. 
Langwell (1990) mentioned that health maintenance organizations combine 
utilization management, provider selection and financial 'incentives to control 
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provider behaviour. However, the many diverse types of these organizations 
and the mixture of these elements of managed care systems make it difficult to 
disentangle the effects of utilization management methods, provider selection 
and financial incentives to determine which specific mechanisms are most 
effective. 
Commonly used utilization management methods by health maintenance 
organiza-tions include: primary care gatekeepers (93%); concurrent utilization 
review (94%); retrospective utilization review (89%); prior authorization for 
inpatient care (88 %). 
Preferred provider organizations recruit and offer a network of preferred 
providers who are selected on the basis of practice style and willingness to 
follow the utilization management and review requirements of the organization. 
Their utilization management activities include: preadmission certification 
(78%); concurrent utilization review (51 %); retrospective utilization review 
(55%); mandatory second surgical opinion (44%); discharge plamling (31 %). 
Gold et al. (1995) conducted a national survey of the arrangements managed-
care plans make with physicians in the United States. Of the 108 plans that 
responded, 29 were group-model or staff-model health maintenance organiz-
ations, 50 were network or independent-practice-association health maintenance 
organizations, and 29 were preferred provider organizations. Respondents from 
all three types of plans said they emphasized careful selection of physicians, 
although the group or staff health maintenance organizations tended to have 
more demanding requirements, such as board certification. Sixty-one percent of 
the plans responded that physicians' previous patterns of costs or utilization of 
resources had little influence on their selection; 26 percent said these factors 
had a moderate influence; and 13 percent said they had a large influence. 
Some risk sharing with physicians was typical in the health maintenance 
organiza-tions but rare in the preferred provider organizations. Fifty-six percent 
of the network or independent-practice-association health maintenance organiz-
ations used capitation as the predominant method of paying primary care 
physicians, as compared with 34 percent of the group or staff health mainten-
ance organizations and 7 percent of the preferred provider organizations. 
Ninety-two percent of the network or independent -practice-association health 
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maintenance organizations and 61 percent of the group or staff health mainten-
ance organizations required their patients to select a primary care physician who 
lVas responsible for most referrals to specialists. About three quarters of the 
health maintenance organizations and 31 percent of the preferred provider 
organizations reported using studies of the outcomes of medical care as a part of 
their quality-improvement programs. 
The authors concluded that managed-care plans, particularly health maintenance 
organizations, have complex systems for selecting, paying, and monitoring their 
physicians. Hybrid forms are common and the differences between several types 
of health maintenance organizations are less than is commonly assumed. 
Summarizing an insurer can use many tools to improve the efficiency of care. 
The most important tools seem to be: 
- Utilization management techniques. 
- Disease and (high-cost) case management techniques. 
- Selective contracting with physicians and pharmacists. 
- Financial incentives to share some risk with providers of care. 
- Negotiating lower fees than those officially approved. 
- Offering different insurance modalities. 
An insurer can be expected to use several combinations of the tools mentioned 
above. Such a combination might focus on: 
- All expenditures within the specified benefits package. 
- Expenditures for specific types of care 61' specific groups of members. 
The next section describes evidence on potential savings when tools to improve 
efficiency are applied. 
4.2 Potential savings 
Various studies indicate that tools to improve the efficiency of care can be 
applied successfully. These studies are mainly based on experiences with 
managed care in the United States. First the potential savings that can be 
achieved for all types of care within the specified benefits package will be 
discussed. This is followed by some evidence of savings for hospital care and 
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for specific groups of members. 
4.2.1 Overall savings 
Manning et al. (1984) investigated whether a prepaid group practice delivers 
less care than the fee-for-service system when both serve comparable popula-
tions with comparable benefits. To answer this question they randomly assigned 
a group of 1,580 persons to receive care free of charge from either a fee-for-
service physician of their own choice (431 persons) or the Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound (1,149 persons). In addition, 733 prior emolees of 
the Cooperative were studied as a control group. The rate of hospital admis-
sions in both groups at the Cooperative was about 40% less than in the fee-for-
service group (p < 0.0 I), although ambulatory visit rates were similar. The 
calculated expenditure rate for all services was about 25 % less in the two 
Cooperative groups (p<O.OI for the experimental group; p<0,05 for the 
control group). The number of preventive visits was higher in the prepaid 
groups, but this difference does not explain reduced hospitalization. 
The lower rate of use along with comparable reductions found in non-controlled 
studies by others, suggested that the style of medicine at prepaid group practices 
is markedly less 'hospital-intensive' and, consequently, less expensive. Accor-
ding to the authors it is very unlikely that prepaid group practices have a 
substantial negative effect on the health status of (some of) their members. 
Kirkmalll1-Liff and Van de Ven (1989) described a variety of efforts that have 
been launched in the Netherlands to achieve a more effective use of limited 
resources. Among these iImovations are improved systems for the monitoring of 
utilization and cost of medical care providers, demonstrations of incentives for 
cost-effective care, the development of community care projects, and efforts to 
improve the coordination of care. They mentioned that the estimated ineffic-
iency in the Dutch health care system was about 15 % of total health care 
expenditures. 
On the basis of an extensive review of the literature, Miller and Luft (1994) 
concluded that, compared with indemnity plans, health maintenance organiz-
ations have somewhat lower hospital admission rates, 1 % to 20% shorter 
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hospital length of stay, the same or more physician office visits per enrolee, less 
use of expensive procedures and tests, greater use of preventive services, mixed 
results on outcomes, and somewhat lower enrolee satisfaction with services but 
higher satisfaction with costs. There were few or no results for key summary 
measures of performance, including total health plan and system-level expendi-
tures, out-of-pocket costs per emolee, and the level and rate of growth of 
premiums. 
Enthoven and Singer (1996) presented evidence from California of a broad 
decline in health care costs for employment groups adopting managed care and 
managed competition. The premium for some groups were reduced by about 10 
percent in comparison with the previous year(s). Many of the employees 
involved are emoled in a health maintenance organization. Lower premiums 
may not imply reductions in total spending, because benefit changes and 
selection may increase overall spending. For the purchasers they examined, 
however, benefits have been fairly standard. Also, in general, benefits have not 
been manipulated to reduce premiums. In addition, the decreases in weighted 
average premiums probably did not reflect favourable risk selection. 
4.2.2 Savings for hospital care 
Siu et al. (1988) investigated whether health maintenance organizations selec-
tively avoid discretionary hospitalizations. Medical records were reviewed from 
the same randomized trial as used by Manning et al. (1984). Physicians who 
were blinded to the system reviewed 244 medical records and judged the 
appropriateness of both the hospital setting and the medical indications for 
hospitalization. The rate of discretionary surgery was lower in the health 
maintenance organization, while the rate of nondiscretionary surgery was 
equivalent in the two systems. For medical admissions, rates of discretionary 
and nondiscretionary admissions were lower in the health maintenance organiz-
ation. There were no observable adverse effects on health from the lower rates 
of nondiscretionary hospitalization, either because the net effect on health was 
small or because the health maintenance organization substituted appropriate 
ambulatory services. The authors concluded that the health maintenance 
organization's reductions in hospitalization rates do not occur 'across the 
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board'. Discretionary surgery is selectively avoided. 
Melmemeyer and Olinger (1989) examined the financial consequences when 
California implemented selective contracting for Medicaid services. They con-
cluded that selective contracting halted a long history of hospital price inflation 
and won significant price concessions for the state (about 19%). While the state 
might have tried to get the cheapest possible care from the worst possible 
providers, their evidence showed that the state secured price concessions from 
mainstream hospitals that provided accessible, good-quality care. Furthermore 
length of stay remained virtually unchanged and growth of volume remained 
within expected ranges. Faced with a credible danger of loss of business, 
hospitals were able to make price concessions and find approaches to more 
economical operation. 
Melnick et al. (1992) investigated prices obtained in different types of markets 
by the largest preferred provider organization in California. Their results 
indicated that prices paid to hospitals in the Blue Cross of California preferred 
provider organization network, after controlling for hospital product differences, 
are strongly influenced by the competitive structure of the hospital market. 
Greater hospital competition leads to lower prices. Furthermore as the impor-
tance of a hospital to the preferred provider organization in an area increases, 
the price rises substantially. 
Khandker and Manning (1992) examined the performance of a utilization review 
program with data of one insurer. They compared the group of costumers 
involved with a representative sample of the costumers which had no utilization 
review during the study period. The program included precertification and 
concurrent review for each medical and surgical admission. The precertification 
covered both the necessity of the admission and the length of stay. The data 
suggested that utilization review reduced inpatient expenses by 8.1 % (and 
overall medical expenses by 4.4%) after a year of experience, largely by 
reducing length of stay. The savings of the program outweighed the extra 
administration costs of the program. Therefore the authors concluded that 
utilization review offers some promise as a cost control strategy. However, they 
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also mentioned several limitations in their data and they note that their study has 
not looked at the possibility that the utilization review program may have 
impacts on the health status of the population. 
4.2.3 Savings for specific groups of members 
According to Enthoven and Singer (1996) clinical improvements will be the 
main source of continued savings in the health care system in the future. They 
give several examples of such improvements. For instance, one hospital 
introduced clinical case management for congestive heart failure. This reduced 
the overall costs per patient by 39 percent. Satisfaction levels for patients with 
congestive heart failure with clinical case management were higher than those 
for patients without case management. In addition, the readmission rate for 
congestive heart failure fell 33 percent to 7.1 percent. Another example is a 
hospital that reduced the inpatient stay for hip replacement surgery from 8 days 
to 3.4 days and cut costs by $4,500 per patient. 
Armstrong (1997) gave examples of successfully applied disease management 
programs. By utilizing an asthma disease management program it is reported 
that the Harvard Community Health Plan's admission rate for paediatric asthma 
admissions dropped by 25 %. For adults the admission rate dropped 10 %. 
Leading health maintenance organizations in the United States are targeting 
diabetes for disease management. It is believed by these organizations that 
although diabetes afflicts only 3 % of their members it accounts for about 13 % 
of their overall costs. It is estimated that diabetes disease management programs 
are already producing cost savings of 15-35 %. 
Summarizing various forms of managed care may improve efficiency compared 
with indemnity insurance. However, introducing risk sharing 61' prior costs as 
an additional risk adjuster will reduce an insurer's potential benefits of improv-
ing efficiency. This brings us to the question: how can an insurer's incentives 
for efficiency be measured in the case of risk sharing and in the case of prior 
costs as an additional risk adjuster? This question is addressed in the next 
section. 
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4.3 Measuring incentives for efficiency 
Section 4.3.1 presents overall indicators of an insurer's incentives for effi-
ciency. These overall indicators are relevant under the assumption that an 
insurer tries to improve efficiency for all types of care within the specified 
benefits package together at once. Section 4.3.2 presents specific indicators of 
an insurer"s incentives for efficiency, These indicators may be appropriate if an 
insurer's efficiency improving activities focus on various specific types of care 
within the specified benefits package or on specific subgroups of members. 
4.3.1 Overall indicators 
Insurer's portion of an overall efficiency gain 
If capitation payments are supplemented with a form of risk sharing, the 
financial result for an insurer (R) equals its normative costs (NC) minus its 
actual costs (AC) plus the risk sharing reimbursement that it is entitled to 
(RSREIMB) minus the price that it has to pay for the risk sharing (RSPRlCE), 
Any difference between the capitation payments plus the additional premiums 
and the normative costs is not relevant for this analysis and is therefore ignored. 
Then in the case of risk sharing: 
(4.1) R=(NC- AC) +(RSREIMB- RSPRlCE), 
Suppose that an insurer can reduce its actual costs while all other things are 
kept equal, Then its actual costs and - most likely - its risk sharing reimburse-
ment will be lower. Its normative costs and the price it pays for the risk sharing 
will remain unchanged, A small change in the price of the risk sharing can be 
neglected here if the market share of the insurer is sufficiently small. The total 
efficiency gain can be split into a portion that is kept by the insurer and a 
portion that is taken by the regulator. The insurer's portion of the efficiency 
gain (IPEG) equals: 
(4.2) IPEG = (i-LiRSREIMB/.MC), 
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The higher this measure, the higher are the incentives to improve efficiency. 
Suppose that an insurer is able to reduce the costs of each member by the same 
percentage. This situation can be analyzed theoretically with an assumption on 
the distribution of individual health care expenditures. Suppose that the prob-
ability density function of health care expendinlres consists of a combination of 
an alternative distribution (yes/no costs) and a lognormal distribution for those 
members with positive costs. Assume that the mean costs are Dft. 2,000, the 
coefficient of variation is four, the probability of positive costs is 0.8 and the 
correlation between the costs of individual members in two consecutive years is 
0.3. Table 4.1 then presents the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain if the 
costs for each member are reduced by 10 %. 
Table 4.1. The insurer's portion of a ten percent overall efficiency gain 
(IPEG) 
Risk sharing Risk sharing Outlier Proportional 
high-risks high-costs risk sharing risk sharing 
PSE=0.089 p=0.0335 p=0.0012 T=40,000 a=0.089 
IPEG 0.911 0.911 0.826 0.911 
PSE=0.171 . p=0.0757 p=0.0041 T=20,000 a=0.171 
IPEG 0.829 0.829 0.695 0.829 
PSE=0.288 p=0.1486 p=0.0119 T= 10,000 a=0.288 
IPEG 0.712 0.712 0.533 0.712 
PSE=0.431 p=0.2554 p=0.0295 T=5,000 a=0.431 
IPEG 0.569 0.569 0.364 0.569 
PSE = proportion shared expenditures. p = fraction of designated members; T = threshold 
amount in guilders; a=weight on actual costs. Under the assumption of lognormally distributed 
individual annual health care expenditures and with E(AC)=Dfl. 2,000; cv=4; sr=O.8 and 
p~O.3. 
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Given a certain threshold amount (T), the proportion shared expenditures under 
outlier risk sharing was calculated with Equation (3.3) of the previous chapter. 
Then with Equation (3.1) and (3.2) of the previous chapter, the fractions of 
designated members under risk sharing for high-risks and risk sharing for high-
costs (p) were calculated such that they yield the same proportion of shared 
expenditures. Next the risk sharing reimbursement after the assumed costs 
reductions were calculated. Given the reduction of the actual costs and the 
reduction of the risk sharing reimbursement, the insurer's portion of the 
efficiency gain was calculated via Equation (4.2). 
The insurer's portion of the efficiency gain is the same under risk sharing for 
high-risks, risk sharing for high-costs and proportional risk sharing and cquals 
one minus the proportion shared expenditures. Under outlier risk sharing the 
insurer's efficiency gain is smaller and therefore its incentives for efficiency are 
smaller. The rcason is that under outlier risk sharing the costs above the 
threshold reduce by a larger percentage than the total costs. With the other 
forms of risk sharing, the same members remain designated and their costs 
reduce by the same percentage as the costs of non-designated members. 
Consequently, in these cases, the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain equals 
exactly one minus the proportion shared expenditures. 
The conclusion is that, given a certain proportion shared expenditures, the four 
forms of risk sharing yield different incentives for efficiency. If an insurer can 
reduce the costs of each member by a certain percentage, its own portion of the 
efficiency gain is the same under risk sharing for high-risks, risk sharing for 
high-costs and proportional risk sharing and equals one minus the proportion 
shared expenditures. Under outlier risk sharing, the insurer's portion of the 
efficiency gain is smaller. 
Under the assumption that all members stay with their insurer and that a 
discount factor can be neglected, the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain in 
the case of prior costs as an additional risk adjuster is": 
15 Like previous studies the empirical analyses in the second part of the study are restricted 
to one-year prior costs with prior costs as a continuous variable as far as these costs are above 
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(4.3) [PEG = (I-Ll.NC,+/Ll.AC,), 
where Ll.NC, + I is the change in the nonnative costs of the insurer for the next 
year. In comparison with Equation (4.2), the change in risk sharing reimburse-
ment in the current year is replaced by the change in normative costs for the 
next year. 
Weighteli expenditures 
Another way to measure incentives for efficiency is to assume that (some) 
incentives for efficiency are present as long as (a part of) the marginal expendi-
tures for a member in a year are born by the insurer itself. As soon as it is 
certain that these marginal expenditures are fully shared between the insurer and 
the regulator, the insurer's incentives for efficiency with respect to the expendi-
tures for this member in this year are zero. 
Under proportional risk sharing, one minus the proportion shared expendinlres 
then is a good indicator of an insurer's incentives for efficiency. It can be seen 
as a normalized weighted sum of an insurer's expenditures during the year. All 
expenditures are weighted with the weight on the normative costs. 
Under the assumption that all members stay with their insurer and that a 
discount factor can be neglected, with prior cost as a continuous variable, the 
so-called weighted expendinlres (WE) can be calculated as: 
(4.4) WE = (J-{3), 
where {3 is the coefficient of prior costs in the capitation formula. 
Under risk sharing for high-risks, members are designated for risk sharing at 
the start of a year. Again, one minus the proportion shared expenditures is a 
good indicator of the insurer's incentives for efficiency. Here, it can be seen as 
a weighted sum of an insurer's expenditures in which the weight is zero for 
designated members and the weight is one for non-designated members. 
a certain threshold. 
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Under risk sharing for high-costs, the regulator specifies a certain fraction of 
members that may be designated. Given this fraction, an insurer can estimate a 
threshold amount such that the fraction of its members that will have costs 
above this threshold equals the fraction of members that it is allowed to 
designate. Risk sharing for high-costs with such an implicitly defined threshold 
yields similar incentives for efficiency as outlier risk sharing with the same 
threshold 16. 
For a particular member the probability that he or she will be designated is 
higher as the (implicit) threshold amount is lower. This probability further 
depends on: 
- The already incurred costs of the member. 
- The medical problem of the member. 
- The health status of the member before the medical problem occurred. 
- The number of days until the end of the year. 
The higher the already incurred costs, the more severe the medical problem, the 
worse the health status before the medical problem occurred, and the more days 
remain until the end of the year, the higher is the probability that the member 
will be designated in that year, thus the lower are the insurer's incentives for 
efficiency with respect to this member. However, the method below only needs 
the already incurred costs of a member, because we are interested in an 
insurer's average incentive per guilder that is spent below the threshold. 
Suppose that an insurer divides expenditures below the threshold (T) into n cost 
intervals of length k (n=T/k). Then the insurer can calculate after each k 
guilders that are spent for a member, the probability that the total anllual 
expenditures of this member will exceed the threshold given its alreadY incurred 
costs: 
(4.5) P(AC>TIAC>i*k) = P(AC>T)/P(AC>i*k) for i=O .. n. 
]6 The insurer's incentives for efficiency can not be exactly the same because of the Ullcer-
tainty about the exact threshold amount under risk sharing for high-costs. Nevertheless the 
method presented here will treat risk sharing for high-costs and outlier risk sharing the same. 
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One minus this probability is an indicator of the insurer's incentives for 
efficiency with respect to the next k guilders to be spent on this member during 
the rest of the year (IFE[i]). This gives a monotonic decreasing function that 
starts near one for the first cost interval (i=O) and ends with zero for costs 
above the threshold (i =n). 
(4.6) IFE[i] = I - (P(AC > T)/P(AC > i*k» for i =O .. n. 
The overall incentives for efficiency for the expenditures below the threshold 
can be seen as a weighted sum of the incentives for efficiency per cost interval. 
These are weighted with the probability that expendinIres in the relevant interval 
occur. The weighted expenditures below the threshold (WEBT) can be estimated 
as: 
The incentives for efficiency above the threshold are zero. So the total weighted 
expenditures (WE) can be calculated as the product of the weighted expendi-
tures below the threshold and the percentage of the expenditures below the 
threshold. 
(4.8) WE = WEBT*«E(AqAC<T)*P(AC<T) + T*P(AC>T)) / E(AC». 
This so-called weighted expendinlres measure is an indicator for the insurer's 
inccntives for efficiency under outlier risk sharing 61' risk sharing for high 
costs. It can vary between zero and one. The higher the weighted expendinIres, 
the higher are the insurer's incentives for efficiency. 
Under the assumption that the probability density function of health care 
expenditures consist of a combination of an alternative distribution (yes/no 
costs) and a lognormal distribution for those members with positive costs, 
Figure 4.1 gives an example of the insurer's incentives for efficiency per cost 
interval (IFE[i]). As previously, the mean costs equal Df!. 2,000; the coefficient 
of variation equals four and the probability of positive costs equals 0.8. 
In Figure 4.1 the threshold amount equals Dft. 20,000 and it is assumed that the 
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Figure 4.1 Incentives for efficiency per cost interval below the (implicit) 
threshold (T=DI1. 20,000; k=Df1. 5,000; and n=4) 
insurer divides expenditures below the threshold into four cost intervals of 
length Ofl. 5,000. The figure shows that for the first Ofl. 5,000 to be spent on 
a member, the incentives for efficiency are nearly one. If a member's costs 
exceed Ofl. 5,000, the insurer recalculates its incentives for efficiency with 
respect to this member. Then, the incentives for efficiency for this member 
reduce to about 0.82. After the insurer has spent Ofl. 10,000 for a member, the 
insurer's incentives for efficiency are 0.62 and after Ofl. 15,000, these incen-
tives are 0.35 only. At Ofl. 20,000 the incentives for efficiency with respect to 
this member reduce to zero. 
With these incentives for efficiency per cost interval as weights, it can be calcu-
lated that the insurer's weighted expenditures equal 0.77. That is the insurer's 
incentives for efficiency are 77% of those under flat capitation payments. 
An extreme case is that the insurer updates its incentives for efficiency with 
respect to a member only at the time the member exceeds the threshold. Then 
the insurer would retain its incentives for efficiency nearly at one until the 
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member's costs exceed the threshold. At that moment the insurer immediately 
lowers its incentives for efficiency with respect to this member to zero. It can 
be calculated that the weighted expenditures equal 0.81 in this case. This value 
is slightly lower than one minus the proportion shared expenditures under' 
outlier risk sharing. The latter value is 0.83. The reason is that in the latter 
case, the expenditures below the threshold are weighted with weight one 
whereas in the first case the weight is a little smaller. Consequently one minus 
the proportion shared expendit1ll'es under outlier risk sharing yields an 
overestimation of an insurer's incentives for efficiency17. 
Another extreme case is that the insurer continuously updates its incentives for 
efficiency with respect to each member. For this situation, the resulting weights 
are also depicted in Figure 4.1. The application of these weights yields 0.65 for 
the weighted expenditures. 
Table 4.2 presents these results for the weighted expenditures along with those 
for other values of the threshold and the length of the cost intervals. 
Table 4,2, Weighted expenditures for different thresholds and different cost 
intervals 
Tlk !O 1,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 
40,000 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.90 
20,000 0.65 0.71 0.77 0.79 0.81 n.a. 
10,000 0.48 0.55 0.64 0.67 n.a. n.a. 
5,000 0.30 0.40 0.49 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
T=(lmplicit) threshold amount under outlier risk sharing or risk sharing for high-costs. 
k::::: Length of cost intervals below the threshold. Under the assumption of iognonnally 
distributed individual annual health care expenditures and with E(AC)=Dfl. 2,000; cv=4; 
~~0.8 and ~~0.3. 
17 One minus the proportion shared expenditures under outlier risk sharing equals 0.91. 
0.83, 0.71, 0.57 for the thresholds ~O. 40,000, ~O. 20,000, ~O. 10,000 and ~O. 5,000 
respectively. 
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It clearly shows that the higher the threshold and the larger the cost intervals, 
the higher are an insurer's incentives for efficiency. Of course the correct 
length of the cost intervals is unknown. Especially in the longer run, it is 
unlikely that the appropriate value is near the threshold amount. Consequently 
one minus the proportion shared expenditures under outlier risk sharing yields 
an overestimation. On the other hand infinitely small cost intervals are imposs-
ible in practice. Therefore the left column yields an underestimation of the 
insurer's incentives for efficiency. It can be shown that the values in the left 
column equal one minus the proportion shared expenditures under risk sharing 
for high-costs with an implicit threshold T (see appendix). Thus one minus the 
proportion shared expenditures under risk sharing for high-costs yields an 
underestimation of the insurer's incentives for efficiency. 
An appropriate value for the length of the cost intervals could be the average 
price of a one-night stay in a hospital. In the Netherlands this price is about 
Dft. 1,000. Therefore Table 4.2 also presents the total weighted expenditures 
for this length of the cost intervals. 
With prior costs as a risk adjuster and measured as a continuous variable as far 
as these costs are above a certain threshold (T), the situation resembles that of 
outlier risk sharing and risk sharing for high-costs. For expenditures above the 
threshold, the insurer's incenti~es for efficiency are one minus the relevant 
coefficient ((3T) in the capitation formula. For expenditures below the threshold, 
the insurer's incentives for efficiency are initially nearly one and then gradually 
decrease towards the value one minus (3T' 
Summarizing this subsection proposed two overall indicators for an insurer's 
incentives for efficiency: the insurer's portion of overall efficiency gains and the 
insurer's weighted expenditures. 
4.3.2 Specific indicators 
The efficiency improving activities of an insurer might be different for different 
types of care within the specified benefits package or for different subgroups of 
insureds. Thus it is interesting to measure an insurer's incentives for efficiency 
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with respect to various types of care and various subgroups. This can be done 
by calculating the insurer's portion of certain efficiency gains. 
Uniform proportional savings for specific types of care 
In the case of a reduction of hospital costs, the more hospital costs are shared, 
the smaller will be the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain. It can be 
expected that given a certain proportion shared expenditures, more hospital 
costs are shared in the case of risk sharing for high-costs or outlier risk sharing 
than in the case of risk sharing for high-risks. Therefore given a certain 
proportion shared expenditures, the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain can 
be expected to be larger in the latter case. 
In an extreme case of risk sharing for high-risks, say with 10% designated 
members, the savings on members with unpredictable hospital admissions can 
still be seen in the financial result of the insurer and therefore the insurer's 
portion of the efficiency gain will not be zero. However, in an extreme case of 
risk sharing for high-costs, say with 10% designated members, or an extreme 
case of outlier risk sharing, say with a threshold of Dft. 5,000, virtually none 
of such savings can be seen in the financial result of the insurer and therefore 
the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain will be near zero. 
In the case of a cost reduction for physical therapy, given a certain proportion 
shared expenditures, more of these costs can be expected to be shared in the 
case of risk sharing for high-risks than in the case of risk sharing for high-costs 
or outlier risk sharing. Therefore the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain for 
this type of care can be expected to be larger in the latter cases. Even with the 
extreme cases mentioned above it is unlikely that the insurer's portion of the 
efficiency gain will be near zero. With and without the cost reduction, a 
substantial part of these costs will not be shared. 
A uniform proportional reduction of the hospital costs of each member seems a 
relevant assumption if the length of stay can be reduced by about the same 
percentage for each admission. However, the literature suggests that health 
maintenance organizations not only have lower hospital costs because they are 
able to reduce length of stay but also because they have lower admission rates, 
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suggesting non-uniform proportional reductions of the hospital costs (Siu et al., 
1988; Miller and Luft, 1994). Tools that may contribute to this are preadmis-
sion certification, mandatory second opinion and practice guidelines. An 
insurer's incentives to use such tools to avoid discretionary hospitalizations will 
be analyzed separately. 
Avoiding discretionaty hospital admissions 
In the case of avoiding discretionary hospital admissions, given a certain 
proportion shared expenditures, it is hard to predict whether the insurer's 
portion of the efficiency gain will be largest in the case of risk sharing for high-
risks, risk sharing for high-costs 61' outlier risk sharing. In cases that are not too 
extreme, it can be expected that the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain will 
be relatively high. The reason is that discretionary hospital admissions are 
unlikely to be very predictable and/or expensive. 
Non-uniform proportional savings for hospital care as well as for other types of 
care could also be achieved if managed care activities of an insurer focus on 
specific groups of members. Enthoven and Singer (1996) as well as Armstrong 
(1997) gave examples of successfully applied disease management and (high-
cost) case management principles. 
Vni/orm proportional savings for specific subgroups of members 
The insurer's portion of the efficiency gain depends on the costs of the desig-
nated members within such a group, with and without the savings. If all 
members of the group are designated in both sinmtions, the insurer's portion of 
the efficiency gain will be zero. This could well be the case for renal disease 
patients. Given a certain proportion shared expenditures, it is hard to predict 
whether the measure will be largest in the case of risk sharing for high-risks, 
risk sharing for high-costs 61' outlier risk sharing. In the extreme cases men-
tioned above, the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain will be near zero for 
members with chronic (high-cost) conditions. For members with acute (high-
cost) conditions, the measure might be relatively high in the case of risk sharing 
for high-risks whereas under risk sharing for high-costs 61' outlier risk sharing, 
it might be near zero. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
Under nat capitation payments as well as under demographic capitation pay-
ments, an insurer keeps the entire revenue of its cost reducing activities itself. 
In that case an insurer's incentives for efficiency are as great as possible. 
Introducing risk sharing reduces an insurer's incentives for efficiency. The same 
holds if prior costs are included as a risk adjuster in the capitation formula. In 
both cases a selection-efficiency tradeoff takes place. Previous studies hardly 
quantified an insurer's incentives for efficiency under risk sharing or under 
capitation payments that are partly based on prior costs. This chapter developed 
indicators of (the reduction of) an insurer's incentives for efficiency for these 
situations. This is a necessary step before the selection-efficiency tradeoff can 
be optimized. 
Section 4.1 showed that an insurer can use several tools to improve the effi-
ciency of care such as: utilization management, disease management, (high-cost) 
case management, selective contracting with providers, financial incentives, 
negotiating lower fees and offering different insurance modalities. The applica-
tion of (combinations of) several tools might focus on: all expenditures within 
the specified benefits package or expenditures for specific types of care. It may 
also focus on specific groups of members. 
Section 4.2 focused on potential savings that could be achieved when insurers 
apply tools for improving efficiency. Evidence from the United States with 
various forms of managed care shows that this may improve efficiency com-
pared with indemnity insurance. For instance, in California, the adoption of 
managed care and managed competition has led to a broad decline in health care 
costs to employment groups, which was followed by premium reductions of up 
to 10 percent. 
Introducing a utilization review program for hospital care has reduced inpatient 
expenses by 8.1 percent and overall medical expenses by 4.4 percent. 
Furthermore, there are several examples of successfully applied disease manage-
ment or case management principles, for instance a 39 percent reduction of the 
costs for patients with congestive heart failure and costs savings of 15-35 
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percent for diabetics. 
Section 4.3 addressed the measurement of an insurer's incentives for efficiency. 
Two methods have been proposed to analyze these incentives. The first method 
focuses on the portion of the efficiency gain that will be kept by the insurer 
itself. 
If, ceteris paribus, an insurer can reduce certain costs, its actual costs and -
most likely - its risk sharing reimbursement will be lower. Therefore the 
efficiency gain can be split into a portion that is kept by the insurer and a 
portion that is taken by the regulator. The higher the insurer's portion of the 
efficiency gain, the higher are its incentives to employ efficiency improving 
activities. The insurer's portion of the efficiency gain can be calculated under 
various assumptions with respect to costs savings that it could achieve: overall 
savings, savings for specific types of care and savings for specific groups of 
members. 
The second method yields an overall indicator for incentives for efficiency only. 
It assumes that (some) incentives for efficiency are present as long as (a part of) 
the marginal expenditures for a member in a year are born by the insurer itself. 
As soon as it is certain that these marginal expenditures are fully shared 
between the insurer and the regulator, the insurer's incentives for efficiency 
with respect to the expenditures of this member in this year are zero. 
Under this assumption one minus the proportion shared expenditures is a good 
indicator of incentives for efficiency under proportional risk sharing and under 
risk sharing for high-risks. It can be seen as a normalized weighted sum of the 
insurer's expenditures during the year. 
Under outlier risk sharing and under risk sharing for high-costs, the regulator 
specifies a threshold and a fraction of members that may be designated respect-
ively. For an insurer, the fraction of designated members under risk sharing for 
high-costs implicitly defines, with some uncertainty about the exact value, a 
threshold amount. For expenditures above the threshold, the insurer's incentives 
for effiCiency are zero and for expenditures below the threshold, the insurer's 
incentives for efficiency are lower than one. Suppose that an insurer divides its 
expenditures below the threshold into n cost intervals of length k. Then, the 
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insurer can calculate the probability that the annual expenditures of a member 
will exceed the threshold, given its already incurred costs. Subsequently, one 
minus this probability is an indicator of the insurer's incentives for efficiency 
per cost interval. The insurer's overall incentives for efficiency can be seen as a 
weighted sum of the incentives for efficiency per cost interval. These are 
weighted with the probability that expenditures in the relevant interval occur. 
The resulting weighted expenditures measure is an overall indicator of the 
insurer's incentives for efficiency under outlier risk sharing and risk sharing for 
high-costs. 
If an insurer uses one cost interval below the threshold only, the weighted 
expenditures will be lower than one minus the proportion shared expenditures 
under outlier risk sharing with this threshold. Thus the latter value yields an 
overestimation of the insurer's incentives for efficiency. Furthermore it has 
been shown that if the length of the cost intervals below the threshold is 
infinitely small, the weighted expenditures yield a value of one minus the 
proportion shared expenditures under risk sharing for high-costs with this 
implicit threshold. Thus one minus the proportion shared expenditures under 
risk sharing for high-costs yields an underestimation of the insurer's incentives 
for efficiency. 
It has been shown that, if an insurer quickly recalculates its incentives for effi-
ciency with respect to a member after some expenditures have occurred, the 
weighted expenditures give similar results as the insurer's portion of an overall 
efficiency gain. 
Section 4.3 showed that the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain as well as 
the insurer's weighted expenditures can be calculated if (high) prior costs is 
used as an additional risk adjuster. In this situation it is assumed that all 
members stay with their insurer and that a discount factor can be neglected. 
Besides the tools for improving efficiency and the potential gross benefits of 
improving efficiency for an insurer, its efficiency improving activities might 
also be influenced by other factors such as: its working area and market share; 
the level of competition in the health insurance market and in the market for 
health care provision; and the role of employers. These factors may alter the 
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potential gross benefits of efficiency improving activities for an individual 
insurer as well as the costs of these activities. 
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Appendix chapter 4 
Under risk sharing for high-costs and outlier risk sharing, the weighted expendi-
tures (WE) measure is a function of the (implicit) threshold (T) and the length 
of the cost-intervals that the insurer distinguishes below the threshold (k). Under 
the assumption that an insurer continuously updates its incentives for efficiency 
with respect to individual members (H 0), it has been claimed that the weighted 
expenditures equals one minus the proportion shared expenditures under risk 
sharing for high-costs with an implicit threshold T. This claim is proved below. 
Proposition 4. I: 
For any continuous probability density function of health care expenditures (Y), 
the limit of k ~O {WE(T;k)} is one minus the proportion shared expenditures 
under risk sharing for high-costs with an implicit threshold T. 
,-I 
I: (P(Y>;'k)-P(Y>1) 
T 
f(P(Y>t)-P(Y>1)dy 
o lim WE(T;k)~lim .o:1-O~ __ _ 
kiD kiD ,-I T 
f p(Y>1)dy 
o 
I: P(Y>;.k) 
I~O 
Which by definition and via partial integration equals: 
T 
f(F(1)-F(y»dy 
o 
T f(I -F(y»dy 
o 
T T 
y.[F(1) -F(y)]- fy.( -j(y))dy 
o 0 
T T 
y.[t -F(y)]- f y.( -j(y))dy 
o 0 
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Which is equivalent with: 
T 
jY'fiy)dy 
o E(Yiy<1)'F(1) 
T T'(l-F(1)+E(Yiy<1)'F(1) 
T'(l-F(1)-jy.fly)dy 
o 
The costs below the threshold (T) expressed as a percentage of the total costs 
can be written as: 
E(Yiy<1)'F(1)+T+(l-F(1) 
E(y) 
By multiplying the last two formulae one gets: 
lim WE(T;k) E(Yiy<1)'F(1) E(y)-E(Yiy>1)'(l-F(1) 
kiD ~ ~) 
This gives us: 
lim WE(T;k) = 1 E(yiy>1)·(1-F(1) 
kiD E(y) 
which completes the proof. 
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5. Optimizing the tradeoff 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a systematic method for optimizing the 
tradeoff between selection and efficiency. The previous chapters described four 
forms of risk sharing and two variants of prior costs as a risk adjuster. Indica-
tors of an insurer's incentives for selection and efficiency were also developed. 
Section 5.1 describes the decision problem of the regulator (Van Barneveld et 
aI., 1999b). This section introduces some terminology and is restricted to a 
linear blend of flat capitation payments and full cost reimbursement. Thus, it 
considers the most simple capitation formula supplemented with the most simple 
form of risk sharing (i.e. proportional risk sharing). Section 5.2 extends the 
framework by including the possibility that the regulator employs a better 
capitation formula then flat capitation payments, but is still restricted to propor-
tional risk sharing. Optimal proportional risk sharing variants will be derived 
analytically. Section 5.3 presents the conclusions. 
5.1 The decision problem 
This section addresses the following issues: feasible payment systems, the 
regulator's objective function with respect to these payment systems, the 
regulator's decision problem if it is restricted to a linear blend of flat capitation 
payments and full cost reimbursement, the optimal solution of the decision 
problem and a graphical illustration. 
Feasible payment systems 
Any payment system can be represented by a point (Xl; Yl), where Xl represents 
the reduction of an insurer's incentives for selection relative to the situation of 
flat capitation payments and Yl represents an insurer's incentives for efficiency 
relative to the situation of flat capitation payments. If both coordinates are 
expressed as a fraction, they can vary between zero and one. The point (0; I) 
represents flat capitation payments, i.e. the incentives for selection are not 
reduced in comparison with flat capitation payments and the incentives for 
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efficiency are fully retained in comparison with flat capitation payments. The 
point (1; 0) represents full cost reimbursement, i.e. the incentives for selection 
are fully removed in comparison with flat capitation payments and the incen-
tives for efficiency are also fully removed. The point (1; 1) represents the 
perfect capitation formula: the incentives for selection are fully removed in 
comparison with flat capitation payments and the incentives for efficiency are 
fully retained in comparison with flat capitation payments. In Figure 5.1, point 
A represents flat capitation payments; and point B represents full cost reim-
bursement. 
Incentives for efficiency 
A c 
O.S 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
.. "', 
o B 
o 0.2 0.4 0.6 O.S 
Reduction of Incentives for selection 
Figure 5.1 Flat capitation payments (A); Full cost reimbursement (ll) and the 
perfect capitation formula (C) 
Point C represents the perfect capitation formula. There is a growing consensus 
in the literature that this point may never be reached in practice. Some countries 
are trying to move from full cost reimbursement (B) into the direction of the 
perfect capitation formula (C) whereas others are trying to move from flat 
capitation payments (A) into the direction of C. That is, some countries are 
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trying to increase the insurers' incentives for efficiency while keeping their 
incentives for selection as low as possible (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). 
Other countries are trying to decrease the insurer's incentives for selection 
while keeping their incentives for efficiency as high as possible (e.g. Switzer-
land and the United States (Medicare)). 
The line AB represents a possible linear blends of flat capitation payments and 
full cost reimbursement (i.e. all possible variants of proportional risk sharing). 
For example, if proportional risk sharing with a weight of 0.4 on actual costs 
(a =0.4) is employed as a supplement to flat capitation payments, the payment 
system is represented by the point (0.4; 0.6). The line AB satifies the following 
equation: x +y = I. How the regulator values different variants of proportional 
risk sharing depends on its objectives. 
Objective jUllction 
Because this study assumes that the regulator intends to reduce an insurer's 
incentives for selection as much as possible while retaining its incentives for 
efficiency as much as possible, the preferences of the regulator satisfy the 
condition of strong monotonicityl8. Formally, the condition of strong monoto-
nicity is: 
(5.1) If A2B and Ar'B, then A'B. 
In this condition, A and B both represent some payment system and are not 
necessarily equal to those in Figure 5.1. The condition states that if payment 
system A reduces the incentives for selection more than payment system B 
while it retains the same or even more incentives for efficiency, then the 
regulator prefers A above B. Similarly, if A retains more incentives for 
efficiency than B while the incentives for selection are the same or even less, 
than A is preferred above B. Given this assumption, it is clear that point C in 
18 It is also assumed that the preferences of the regulator with respect to different payments 
systems satisfy the usual assumptions with respect to preferences in micro-economic analysis: 
completeness, reflexivity, transitivity and continuity. Given these assumptions the preferences of 
the regulator with respect to different payment systems can be represented by some utility function 
(Varian. t984). 
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Figure 5.1 is the optimal point for the regulator. That is why C is called the 
perfect capitation formula. The assumption of strong monotonicity is likely to 
be satisfied if considerations of validity, reliability, manipulation and feasibility 
are not included in the analysis (see chapter two). 
It is further assumed that the preferences of the regulator satisfy the condition 
of convexity. Formally, this condition is stated as: 
(5.2) Given A¢B and A¢C, if A,C and B~C, then t*A+(1-t)*B,C 
'10<t<1. 
In condition (5.2), A, Band C all are some payment systems and not necessar-
ily equal to those in Figure 5.1. The condition states that, if two payment 
systems A and B are preferred above a third payment system C, then all linear 
combinations of A and B are preferred above C. The assumption of convexity 
implies diminishing marginal rates of substitution given a certain level of the 
regulator'S utility function. The marginal rate of substitution of x (instead of y) 
is defined as: 
(5.3) MRS = -(oy/ox). 
In our application the marginal rate of substitution is the number of percentage 
points of incentives for efficiency that the regulator is willing to give up in 
order to obtain one extra percentage point reduction of incentives for selection. 
It seems likely that the preferences of the regulator satisfy diminishing marginal 
rates of substitution. As a result of the condition of convexity, any payment 
system that is represented by a point below the line AB can be ignored in the 
analysis, because such a payment system can be improved upon by employing a 
linear blend of flat capitation payments and full cost reimbursement. Therefore, 
the analysis is restricted to points (x,; y,) that satisfy the following conditions: 
(5.4) Osx,sl; Osy,sl; x,+y,;:o,I; (x,<16r y,<I). 
In Figure 5.1 these conditions state that only those payment systems that lie in 
the triangle ABC are of interest and that the payment systems are not identical 
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to the perfect capitation formula (C). 
A well known utility function that satisfies both strong monotolllCIty and 
convexity is the CES-function (Constant Elasticity of Substitution). 
(5.5) U(x;y) = (b*x'+(l-b)*y')"', whereO<b<l; -oo<c<l. 
Taking the limit of c to zero yields a special case of this function: the Cobb-
Douglas function, which equals (Varian, 1984): 
(5.6) U(x;y) = Xb*yl-b, where O<b< l. 
For the purpose of this snldy, the Cobb-Douglas function is not too restrictive 
and appears to be convenient in the analysis. Therefore this study assumes that 
the regulator specifies its preferences via a Cobb-Douglas function. In particu-
lar, it is up to the regulator to provide the weight on reducing incentives for 
selection (b). It is assumed that this weight is chosen between zero and one. If it 
would be zero, the optimal payment system would be flat capitation payments; 
if it would be one, the optimal payment system would be full cost reimburse-
ment. 
The marginal rate of substitution in a Cobb-Douglas function is given byl9: 
(5.7) MRS = -Coy/ox) = [ou/ox]/[ou/oy] = [b*xb-'*yl-b]/[(l-b)*xb*y-b] 
b/(l-b) * (y/x). 
The factor b/(l-b) indicates that given a relatively 'low' weight on reducing 
incentives for selection, the regulator is willing to give up little incentives for 
efficiency in order to obtain a (further) reduction of incentives for selection. A 
relatively 'high' weight on reducing incentives for selection means that the 
regulator is willing to give up many incentives for efficiency in order to obtain 
"The second equation sign follows from: liu~(liu/lix)*lix+(liu!Oy)*liy~O. 
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a (further) reduction of incentives for selection. This effect is depicted graphi-
cally in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 respectively where the weight on reducing incentives 
for selection is set equal to 0.25 and 0.75 respectively. 
Incentives for ef1lclency 
0.0 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
o 
o 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Reduction of Incentives for selection 
Figure 5.2 Three indifference curves of the utility function with h=0.25 
Figure 5.2 shows that for the point (0.4; 0.55), the value of the utility function 
is 0.5. Suppose the regulator wants to achieve a reduction of the incentives for 
selection from 0.4 to 0.6 while retaining the same level of utility. Then the 
Figure shows that the regulator is willing to give up about 0.1 of the incentives 
for efficiency because the point (0.6; 0.45) also has a utility of 0.5. The 
marginal rate of substitution on the indifference curve 110=0.5 in the point 
x=O.4 is about 0.5 
(= -( -10/20»20. 
Figure 5.3 shows three indifference curves of the utility function where the 
20 More formally, given band Uo. the marginal rate of substitution equals minus the derivative 
of the indifference curve y=(uc/Xb)!I(1-b). 
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Incentives for efficiency 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
Reduction of Incentives for selection 
Figure 5.3 Three indifference curves of the utility function with 11=0.75 
weight on reducing incentives for selection is 0.75. It can be seen that the point 
(0.4; I) yields a utility of 0.5. If, in this situation, the regulator wants to 
achieve a reduction of the incentives for selection from 0.4 to 0.6 while 
retaining the same level of utility, it is willing to give up about 0.7 of the 
incentives for efficiency. The marginal rate of substitution on the indifference 
curve uo=0.5 in the point (0.4; l) can be estimated to be 3.5 (= -(-70)/20). 
Thus, given the increase of the weight on reducing incentives for selection from 
0.25 to 0.75, the marginal rate of substitution is higher and consequently the 
regulator is willing to give up more incentives for efficiency in order to obtain 
the same reduction in incentives for selection. Together Figure 5.2 and 5.3 
show that the regulator's choice of the weight on reducing incentives for 
selection plays a crucial role when it wants to optimize the tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency. 
Model 
If the analysis is restricted to a linear blend of flat capitation payments and full 
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cost reimbursement, the line AB represents the available payment systems for 
the regulator. Assuming that the regulator makes a rational choice, its decision 
problem becomes: 
(5.8) Maximize U(x;y)=xb*yi-b 
Subject to x + y = 1. 
This problem can be solved by solving the first order condition'l. 
(5.9) ou/oy = o{(l-y)b*yl-b}/oy 
ou/oy =0 .. olog[u]/oy = 0 .. 
o{b*log[l-y] +(l-b)*log[yJ}/oy=O" 
-(b/(l-y)) + «l-b)/y) = 0 .. 
y'=l-b. 
Solution 
The optimal solution (x'; y') for this decision problem equals: 
(5.10) x'=b; y'=l-b. 
The optimal weight on actual costs (a ') equals b. 
(5.11) a' = b. 
Intuitively the more priority is given to the reduction of incentives for selection, 
the higher should be the weight on actual costs. 
21 Throughout this chapter the utility function is convex and the constraints are linear. Thus 
the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied in all cases, 
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Graphical illustration 
Suppose that the regulator chooses the weight on reducing incentives for 
selection to be 0.5. then its utility function is: 
(5.12) U(x;y)=.,f(x)*.,f(y). 
Incentives for efficiency 
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Figure 5.4 Optimal blend of flat capitation payments and full cost reimburse-
lIIent (D) with b=O.5. 
Thus. the utility of flat capitation payments as well as the utility of full cost 
reimbursement is zero and the perfect capitation formula has a utility of one". 
Figure 5.4 shows three indifference curves of this utility function. It can be 
seen that proportional risk sharing may increase the regulator's utility in 
comparison with either flat capitation payments or full cost reimbursement. For 
instance a weight of 0.2 6r a weight of 0.8 on actual costs yields a utility value 
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of 0.4". The optimal weight on actual costs equals 0.5 (Equation 5.11). The 
optimal point is (0.5; 0.5) which is labelled D (Equation 5.10). The maximum 
attainable value of the utility function is 0.5 (Equation 5.12). 
Conclusion 
Any payment system can be characterized via two indicators: one for the 
reduction of an insurer's incentives for selection relative to the situation of flat 
capitation payments (x) and one for its incentives for efficiency relative to the 
situation of nat capitation payments (y). If both coordinates are expressed as 
fractions, they can vary between zero and one. Then the point (0; 1) represents 
flat capitation payments; the point (1; 0) represents full cost reimbursement; and 
the point (1; 1) represents the perfect capitation formula. 
Given some reasonable assumptions, a Cobb-Douglas function can be used to 
describe the regulator's preferences with respect to available payment systems: 
U(x;y)=xb*yl-b. The weight on reducing incentives for selection (b) has to be 
specified by the regulator. It is assumed that the regulator chooses this weight 
between zero and one. If it is zero, the optimal payment system is flat capitation 
payments; if it is one, the optimal payment system is full cost reimbursement. 
A Cobb-Douglas function implies strong monotonicity. This reflects the 
assumption that the regulator intends to reduce an insurer's incentives for 
selcction as much as possible while retaining its incentives for efficiency as 
much as possible .. Given this assumption it is clear why the point (1; 1) is called 
the perfect capitation formula. 
Furthermore a Cobb-Douglas function implies diminishing marginal rates of 
substitution. That is the more the incentives for selection are already reduced, 
the less incentives for efficiency the regulator is willing to give up in order to 
obtain a further reduction of incentives for selection. The higher the weight on 
reducing incentives for selection, the higher is the marginal rate of substitution. 
That is the higher thc weight on reducing incentives for selection, the more 
incentives for efficiency the regulator is willing to give up in order to obtain a 
reduction of incentives for selection. 
If the regulator is restricted to a linear blend of flat capitation payments and full 
D U(O.2; O.8)~ U(O.8; O.2)~0.4. 
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cost reimbursement, the optimal weight on actual costs equals the weight on 
reducing incentives for selection. 
5.2 Optimal proportional risk sharing variants 
It is likely that the regulator first tries to improve the capitation payments before 
introducing any form of risk sharing. For instance, the regulator may employ 
demographic capitation payments instead of flat capitation payments. This 
section derives optimal proportional risk sharing variants as a supplement to any 
capitation formula (Van Barneveld et a!., 1999b). 
Section 5.2.1 considers capitation payments that are independent of prior costs. 
Globally speaking such capitation payments do not reduce an insurer's incen-
tives for efficiency relative to the situation of flat capitation payments. There-
fore in section 5.2.1, the capitation formula can be represented by a point A' 
that lies on the line AC (see Figure 5.1). 
Section 5.2.2 considers capitation payments that are partly based on prior costs. 
Such capitation payments will reduce an insurer's incentives for efficiency 
relative to the sinmtion of flat capitation payments. Consequently, such capita-
tion formulae can be represented by a point A' that lies below the line AC. 
In both sections the line A'B represents all variants of proportional risk sharing 
that could be used as a supplement to the capitation payments. If A' has 
coordinates (x,;y,), the line A'B is given by the following equation: 
x + «1 - x,)/y,)*y = 1. Subsequently the regulator chooses the variant of propor-
tional risk sharing that maximizes its utility function. 
5.2.1 Capitation payments independent of prior costs 
In this situation, the model becomes: 
(5.13) Maximize U(x;y) =x"*yl-b 
Subject to: x = 1 - (1- x,)*y. 
The first-order condition is: 
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(5.14) OIog[u]/8y = 0 .. 
8{b*log[1 - (l-xl)*y] + (I-b)*log[yJ}/8y = 0 .. 
- «1-xl)*b)/(I- (l-xl)*y) + (I-b)/y = 0 .. 
y' = (I-b)/(I-x,). 
The optimal solution is: 
(5.15) x' = b; y' = (I-b)/(I-xl) 
Because we are looking on the line between (XI; I) and (I; 0), this optimal 
solution has to satisfy the condition: 
(5.16) x' > XI' 
Therefore this solution is only valid in the case that b > XI' 
Define a' as the optimal weight on full cost reimbursement in this situation. 
Then a' can be written as: 
In the case that b < XI' it is optimal to employ the capitation formula only, 
because along the line A'B, U(x;y) then is a decreasing function in X (see 
appendix). 
Graphical illustratioll 
Figure 5.5 provides a graphical illustration given demographic capitation 
payments and given that the weight on reducing incentives for selection is 0.5. 
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It is assumed that demographic capitation payments yield A' is (0,15; I)", 
The optimal point (0,5; 0,588) is labelled D (Equation 5,15), The optimal 
weight on actual costs equals 0.41 (Equation 5,17), The maximum value of the 
utility function is 0,54 (Equation 5,13), 
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Figure 5.5 Optimal blend of demographic capitation payments and fnll cost 
reimbursement (D) with b=O.S. 
Numerical examples 
Table 5.1 presents numerical examples for .three different capitation formulae 
and for three different weights on reducing incentives for selection, The 
capitation formulae represent flat capitation payments, a demographic model and 
an improved model respectively, The improved model represents a capitation 
formula that is partly based on diagnostic cost groups (see chapter two). It is 
2~ This assumption is based on the R2-value for demographic capitation formulae found in 
previous studies together with the theoretical analysis presented in the appendix of chapter two, 
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assumed that the point A' equals (0; I); (0.15; I) and (0.25; I) respectively". 
Table 5.1 Optimal weights in a blend of capitation payments and full cost 
reimbursement for three capitation formulae and three weights on reducing 
incentives for selection 
b=0.25 b=0.5 
U • U· U • U· a a 
Capitation fort/wla 
Flat 0 0.25 0.57 0 0.5 0.5 
Demographic 0.62 0.12 0.64 0.39 0.41 0.54 
Improved 0.71 0 0.71 0.50 0.33 0.57 
b is the parameter in the regulator's utility function U(x;Y)=Xb*y'-b, 
U is the utility of employing the capitation formula only. 
b=0.75 
U • U· a 
0 0.75 0.57 
0.24 0.71 0.59 
0.35 0.67 0.61 
a' is the optimal weight on actual costs in the blend of the capitation fonnula and full cost 
reimbursement. 
U· is the value of the utility function when using the optimal blend, 
The Table provides a clear illustration of the following points: 
(I) An improvement of the capitation formula reduces the need for risk sharing. 
Suppose the regulator chooses the weight on reducing incentives for selection as 
0.5. Then, under flat capitation payments, the maximum value of the utility 
function equals 0.5 and the optimal weight on acnJaI costs equals 0.5. For the 
demographic model, the maximum value of the utility function is 0.54 and the 
optimal weight on actual costs is 0.41 only. Thus the regulator's utility is higher 
while the weight on actual costs is lower. This implies that given a demographic 
capitation formula, a utility level of 0.5 can be reached with an even lower 
25 The assumed reductions of the incentives for selection are based on the R2-values that were 
found for such capitation formulae in previous studies together with the theoretical analysis 
presented in the appendix of chapter two. 
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weight on actual costs than 0.41. Consequently, given an improvement of the 
capitation formula, the extent of risk sharing can be reduced without lowering 
the regulator's utility. 
(2) Whether the demographic model supplemented with proportional risk 
sharing is preferred above the improved model without risk sharing, depends on 
the weight on reducing incentives for selection. 
If this weight is 0.25, the improved model yields a utility of 0.71 which is 
higher than the maximum utility of the demographic model supplemented with 
proportional risk sharing (U'=O.64). However, if the weight on reducing 
incentives for selection is 0.5 or 0.75, the improved model yields a lower utility 
value than the demographic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing 
(0.5 versus 0.54 and 0.35 versus 0.59). 
The regulator is indifferent between both systems if the weight on reducing 
incentives for selection is about 0.43. This can be shown by solving the 
equation: 
(5.18) bb*[(lfO.85)*(I-b)]'-b = 0.25b 
The left-hand side of the equation is the utility of the demographic model 
supplemented with proportional risk sharing (if b > 0.15) and the right-hand side 
is the utility of the improved model without risk sharing. 
5.2.2 Capitation payments partly based on prior costs 
The regulator may include a risk adjuster based on prior costs in its capitation 
formula. Such a capitation formula implies a reduction of an insurer's incentives 
for efficiency relative to the situation of flat capitation payments. Three situ-
ations can be distinguished (see Figure 5.6): 
(I) The optimal point is found on the line A'B. In this situation, the optimal 
point is a blend of the capitation formula and full cost reimbursement (i.e. 
proportional risk sharing). 
(2) The optimal point is found on the line AA'. In this situation, the optimal 
point is a blend of flat capitation payments and the capitation formula. 
(3) The optimal point is A'. In this situation, it is optimal to employ no blend at 
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all. 
Figure 5.6 gives an example of the place of the point A' if the capitation 
formula is partly based on prior costs. In the Figure, A' is (0.4; 0.7). This 
represents the prior cost model as discussed in chapter two'". 
Incentives for efficiency 
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Figure 5.6 Potential place of the prior cost model (A') 
In the first situation, the model becomes: 
(5.19) Maximize U(x;Y)=X"*yH 
Subject to: x = 1 - «1-x,)/y,)*y. 
21, The assumed reduction of incentives for selection is based on the R2-values in previous 
studies for a capitation formula that is parlly based on prior costs and the theoretical analysis 
presented in the appendix of chapter two, The assumed reduction of incentives for efficiency is 
based on Van Vliet and Ven (1993). They found an estimated coefficient of 0.3 for prior costs in 
a capitation formula based on demographic variables and prior costs. 
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The first-order condition is: 
(5.20) bloglu]lby = 0 '* 
b{b*logll - «1-x,)/y,)*y] + (i-b)*log[yJ}/by = 0,* 
- «(l-x,)/y,)*b) I (I - «1-x,)/y,)*y) + (l-b)/y = 0,* 
y' = (y,l(1-x,))*(I-b). 
The optimal solution is: 
(5.21) x' = b; y' = y, * (I-b) I (I-x,) 
Because we are looking on the line between (x,; y,) and (I; 0), this optimal 
solution has to satisfy the conditions: 
(5.22) x' > x,; y' < y,. 
Therefore, this solution is only valid in the case that b > x,. 
Define a' as the optimal weight on full cost reimbursement in this situation. 
Then a' can be written as: 
(5.23) a' = (b-x,)/(I-x,). 
In the second situation, the model becomes: 
(5.24) Maximize U(x;y)=xb*yi-b 
Subject to: x = (x,/(y,-I)*(y-I). 
The first-order condition is: 
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(5.25) Illog[u]/Ily = 0 # 
Il{b*log[(x,/(y,-l)*(y-l)] + (l-b)*log[yJ}/lly = 0 # 
«x/(y,-l))*b) / «x/(y,-I»*(y-l» + «I-b)/y) = 0 # 
y' = I-b. 
The optimal solution equals: 
(5.26) x' = (x,*b)/(I-y,); y' = I-b. 
Because we are looking on the line between (0; I) and (x,; y,), this optimal 
solution has to satisfy the conditions: 
(5.27) x' < x,; and y' > y,. 
Therefore this solution is only valid in the case that b < (I-y,). 
Define a' as the optimal weight on flat capitation payments in this situation. 
Then, a' can be written as: 
(5.28) a' = I - (b/(I-y,)). 
If the first and second situation do not hold, that is if (I-y,)<b<x" the 
optimal point equals A'. Then it is optimal to employ no blend at all. Along the 
line between (x,; y,) and (I; 0), the utility function appears to be a decreasing 
function in x and along the line between (x,; y,) and (0; I), the utility function 
then appears [0 be a decreasing function in y (see appendix). 
The conclusion is that given the preferences of the regulator and the place of 
the capitation formula in Figure 5.6 , it is possible to derive the optimal 
proportional risk sharing variants analytically. For relatively 'low' weights on 
reducing incentives for selection, it is optimal to employ a blend of flat capita-
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tion payments and the capitation formula; for relatively 'high' weights on 
reducing incentives for selection, it is optimal to employ proportional risk 
sharing. For intermediate weights on reducing incentives for selection, it is 
optimal to employ the capitation formula only. In the remainder of this section, 
a graphical illustration is presented as well as some numerical examples. 
Graphical illustration 
Figure 5.7 provides a graphical illustration where A' represents the prior cost 
model. Based on chapter two, the point A' equals (0.4; 0.7). If the weight on 
reducing incentives for selection is lower than 0.3, the optimal solution is found 
on the line between A and A'. For instance, if it is 0.25 the Figure shows that 
the optimal solution is (0.333; 0.75) which is labelled D,. If the weight on 
reducing incentives for selection is higher than 0.4, the optimal solution is 
found on the line between A' and B. For instance, if it is 0.75 the Figure shows 
that the optimal solution is (0.75; 0.292) which is labelled D,. For weights on 
reducing incentives for selection that are greater than 0.3 but smaller than 0.4, 
the optimal solution equals A'. 
Numerical examples 
Table 5.2 presents numerical examples for three different capitation formulae 
and for three different weights on reducing incentives for selection. The 
capitation formulae represent: a demographic model, an improved model, and a 
prior cost model. The points (x,; y,) are assumed to be (0.15; 1); (0.25; 1) and 
(0.4; 0.7) respectively. With Table 5.2, several interesting comparisons can be 
made: 
(1) The regulator's choice between the improved model and the prior cost 
model, both without risk sharing, depends on the weight on reducing incentives 
for selection. 
If this weight is 0.25, the improved model is preferred above the prior cost 
model. If the weight is 0.5 or 0.75, the opposite holds. The regulator will be 
indifferent between both models if the weight on reducing incentives for 
selection is about 0.43. This can be shown by solving the equation: 
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Figure 5.7 Optimal blend of the prior cost model and either fnll cost reimbur-
sement (D,) or flat capitation payments (D,). 
(5.29) 0.25b = 0.4b*0.7'-b. 
The left-hand side equals the utility of the improved model and the right-hand 
side that of the prior cost model. 
The explanation is that the weight on reducing incentives for selection reflects 
the preferences of the regulator. A 'low' weight means that reducing incentives 
for selection is not so important whereas maintaining incentives for efficiency is 
very important. Given a 'low' weight, the improved model performs better than 
the prior cost model. For 'high' weights on reducing incentives for selection, 
reducing incentives for selection becomes more important and maintaining 
incentives for efficiency less so. As a result above a certain weight on reducing 
incentives for selection, the prior cost model is preferred above the improved 
llIodel. 
(2) Suppose that the regulator - for whatever reason - does not want to employ 
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the improved model. Then it is interesting to make some comparisons between 
the demographic and the prior cost model. 
Table 5.2 Optimal weights in a blend ot' capitation payments and full cost 
reimbursement for three capitation formulae and three weights on reducing 
incentives for selection 
b=0.25 b=0.5 
U a • U· U • a 
Capitation for1l1111a 
Demographic 0.62 0.12 0.64 0.39 0.41 
Improved 0.71 0 0.71 0.50 0.33 
Prior costs 0.61 0' 0.61 0.53 0.17 
b is the parameter in the utility function U(x;Y)=Xb*y'-b, 
U is the utility of employing the capitation fomlUla only. 
a' is the optimal weight on actual costs, 
U· 
0.54 
0.57 
0.54 
U· is the value of the utility function when using the optimal blend. 
b=0.75 
U • U· a 
0.24 0.71 0.59 
0.35 0.67 0.61 
0.46 0.58 0.59 
#) In this situation, it Is optimal to employ a blend of flat capitation payments and the capitation 
formula with a w~ight of 0.167 on flat capitation payments. This blend only marginally 
increases the utility of the regulator. Due to rounding, U and U· are the same. 
First let us compare the demographic model and the prior cost model both 
without risk sharing. Then it depends on the weight on reducing incentives for 
selection which model is preferred. The regulator is indifferent between both 
models if the weight on reducing incentives for selection is about 0.27. This can 
be shown by solving the equation: 
(5.30) 0.15h = 0.4b*0.7H . 
The left-hand side equals the utility of the demographic model and the right-
hand side that of the prior cost model. 
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Second it is possible to compare the prior cost model with the demographic 
model supplemented with proportional risk sharing in which the weight on 
actual costs is set equal to the coefficient of prior cost in the prior cost model. 
This coefficient is assumed to be 0.3. For the demographic model supplemented 
with proportional risk sharing, the possible variants are represented by the line: 
(5.31) X= 1-0.85*y. 
If the weight on actual cost equals 0.3, then the incentives for efficiency (y) are 
0.7, and consequently, the incentives for selection (x) must be 0.405. Thus the 
demographic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing then is repre-
sented by the point (0.405; 0.7). This point almost equals the coordinates of the 
prior cost model (x=O.4 and y=0.7). Because the coordinates of both payment 
systems are nearly equal, the difference between these systems is negligible 
small. This finding supports Newhouse's remark that actual costs and prior 
costs have similar incentives effects (Newhouse, 1994). However, it crucially 
depends on the place of the points (x,;y,) for the demographic model and the 
prior cost model respectively. These points are assumed to be (0.15; 1) and 
(0.4; 0.7) respectively. In the second part of this study, these assumptions are 
verified in an empirical analysis (see chapter eight). 
Third the demographic model can be supplemented with proportional risk 
sharing in which the weight on actual costs is set equal to the optimal value 
instead of 0.3. 
Then, given the previous comparison, the demographic model supplemented 
with proportional risk sharing is preferred above the prior cost model without 
risk sharing. The difference in utility level between both payment systems 
depends on the weight on reducing incentives for selection. For 'intermediate' 
weights, the difference is small. For instance if the weight is 0.5, the demo-
graphic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing yields a maximum 
utility of 0.54 whereas the prior cost model yields a utility of 0.53. 
For 'low' weight on reducing incentives for selection, the difference can be 
larger. For instance if the weight is 0.25, the demographic model supplemented 
with proportional risk sharing yields a maximum utility of 0.64 whereas the 
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prior cost model yields a utility of 0.61. The lower the weight on reducing 
incentives for selection, the larger is the difference between both systems. 
For 'high' weights on reducing incentives for selection, the difference can also 
be large. For instance if the weight is 0.75, Table 5.2 shows that the demo-
graphic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing yields a maximum 
utility of 0.59 whereas the prior cost model yields a utility of 0.46 only. The 
higher the weight on reducing incentives for selection, the larger is the differ-
ence between both payment systems. 
Finally the prior cost model might also be supplemented with proportional risk 
sharing. Then for relatively 'low' weights on reducing incentives for selection, 
the demographic model supplemented with risk sharing outperforms the prior 
cost model supplemented with risk sharing. For instance if the weight on 
reducing incentives for selection is 0.25, the demographic model yields a 
maximum utility of 0.64 whereas the prior cost model yields a maximum utility 
of 0.61. The lower the weight on reducing incentives for selection, the larger is 
the difference between both payment systems. For higher weights on reducing 
incentives for selection, the difference between both payment systems becomes 
negligible small. For instance if the weight is 0.5, the two payment systems 
both yield a maximum utility of 0.54. The higher the weight on reducing 
incentives for selection, the smaller is the difference between the two payment 
systems. 
To sum up this section derived optimal proportional risk sharing variants as a 
supplement to capitation payments analytically. Applications require information 
on an insurer's incentives for selection and efficiency under the capitation 
payments and the weight the regulator assigns to either (reducing) selection or 
(retaining) efficiency. 
With the situation of nat capitation payments as a reference point, the regulator 
may first try to include risk adjusters other than prior costs in the capitation 
formula. Such risk adjusters will reduce incentives for selection while they -
generally speaking - will fully retain incentives for efficiency. Given the 
assumption of strong monotonicity in the previous section, including such risk 
adjusters into the capitation formula always improves the regulator's utility. 
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Second the regulator may include a risk adjuster based on prior costs into the 
capitation formula. Then an insurer's incentives for selection may be further 
reduced but its incentives for efficiency are also reduced. It depends on the 
weight on reducing incentives for selection versus retaining incentives for 
efficiency, whether the inclusion of prior costs in the capitation formula 
improves the regulator's utility. 
Third the regulator may use risk sharing as a supplement to capitation pay-
ments. Then given the incentives for selection and efficiency under the capita-
tion formula and given the weight on reducing incentives for selection, optimal 
proportional risk sharing variants can be calculated easily. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter presented a systematic method for optimizing the tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency in a regulated competitive individual health insurance 
market when dealing with proportional risk sharing. 
Section 5.1 showed that any payment system can be characterized via two 
indicators: one for the reduction of an insurer's incentives for selection (x) 
relative to flat capitation paymfnts and one for the insurer's incentives for 
efficiency (y) relative to flat capitation payments. Flat capitation payments 
maximize the incentives for selection and efficiency while full cost reimburse-
ment minimizes both incentives. The perfect capitation formula combines 
maximum incentives for efficiency with minimum incentives for selection. 
Given some reasonable assumptions on the preferences of the regulator with 
respect to different payment systems, a Cobb-Douglas function can be used to 
describe its preferences: U(x; Y)=Xb*y'-b. The weight on reducing incentives 
for selection (b) must be specified by the regulator. If this weight is zero, flat 
capitation payments are optimal; if it is one, full cost reimbursement is optimal. 
It is assumed that the regulator chooses the weight on reducing incentives for 
selection between zero and one. If the regulator is restricted to a blend of flat 
capitation payments and full cost reimbursement, the optimal weight on actual 
costs equals the weight on reducing incentives for selection. 
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Section 5.2 showed that optimal proportional risk sharing variants can also be 
derived analytically if the regulator employs a better capitation formula than flat 
capitation payments. For instance the regulator may employ a demographic 
capitation formula. Depending on the incentives for selection and efficiency 
under the capitation formula employed, for 'low' weights on reducing incentives 
for selection it is optimal to use a blend of flat capitation payments and the 
capitation formula; for 'high' weights it is optimal to use a blend of the capita-
tion formula and "full cost reimbursement"; and for intermediate weights it is 
optimal to use no blend at all. In the latter situation, the capitation formula itself 
is optimal. Numerical examples illustrated that an improvement of the capitation 
formula reduces the need for risk sharing. Consequently countries that are 
considering a regulated competitive health insurance market may start imple-
menting a crude capitation formula supplemented with an extensive form of 
(proportional) risk sharing. If in the future, the regulator is able to improve its 
capitation formula, the extent of risk sharing can be reduced without lowering 
the regulator's utility. 
Under the assumption that a demographic model reduces incentives for selection 
by 15 % in comparison with flat capitation payments and that a prior costs 
model reduces incentives for selection by 40 % and incentives for efficiency by 
30 %, several comparisons were made". If the demographic capitation pay-
ments are supplemented with proportional risk sharing with a weight on actual 
costs that equals the weight on prior cost in the prior cost model, then both 
payment systems have similar incentives effects. If the assumptions are correct, 
the difference between these two payment systems is small. 
Demographic capitation payments may also be supplemented with the optimal 
pro-portional risk sharing variant. Such a payment system is preferred above the 
prior cost model for relatively 'low' and for relatively 'high' weights on 
reducing incentives for selection. For intermediate weights the difference 
between both payment systems is still small. 
Finally the prior cost model may also be supplemented with proportional risk 
27 These assumptions are based on previous theoretical and empirical studies (see chapter two). 
They will be verified empirically in the second part of the present study, 
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sharing. Then only for very low weights on reducing incentives for selection, 
the difference between both payment systems is of any importance. In that case, 
the demographic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing is pre-
ferred. In the other cases the difference between both payment systems is 
negligible small. 
This chapter was restricted to proportional risk sharing. The other main forms 
of risk sharing as presented in chapter three could not be analyzed analytically. 
Therefore the next part of the study moves to an empirical analysis of tradeoffs 
between selection and efficiency. Preliminary empirical results have been 
presented in Van Barneveld et al. (1998). 
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Section 5.2.1 considered capitation payments that are independent of prior 
costs. Such a capitation formula can be represented by a point A'(x,; y,) where 
O,,;x, < 1 and y, = 1. If A=(O; I), B=(I; 0), and C=(I; 1), A' lies on the line 
AC and possible blends of the capitation formula and full cost reimbursement 
are represented by the line A'B (see Figure 5.5 of the main text). It is assumed 
that the regulator has a Cobb-Douglas utility function with parameter b: 
U(x;Y)=Xb*y'-b It has been claimed that if b<x" it is optimal to employ the 
capitation formula only, because along the line A'B, the utility function is 
decreasing in x. This claim is proved below. 
Proposition 5.1 : 
If U(x;y)=xb*yi-b and {b<x, and y=(l-x)/(I-x,)} then ou/ox <0 for x> x,. 
Proof: 
U(x;y) = Xb*y'-b *> 
U(x) = xb*«I-x)/(I-x,»'-b *> 
ou/ox < 0 *> Olog[u]/ox < 0, 
olog[u]/ox = (b/x) - «I-b)/(I-x» <* 
(b - x) / (x*(l-x». 
The denominator is positive and the nominator is negative for x> b, which com-
pletes the proof. 
Section 5.2 considered capitation payments that partly depend on prior costs. 
Such a capitation formula can be represented by a point A'(x,; y,) where 
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Os x, < I and 0 s y, < 1. It has been claimed that if (1- y,) < b < x" it is optimal 
to employ the capitation formula only because along the line A'B, the utility 
function is decreasing in x and along the line A' A, the utility function is 
decreasing in y. 
The first part of this claim can be stated as: 
Proposition 5.2.a 
If U(x;y) = Xb*y'-b and {b<x, and y=(y,l(I-x,»*(I-x)} then liu/lix<O for 
x>x,. 
Proof: 
U(x;y) = Xb*y'-b '* 
U(x) = xb*«y,l(I-x,»*(I-x))'-b '* 
liu/lix < 0 '* olog[u]/ox < 0, 
lilog[u]/lix = (b/x) - «1-b)/(I-x» <9 
(b - x) / (x*(I-x». 
The denominator is positive and the nominator is negative for b < x, which 
completes the proof of proposition 5.2.a. 
The second part of the claim can be stated as: 
Proposition 5.2.b 
If U(x;y) = Xb*y'-b and {b>(I-y,) and x=(x,/(y,-I»*(y-l)} then ou/lly<O 
fory>y,. 
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Proof: 
U(x;y) = Xb*y'-b '" 
U(y) = ((x,/(y,-I»*(y-l»b*yl-b 
ou/oy < 0 '" olog[u]/oy < 0, 
olog[u]/oy = (b/(y-l» + ((l-b)/y) '" 
(y + b - 1) / ((y-l)*y). 
The denominator is negative and the nominator is positive for b>(I-y), which 
completes the proof of proposition S.2.b. Together with proposition S.2.a, this 
shows that the claim is true. 
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Part two: 
Empirical analysis 

6.1 Data 
6. Data, methods and demographic capitation pay-
ments 
The empirical analyses of this study are based on a data set with information for 
six consecutive years (1988-1993) of 47,210 individual members of one Dutch 
sickness fund ("Zorg en Zekerheid"). Originally the data were gathered in the 
context of a study on capitation payments based on diagnostic information from 
prior hospitalizations (Lamers, 1997a). First this chapter provides a description 
of the data and a verification of some of the assumptions that were made in the 
first part of this study (section 6.1). For instance the assumption of 10gnormally 
distributed health care expenditures and the assumed maximum predictable 
variance in individual annual health care expenditures are verified. Second this 
chapter briefly summarizes the methods that will be used in the empirical 
analyses (section 6.2). Third under the assumption that the regulator employs 
demographic capitation payments without any form of risk sharing, section three 
presents predictable profits and losses for an insurer. Finally some conclusions 
are summarized. 
6.1 Data 
The data set includes demographic variables as well as the annual health care 
expenditures for several types of care and the diagnoses from hospital admissi-
ons. Because the expenditure data for 1988 and 1989 were incomplete, these 
expenditures are not included in the present study. All members in this panel 
data set were insured from January 1, 1988 until January 1, 1993. During 1993 
drop-out from the panel could occur as a result of deaths and switches of 
insurer. Every member had the same insurance coverage and the same insur-
ance modality. There were no deductibles or copayments. The data set is 
globally representative for all Dutch sickness fund members with respect to 
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demographic variables". 
Demographics alld disellrolment 
Table 6.1 shows descriptive statistics for some demographic variables in the 
data set. 
Table 6.1 Demographic variables 
Degree of urballizatioll 
Meall age 40 years very strongly urban 11% 
strongly urban 27% 
% Mell 55% moderate 26% 
little urban 22% 
% Disabled" 6.9% rural 14% 
N~47.21O. 
a) This indicates that the individual compulsorily participates in the public health insurance 
sector because he or she receives a disability allowance from the government. 
In 19932.7% of the persons in the data set left the sickness fund (1.1 % died 
and 1. 6 % switched insurer). For these persons the costs in 1993 are raised to 
annual rates. At the same time \'{eights are assigned for the part of the year they 
were in the data set. This means for example that for a person who disenrols at 
the end of March and who had 10,000 guilders health care expenditures during 
the first three months in 1993, the annual rate becomes 40,000 guilders and the 
assigned weight one quarter. By applying this procedure mean costs per person-
year for the total data set are not changed. 
28 All employees (and their family members) earning an atillual income below a certain 
level are insured compulsorily in the public health insurance sector by one of the nearly 30 
sickness funds. About two-thirds of the Dutch population is insured this way. Except for a 
limited group of civil servants who have their own mandatory scheme, the remainder of the 
Dutch population, consisting mainly of self~employed and higher-income groups, Can and does 
voluntarily buy health insurance from one of the about 50 private health insurance companies. 
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Costs for several types of care 
The annual per -person health care expenditures include the costs of inpatient room 
and board, both inpatient and outpatient specialist care, prescribed drugs, medical 
devices, paramedical services, dental care, obstetrics and maternity care, and sick-
transport. The costs of care provided by the general practitioner are excluded 
because they received a uniform aIfiual fee for each sickness fund member in their 
practice regardless of medical consumption. All cost data refer to actual charges. 
Table 6.2 sholYs that in 1993 about 4% of the members did not have any health 
care expenditures at all. The probability of positive costs per type of care ranges 
from about 5% for obstetrics and maternity care to about 79% for prescribed 
drugs. The average health care expenditures are Dfl. 1,941. 
Tahle 6.2 Costs for several types of care in 1993 
Mean Standard Probability of 
deviation positive costs 
Types of care 
1) Hospital care, specialist care 
and sick-transport' 1,233 6,392 0.56 
2) Prescribed drugs 406 1,119 0.79 
3) Paramedical servicesb 116 399 0.17 
4) Medical devices 44 364 0.06 
5) Dental care 100 215 0.69 
6) Obstetrics and maternity care 43 610 0.05 
Total 1,941 6,938 0.96 
N=47,2tO. 
a) In 1993, the Dutch government required the sickness funds to administer a large part of the 
specialists care under the hospital care. Because the distinction between these two types of care 
is vague, they are taken together in one category. Sick-transport often is transport to a hospital. 
Therefore these costs are also included in the first cost-category. 
1» Paramedical services mainly consists of physical therapy (about 95%). 
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The standard deviation is Dfl. 6,938. Therefore the coefficient of variation is 
about 3.6 (~6,938fl,941). In the context of capitation payments and risk 
sharing, the focus is mostly on the total costs of members. However, when 
analyzing an insurer's incentives for selection, subgroups will be formed on the 
basis of total prior costs, prior costs for prescribed drugs and for paramedical 
services. When analyzing an insurer's incentives for efficiency with respect to 
specific types of care, the first three categories will be distinguished as specific 
types of care within the benefits package. The reason for distinguishing these 
types of care is that an insurer may use selective contracting with respect to 
hospitals, pharmacists and physical therapists as a tool for selection as well as 
for efficiency improvements. Together the costs for these types of care consti-
tute about 90% of the total costs. 
It is well known that in a certain year, many people have relatively low costs 
and few have relatively high costs. Together with the fact that some people do 
not have any expenditures at all, such a distribution is typical for annual health 
care expenditures. Van der Laan (1988) showed that the lognormal distribution 
better fits positive health care expenditure data than nine other theoretical 
distributions. Therefore in the first part of the study, some analyses were 
presented based on the assumption of lognormally distributed (positive) health 
care expenditures. However, in the present data set, various chi-square tests 
rejected the hypothesis of lognormal distributed (positive) health care expendi-
tures (p < 0.05). Thus the results of the theoretical analyses that are based on 
this assumption have to be interpreted with caution. 
The right tail of the empirical distribution appears to be thicker than that of the 
lognormal distribution. This is in line with findings of other researchers (Duan 
et ai., 1983). To give some insight in this tail of the empirical distribution, 
which is the most interesting in the context of capitation payments and risk 
sharing, Table 6.3 shows some percentile scores. For instance it can be seen 
that in 1993, 1 % of the members have costs above Dfl. 28,250. Five percent of 
the members have more costs than Dfl. 7,454 and ten percent more than Dfl. 
3,762. 
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Table 6.3 Some percentile scores for three types of care in 1993 
Types of care 
1) Hospital care, specialist care 
and sick-transport 
2) Prescribed dlUgs 
3) Paramedical services 
Total 
p,. 
24,766 
4,101 
1,833 
28,250 
P9, 
5,141 
1,866 
744 
7,454 
1,593 
1,107 
392 
3,762 
N =47,210. Overall mean costs are Dfl. 1.941. Other percentile scores for total costs are: 
P9S~Dfl. t6,573; P97~Dfl. tt,912; P96~Dfl. 9,220. 
Table 6.4 shows Pearson correlations for the total costs in the four consecutive 
years. In comparison with previous research the correlations are rather high but 
the pattern is similar. Based on these correlations and following the method of 
Van Vliet (1992), it has been estimated that in the present data set at most 25 
percent of the variance among individual annual health care expenditures is 
predictable by means of factors reflected in past spending. 
Table 6.4 Pearson correlations for total costs 
1990' 
1991 b 
1992 
N~47,21O. 
1991 
0.306 
1992 
0.233 
0.367 
1993 
0.188 
0.274 
0.425 
J) The costs in 1990 do not include the expenditures for prescribed drugs and medical devices 
because these are not available in the data set. 
b) The costs for prescribed drugs in 1991 are incomplete. Three months are missing. 
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Previous estimates of this maximum ranged from about 15% to at most 20% 
(Newhouse et aI., 1989; Van Vliet, 1992). One of the reason for the relatively 
high correlations and high maximum predictable variance in the present data set 
is that, in contrast to other studies, the total costs now include costs for pre-
scribed drugs. 
Table 6.5 shows the mean costs in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of 
demographic variables. With respect to age the costs vary between Oft. 750 for 
the young (5-19 years) and about Oft. 6,000 for the elderly (> =80 years). In 
rural areas the mean costs are about Oft. 1,600 and in very strongly urban areas 
the mean costs are about Oft. 2,200. The mean costs for disabled persons are 
about Oft. 3,700 which is more than twice as much as for persons who are not 
disabled. 
If the capitation payment would be the same for every individual, it is easy to 
identify (non-)preferred risks on the basis of demographic variables. The young, 
those living in rural areas and those that are not disabled would form preferred 
risks while the others would be non-preferred risks. Capitation payments that 
are based on demographic variables take into account the systematic variation in 
health care expenditures for subgroups based on demographic variables. 
Consequently demographic capitation payments reduce incentives for selection 
in comparison with ftat capitation payments. However, besides systematic 
variation of health care expenditures between subgroups based on demographic 
variables, it is well known that there is other systematic variation as well. In 
section three some examples will be given. 
Hospital admissions and diagnoses 
For each year and each hospital admission, the diagnosis is known in the form 
of the relevant code from the ICD-9-CM coding system". In principle, the 
disease is recorded that is diagnosed on admission because the sickness fund has 
to be notified of the reason for admission. However, notification is often 
delayed until after the discharge in which case the more informative discharge 
diagnosis is recorded. 
29 ICD-9-CM = International Classification of Disease 9th edition Clinical Modification. 
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Table 6.5 Mean costs in 1993 for snbgronps formed on the basis of demo-
graphic variables 
Men Women Total 
Age 
5-19 850 (79) 651 (31) 750 (42) 
20-34 1,518 (53) 785 (42) 1,154 (34) 
35-49 1,638 (83) 1,339 (78) 1,512 (58) 
50-64 2,454 (129) 2,645 (170) 2,535 (104) 
64-79 4,031 (191) 5,174 (307) 4,483 (168) 
>=80 5,548 (334) 6,881 (631) 5,912 (298) 
Degree of urbanization 
Very strongly urban 2,348 (151) 1,967 (156) 2,186 (109) 
Strongly urban 2,134 (86) 1,712 (95) 1,952 (64) 
Moderate 2,130 (84) 1,849 (98) 2,004 (64) 
Little urban 2,167 (104) 1,648 (93) 1,922 (71) 
Rural 1,776 (114) 1,495 (139) 1,643 (89) 
Disabled 
No 2,019 (45) 1,543 (46) 1,808 (32) 
Yes 3,721 (299) 3,752 (285) 3,737 (206) 
Total 2,116 (46) 1,723 (49) 1,941 (33) 
N=47.21O. Costs for obstetrics and maternity care appear to have been assigned to men lnstead 
of women in many cases. Therefore, the costs for men between 20 and 40 years are higher than 
could be expected on the basis of national statistics and for women in the same age groups they 
are lower. The standard error of the mean is presented between parentheses. 
The diagnoses can be classified into so-called diagnostic cost gronps. These 
were originally developed by Ash et al. (1989) in the context of the Medicare 
system in the United States. Lamers (1998) has developed diagnostic cost 
groups specifically for the Dutch situation. The present study mainly nses her 
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classification into five groups based on follow-up costs in the second and third 
year after hospital admission. This classification is used for distinguishing 
subgroups that might be employed by insurers to trace (non)-preferred risks. 
In 1992 6.6% of the members in the data set were hospitalized. The average 
length of stay for hospitalized members was about 12.4 days. In 1993 these 
figures were 7.4% and 13.0 days respectively. 
Health survey data 
In February 1993 a mailed health survey was conducted under those in the data 
set (Lamers, 1997b). The main purpose of the survey was to gather information 
on health status and (additional) medical consumption. About 15,000 persons 
received the health survey. They formed a random sample of the data set. The 
health survey was sent to 13,472 adults between 15 and 90 years old and to the 
parents of 1,509 children aged 5 to 14 years. The parents were asked to 
complete the questiOlmaire for their child. The net response rate for the total 
sample was 70.4%30. An analysis of the nonresponse showed that response 
was associated with age, sex, degree of urbanization and type of insurance. 
After correction for differences in demographic variables, respondents and non-
respondents differed in utilization for several types of care. Relatively more 
users than non-users responded. Response was not associated with utilization of 
care related to severe conditions such as inpatient hospital care. The conclusion 
from the nonresponse analysis Was that nonresponse bias resulted in a small 
overestimation of utilization of outpatient care. 
In the health survey individuals were asked whether they suffered from certain 
chronic medical conditions. The total list of chronic conditions included about 
25 conditions. The present study uses seven of these conditions. For the other 
conditions, the number of members suffering from them was considered to be 
too small, or members suffering from them did not have much higher costs on 
average than average members. 
30 For 10,553 of the 47,210 members, health survey data is available. 
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6.2 Methods 
In the empirical analyses cost predictions of the regulator and the insurer are 
simulated. Moreover several variants of the four forms of risk sharing as well 
as several variants of prior costs as a risk adjuster are employed. This section 
briefly describes the methods used. 
Cost predictions 
To generate two costs predictions for each individual, two regression models 
are used, a so-called demographic model and a so-called selection model. Both 
models are estimated by means of ordinary least squares with an individual's 
health care expenditures in 1993 as dependent variable and various risk 
adjusters as independent variables. This statistical specification closely follows 
the cell-based approach which is generally the form in which capitation pay-
ments are calculated in practice. Based on previous research it is likely that 
using a log-transformation of the dependent variable, or a two-part or even a 
four-part model would yield similar predictive accuracy as the more simple 
linear model (Duan et aI., 1983; Lamers and Van Vliet, 1996). The demo-
graphic model includes 31 dummies for age/sex groups, four dunmlies for 
degree of urbanization and one dummy for disability as risk adjusters. This 
model resembles the capitation formula that has been used in the Dutch sickness 
fund sector since .1995. Besides the demographic variables, the selection model 
also includes diagnostic cost groups and the total costs in 1992, 1991 and 1990 
as risk adjusters. It is assumed that the regulator uses the demographic model to 
calculate the normative costs and that the insurer uses the selection model to 
trace (non)-preferred risks. Some regression results are presen-ted in section 
6.3. The estimated coefficients are given in the appendix. 
Variants of risk sharing 
For each of the four forms of risk sharing several variants are simulated by 
varying the relevant parameters. Given certain parameter values the proportion 
of the expenditures that would be shared between the insurer and the regulator 
is calculated. Under risk sharing for high risks it is assumed that the insurer 
designates those members with the highest costs in the year immediately 
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preceding. This provides a good simulation of the consequences of risk sharing 
for high risks (see appendix). For each variant the overall indicators of the 
insurers' incentives for selection and efficiency are calculated. Then the mean 
result for various subgroups is presented, given a certain overall level of 
incentives for efficiency. Finally, given a certain overall level of incentives for 
selection, the insurers' portion of an efficiency gain is calculated under the 
assumption that the costs of certain types of care or for certain subgroups are 
reduced by a certain percentage. The results of this systematic comparison of 
risk sharing variants as a supplement to demographic capitation payments are 
given in chapter seven. 
Variallls of prior costs 
Like risk sharing, prior costs as a risk adjuster can take many forms. Three 
essential elements are: the types of care to which the costs refer, the period to 
which "prior" refers and the way the costs are included as a risk adjuster. In 
comparison with the essential elements of a form of risk sharing as given in 
chapter three, it is not necessary to have a list of members and to have a 
financing mechanism. Prior costs as a risk adjuster applies to all members and 
the addition of this risk adjuster will - in general - lower the weights (estimated 
coefficients) of the demographic risk adjusters. The difference between the 
weights of the demographic risk adjusters without prior costs as a risk adjuster 
on the one hand and those with prior costs as a risk adjuster on the other hand, 
automatically reflect a certain financing mechanism. 
In line with the choices that were made with respect to risk sharing, prior costs 
will refer to all types of care within the specified benefits package, will refer to 
a period of one year and will be included as a continuous variable as far as the 
costs are above a certain threshold. These choices prevent manipulation by 
insurers that could occur in the registration of different types of care and with 
expenditures around thresholds. They are also in line with previous studies that 
have analyzed prior costs as a risk adjuster (see chapter two). 
In comparison with the formal description of forms of risk sharing, the parame-
ters p and D are redundant. The parameter T remains the same but now refers 
to the costs in the previous year and the parameter a is replaced by an estimated 
coefficient bT • Because the estimated coefficient br automatically follows from 
140 
6.2 Methods 
the choice of the threshold, the prior cost models that will be analyzed in this 
study are described by one parameter only, i.e. the threshold. Like the main 
forms of risk sharing, the resulting capitation formulae that are partly based on 
prior costs do not seem difficult to implement, provided that the necessary cost 
data are available on individual level. The results of prior costs as an additional 
risk adjuster next to the demographic risk adjusters are given in chapter eight. 
These results are compared with those of the four forms of risk sharing as 
studied in chapter seven. 
6.3 Demographic capitation payments 
This section analyzes the incentives for selection if the regulator applies demo-
graphic capitation payments without any form of risk sharing. In section 6.3.1 
the overall indicators are calculated and in section 6.3.2 the predictable profits 
and losses for various subgroups are presented. 
6.3.1 Overall selection 
Table 6.6 shows the R'-value, the mean absolute result and the mean absolute 
predicted result for flat capitation payments and demographic capitation pay-
ments. For the calculation of the mean absolute predicted result, it is assumed 
that the insurer uses the selection model. The latter model yielded an R'-value 
of about 0.22 and a mean absolute result of Dfl. 1,967. Because it has been 
estimated that the maximum R'-value for the present data set is 0.25, it seems 
likely that the selection model can hardly be improved by an insurer given the 
available data. 
The R'-value of the demographic model is about 0.05. This is about one-fifth of 
the maximum R'-value, which is comparable with the results of previous studies 
(see chapter two). The mean absolute result for the demographic model is Dfl. 
2,250. This is a reduction of about seven percent in comparison with the mean 
absolute result for flat capitation payments. However, expressing the reduction 
this way does not take into account that the mean absolute result of the selection 
model is still Dfl. 1,967. So, the maximum reduction of the mean absolute 
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result appears to be about Ofl. 448. Therefore, the reduction of the mean 
absolute result in comparison with flat capitation payment is about 37% of the 
maximum reduction. 
Table 6.6 R'·value, mean absolute result and mean absolute predicted result 
for two capitation models 
FLAT 
DEMO 
R' 
o 
0.047 
MAR 
2,415 
2,250 
MAPR 
1,482 
982 
N=47,ZlO. FLAT=same capitation payment for each individual. DEMO=demographic model. 
MAR=mean absolute result. MAPR=mean absolute predicted result. 
The mean absolute predicted result of the demographic model is Ofl. 982. This 
is a reduction of about 34 % in comparison with the mean absolute predicted 
result of flat capitation payments. As argued in chapter two, the mean absolute 
predicted result yields a better indication of incentives for selection than the R'· 
value or the mean absolute result. Therefore it is concluded that, globally 
speaking, demographic capitation payments reduce an insurer's incentives for 
selection by about one·third in comparison with flat capitation payments. 
Table 6.7 shows the mean absolute result and several versions of a weighted 
mean absolute predicted result for the demographic model. As argued in chapter 
two, the latter indicator is useful if small profits and losses are irrelevant for 
selection. In all cases the weighted mean absolute predicted result is only 
slightly lower than the mean absolute predicted result. 
The last column shows that, if the weighing is right, the mean absolute pre· 
dieted result yields an overestimation of the incentives for selection of less than 
10 %. Thus under demographic capitation payments the question whether small 
profits and loss are relevant for selection seems unimportant. In any case their 
incentives for selection appear to be large. This is in line with the results of the 
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theoretical analysis as presented in the appendix of chapter two. 
Table 6.7 (Weighted) mean absolnte predicted result for demographic 
capitation payments 
(XI (X, DEMO Overestimation 
Absolute Relative 
MAPR 0 0 982 n.a. n.a. 
WMAPR' 10 10 973 9 0.9% 
WMAPR' 20 20 946 36 3.8% 
WMAPR' 30 30 898 84 9.3% 
WMAPRb Oft. 100 Oft. 100 978 4 0.4% 
WMAPRb Oft. 200 Oft. 200 962 20 2.1% 
WMAPRb Oft. 300 Oft. 300 925 57 6.2% 
WMAPR' 30 10 933 49 5.3% 
WMAPRb Oft. 300 Oft. 100 934 48 5.1% 
N=47,21O. DEMO = demographic model. MAPR mean absolute predicted result. 
\VMAPR= weighted mean absolute predicted result. The overestimation is calculated as 
(MAPR-WMAPR) and «MAPR-WMAPR)IWMAPR)*IOO% respectively. 
a) Small predictable profits and losses aTe defmed in relative tenns, i.e. those profits and losses 
that are smaller than a, % and (X2 % of the predicted costs based on the selection model 
respectively. 
b) Small predictable profits and losses are defined in absolute tenns, i.e. those profits and losses 
that arc smaller than Dfl. a l and Dfl. 0'2 respectively. 
The (weighted) mean absolute predicted result can not be calculated for all 
forms of risk sharing. Therefore Table 6.8 shows the mean result for (non)-
preferred risks for ftat capitation payments as well as demographic capitation 
payments. Preferred risks are those for whom the cost prediction of the selec-
tion model is lower than that of the capitation model. Others are non-preferred 
risks. 
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Table 6.8 Mean result for (non)-preferred risks for two capitation models 
Preferred risks 
Non-preferred risks 
FLAT 
N (%) MR 
72.9 
27.1 
1,011 
-2,715 
DEMO 
N (%) MR 
76.5 
23.5 
661 
-2,152 
N=47,21O. FLAT=same capitation payment for each individual. DEMO=demographic model. 
MR =mean result. 
Under ftat capitation payments 72.9% of the members form the group of 
preferred risks and 27. % form the group of non-preferred risks. The mean 
profit for preferred risks is Oft. 1,011 and the mean loss for non-preferred risks 
is Oft. 2,715. If ftat capitation payments are replaced by the demographic 
model, about 76.5% of the members are preferred risks and about 23.5 are 
non-preferred risks. Under the demographic model, the mean profit for pre-
ferred risks is Oft. 661 and the mean loss for non-preferred risks is Oft. 2,152. 
Based on these findings the demographic model reduces the incentives for 
selection by about 31 % in comparison with ftat capitation payments" . 
6.3.2 Selection of subgroups 
Table 6.9 shows 'the mean costs and the mean result in 1993 for subgroups 
formed on the basis of certain costs in 1991. The costs in 1993 for the 1 %-
group with the highest total expenditures in 1991 are Oft. 15,428, which is 
more than seven times the average. The mean predictable loss in 1993 for this 
subgroup is Oft. 11,673 per member. For those individuals who had no costs in 
1991, the mean costs in 1993 are abont Oft. 729 per member and the mean 
profit in 1993 is about Oft. 900 per member. For the 1 %-group with the highest 
expenditures for prescribed drugs in 1991, the mean costs in 1993 are Oft. 
15,945 per member and the mean loss is abont Oft. 12,000 per member. 
3] This reduction almost equals the reduction of the mean absolute predicted result. The 
small difference is caused by a small difference between the mean predicted costs by the 
selection model and the mean actual costs for the two subgroups that are distinguished. 
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Table 6.9 Mean costs and mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the 
basis of certain costs in 1991 
N 
(%) 
Total costs 1991 
0 14.3 
1-2,164 75.7 
2,165-4,651 5 
4,652-17,918 4 
> 17,918 1 
Prescribed drugs 1991 
o 28.4 
1-619 61.5 
620-1,098 5 
1,099-2,451 4 
>2,451 1 
Paramedical services 1991 
o 83 
1-336 7 
337-621 5 
622-1,532 4 
> 1,532 1 
Mean costs 
in 1993 
729 (43) 
1,603 (29) 
4,550 (211) 
6,062 (331) 
15,428 (1,525) 
838 (34) 
1,637 (33) 
4,924 (234) 
7,268 (350) 
15,945 (1,341) 
1,672 (32) 
2,398 (128) 
2,858 (215) 
3,551 (210) 
10,077 (1,073) 
Mean result in 1993 
under the DEMO-model 
883 
266 
-1,843 
-2,978 
-11,673 
711 
231 
-1,574 
-3,633 
-12,118 
212 
-491 
-694 
-1,063 
-6,403 
N=47,21O. Overall mean costs arc Dfl. 1,941. For each subgroup, the mean result differs 
statistically significantly from zero (two-sided Hest, p<O.05). The standard error of the mean 
is presented between parentheses. 
For the 1 %-group with the highest costs for paramedical services in 1991, the 
mean costs in 1993 are Dft. 10,077 per member and the mean loss is about Dft. 
6,000 per member. For those without prescribed drugs (about 20%) or without 
paramedical services (about 80%), the mean profit is about Dft. 700 and Dft. 
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200 per member respectivelyJ2. These findings clearly show that, if the regula-
tor applies demographic capitation payments without any form of risk sharing, 
those with high prior costs form non-preferred risks for an insurer whereas 
those with low prior costs form preferred risks. 
Table 6.10 shows the mean costs and the mean result in 1993 for some sub-
groups formed on the basis of prior hospitalization data. For those in diagnostic 
cost group 4 or 5 in 1992 (about 0.2%), the average costs in 1993 are about 
Dfl. 27,000 and the mean loss is more than Dfl. 20,000. About 0.4 % has been 
hospitalized with a diagnosis in diagnostic cost group 4 or 5 in the previous 
four years. Their average costs in 1993 are about Dfl. 16,000 and the mean loss 
is about Dfl. 12,000. About one percent had at least one hospitalization in three 
of the four preceding years. Their average costs are about Dfl. 16,000 and the 
mean loss is about Dfl. 12,000. For those without an hospitalization in 1992 
(about 93 %), the mean profit in 1993 is about Dfl. 300. For those who were 
not hospitalized in the previous four years (about 80%), the mean profit is 
almost Dfl. 500. Thus, based on prior hospitalization data, an insurer can easily 
identify (non)-preferred risks. 
Table 6.11 shows the mean costs and the mean result for subgroups based on 
the presence of certain chronic conditions, the use of home care, the consulta-
tion of an alternative practitioner and the level of education. The average costs 
are highest for those suffering from a serious heart disease, diabetes mellitus or 
cancer, and for those using home care. For the subgroups formed on the basis 
of education the differences are small. However, with respect to thls socio-
economic variable, it should be noted that the data set includes sickness fund 
members only and therefore higher-income groups are virtually not included. 
Those with a chronic condition, especially those suffering from diabetes, a 
serious heart disease or cancer, form non-preferred risks. The mean loss for 
those with at least one chronic condition (about 40%) is Dfl. 820. For those 
31 In the remainder of this study the mean costs and the mean result for a certain subgroup 
refer to the mean costs and the mean result per member of the specific subgroup, unless stated 
otherwise. 
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suffering from diabetes (1.7%), a heart disease (1.8%) or cancer (1.2%), the 
mean loss is abont Dft. 2,900, Oft. 4,300 and Oft. 5,600 respectively. 
Table 6.10 Mean resnlt in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of 
hospital admissions and diagnostic cost groups in previous years 
DCG in 1992 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4+5 
Unknown' 
N 
(%) 
93.3 
2.3 
1.8 
0.9 
0.2 
1.5 
Mean costs 
in 1993 
1,569 (26) 
3,513 (309) 
7,253 (592) 
14,387 (1,283) 
26,672 (5,857) 
5,975 (498) 
Highest DCG in the period 1989-1992 
1 8.3 2,371 (111) 
2 5.6 4,493 (213) 
3 3.1 9,218 (548) 
4+5 0.4 16,027 (2,411) 
Unknown' 2.8 3,295 (218) 
No. years with hospitalization 
ill the period 1989-1992 
o 79.8 
1 
2 
3 or 4 
15.5 
3.7 
1 
1,307 (24) 
3,222 (105) 
6,329 (371) 
16,079 (1,423) 
Mean result in 1993 
under the DEMO-model 
305 
-1.395 
-4,179 
-10,694 
-22,601 
-2,828 
-417 
-1,584 
-5,732 
-12,159 
-623 
468 
-812 
-3,262 
-12,398 
N=47,21O. Overall mean costs are Dfl. 1,941. For each subgroup, the mean result differs 
statistically significantly from zero (two~sided Hest, p<O.05). The standard error of the mean 
is presented between parentheses. 
a) These persons were hospitalized but the diagnosis is not available. 
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Table 6.11 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of health 
survey data 
N Mean costs Mean result 
(%) in 1993 in 1993 
Presence of chronic conditions" 
None 61.1 1,097 (53) 523 
At least one 38.9 3,260 (156) -820 
Asthma 5.0 3,839 (360) -1,408 
Heart disease 1.8 8,062 (1,268) -4,330 
Hypertension 6.9 4,228 (476) -1,123 
Diabetes mellitus 1.7 6.492 (1,001) -2,895 
Arthrosis 6.3 4,036 (371) -755' 
Rheumatism 2.9 4,480 (770) -1,411' 
Cancer 1.2 8,747 (2,052) -5,602 
Use of home help 61' nursing 
No 95.1 1,625 (57) 178 
Yes 4.9 7,098 (791) -3,487 
Use of alternative practitioner 
No 90.8 1,834 (72) 49' 
Yes 9.2 2,292 (186) -475 
Educationb 
Low 58.3 2,147 (94) -50' 
Medium 28,0 1,422 (103) 37' 
High 10.3 1,209 (145) 249 
Unknown 3.4 3,393 (612) -209' 
N ~ lO,553. Overall mean costs are Dn. 1,890. The standard error of the mean is presented 
between parentheses. 
') Not statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided I-test, p>O.OS). 
a) These conditions were still under treatment in 1993. Asthma includes chronic bronchitis and 
COPD. Heart disease refers to a serious heart disease or heart attack. Arthrosis refers to 
arthrosis of knees, hips or hands. 
h) Low='LBO' or Jess; Medium='MAVO' or 'MBO'; High='HAVO', 'VWO', 'HBD' or 
'WO·. This refers to levels of education that are usually distinguished in The Netherlands. 
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For those that suffer from arthrosis or rheumatism the mean loss is not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. The predictable loss for those individuals 
that receive some form of home care (about 5%) is about Oft. 3,500. 
Those without any chronic condition, those that do not receive home care, those 
that do not consult an alternative practitioner and those with a high education 
generate predictable profits. These profits range from about Oft. 200 for those 
that do not use home care to almost Oft. 600 for those without any chronic 
conditions. 
Summarizing this section clearly shows that an insurer can easily identify 
systema-tic variation in individual health care expenditures that is not accounted 
for by demographic capitation payments. In line with the findings of other 
studies the predictable profits and losses are substantial. Therefore demographic 
capitation payments leave ample room for selection by insurers. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The data set contains administrative data for six consecutive years (1988-1993) 
for about 47,200 members of one Dutch sickness fund. Every member had the 
same insurance coverage and the same insurance modality. The data include 
demographic variables, the annual costs for several types of care and the 
diagnoses from hospital admissions. For a subset of about 10,500 members, 
health survey data is available also. The average health care expenditnres in 
1993 are Oft. 1,941. 
An important difference with previous studies is that the data set for the present 
study includes the costs of prescribed drugs, at least for the last two years. This 
has the following consequences. First only four percent of the members did not 
have any health care expenditures in 1993. In previous studies, the percentage 
of members without any expenditures was generally much larger. Second the 
distribution of health care expenditures is somewhat less skew than in previous 
studies. The coefficient of variation is about 3.6 whereas in previous studies it 
was at least four. Nevertheless the right tail of the distribution still is thicker 
than that of the theoretical lognormal distribution. Therefore, in the present data 
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set, several chi-square tests rejected the hypothesis of lognormally distribnted 
(positive) expenditures. Third the correlation between the total costs in two 
consecutive years is about 0.4. In previous studies this correlation was about 
0.3 only. Finally the maximum variance in individual annual health care 
expenditures that is predictable by means of factors ref!ected in past spending is 
estimated to be 0.25. Previous estimates of this maximum ranged from about 
0.15 to at most 0.20 (Newhouse et aI., 1989; Van Vliet, 1992). 
Given these findings it is clear that most theoretical analyses that were presented 
in the first part of this study should be interpreted with caution. Remember that 
these theoretical analyses are based on the assumption of lognormally distributed 
(positive) health care expenditures and illustrated with numerical examples 
assuming average costs of Of!. 2,000, a coefficient of variation of four, a 
probability of positive costs of 0.8 and a correlation between the total costs in 
two consecutive years of 0.3. 
Although there are some differences with previous studies, the systematic 
variation in health care expenditures that can be traced by demographic vari-
ables in the present study is similar. The average costs for those of 80 years or 
older is about Of!. 6,000 which is about three times the overall average. The 
average costs for those below 20 years is about Of!. 750. The average costs in 
rural areas are lower than in very strongly urban areas. The costs of those who 
receive a disability allowance from the government are almost twice the overall 
average. A regression model with age, gender, degree of urbanization and 
disability as risk adjusters explained about five percent of the variance in 
individual annual health care expenditures which is about one-fifth of the 
estimate of the maximum predictable variance in the present data set. This 
finding is comparable with other studies on demographic capitation payments. 
Under demographic capitation payments an insurer can easily identify subgroups 
that generate substantial predictable profits or losses. Consequently insurers 
have strong incentives for selection. For instance, for the group of 1 % with the 
highest total costs or with the highest costs for prescribed drugs two years ago, 
the mean loss is about Of!. 12,000 per member. For those without any costs 
two years ago the mean profit is about Of!. 900 per member. 
For those with a hospitalization in at least three of the four preceding years the 
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mean loss is about OIl. 12,000 per member. For those without a hospitalization 
in each of the four preceding years the mean profit is about Ofl. 500 per 
member. 
For those that suffer from a serious heart disease, diabetes or cancer, the mean 
losses are about Ofl. 4,300, Ofl. 2,900 and Ofl. 5,600 per member respective-
ly. For those without any chronic medical condition the mean profit is about 
Ofl. 500 per member. 
Finally for those that receive some form of home care, the mean predictable 
loss is about Ofl. 3,500 per member. For those that do not receive any home 
care, the mean predictable profit is about Ofl. 200 per member. Thus, although 
demographic variables are useful to calculate capitation payments, they are 
certainly not sufficient. Generally speaking demographic capitation payments 
reduce an insurer's incentives for selection by about one-third in comparison 
with flat capitation payments. It was shown that ignoring some small predictable 
profits and losses hardly influences this conclusion. 
The next chapter supplements the demographic capitation payments with several 
variants of the four forms of risk sharing and focuses on the reduction of the 
incentives for selection. Because risk sharing also reduces an insurer's incen-
tives for efficiency, this effect is also analyzed. As argued in chapter five, it is 
up to the regulator to weigh the reduction of incentives for selection against the 
reduction of the incentives for efficiency. 
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Table A.6.1 Coefficients of the demographic and the selection model 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
> ~75 
Very strongly urban 
Strongly urban 
Moderate 
Little urban 
Disabled 
DCa 1992~ I 
Dca 1992~2 
Dca 1992~3 
Dca 1992~4 or 5 
Dca 1992~unknown 
Dca 1991 ~ I 
Dca 1991 ~2 
Dca 1991~3 
Dca 1991 ~4 or 5 
Dca 1991 ~lInknown 
Dca 1990~1 
Dca 1990~2 
Dca 1990~3 
Dca 1990~4 or 5 
Dca 1990~unknown 
Total costs in 1992 
Total costs in 1991 
Total costs in 1990 
Women 
410 
504 
349 
397 
381 
660 
730 
804 
1.192 
1,313 
1,809 
2.286 
4,409 
5,284 
6,242 
217 
303 
250 
261 
2,080 
Men 
497 
636 
747 
881 
1,290 
1,356 
1,117 
1,221 
1.359 
1,610 
1,679 
2,555 
2,794 
4,115 
5,144 
Women 
195 
320 
191 
210 
165 
363 
464 
514 
599 
770 
987 
1,336 
2,675 
2,874 
3,717 
49 
158 
101 
133 
887 
-2,234 
-1,411 
79 
7,324 
-2,093 
-475 
-133 
1,128 
5,733 
-144 
79 
645 
1,579 
-293 
-326 
0.46 
0.14 
0.11 
Men 
323 
278 
494 
568 
783 
791 
707 
732 
745 
983 
862 
1,223 
1,430 
2,172 
2,662 
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Table A.6.1 shows the estimated coefficients for the demographic model (left) 
and for the selection model (right). The estimated coefficients of some groups 
are not statistically significantly different from zero and in some cases, the 
estimated coefficients of two groups do not differ statistically significantly. 
Nevertheless these groups are retained (separately) in the model(s). One reason 
is that regulators commonly use a cell-based approach to calculate normative 
cost levels in practice. Another reason is that the present study mainly focuses 
on the overall accuracy of the cost predictions. 
Designation strategy in the case of risk sharing for high risks 
To analyze risk sharing for high risks empirically, an assumption has to be 
made about the designation strategy of the insurer. It will be assumed that the 
insurer designates those members who have had the highest costs in the year 
immediately preceding. Additional analyses have shown that a designation 
strategy based on the highest predicted losses of the insurer (i.e. the cost 
prediction of the selection model minus the cost prediction of the demographic 
model) would increase the insurer's revenue by about one percent only. 
Therefore the empirical illustrations slightly underestimate the potential of risk 
sharing for high risks to reduce predictable profits and losses for an insurer, 
because the insurer could employ better designation strategies. On the other 
hand, the empirical illustrations slightly overestimate the potential of risk 
\ 
sharing for high risks because lags in claims processing would prevent insurers 
from employing our designation strategy exactly and because they have no 
claims history of new emolees. However, insurers might employ the most 
recent claims his wry of their members and for new emolees some relevant 
indicator of the claims history might be passed from one insurer to another. If 
insurers update their claims files every month, they can use information of the 
first 10 or II months of a year to decide whether members are designated for 
risk sharing for the next year. With respect to new emolees an alternative might 
be to pass on from one insurer to another information about whether a member 
was designated for risk sharing in the previous year. Based on these findings 
and considerations, it seems likely that the empirical analyses provide a good 
illustration of the potential consequences of risk sharing for high risks. 
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Table A.6.2 Actual and normative costs as a percentage of total costs for 
designated members nnder risk sharing for high risks 
1% 2% 3% 4% 
Members designated on the basis of their predicted loss 
Actual costs II. 7 16.6 21.0 24.3 
Normative costs 1.9 3.7 5.4 6.9 
Difference 9.8 12.9 15.6 17.4 
Members designated on the basis of their total costs in the previolls year 
Actual Costs 10.9 16.8 20.4 23.8 
Nonnative Costs 2.0 3.9 5.6 7.2 
Difference 8.9 12.9 14.8 16.6 
N =47 ,210. The normative costs equal the predicted costs based on the demographic model. 
The predicted loss for a member is calculated as predicted costs via the selection model minus 
the predicted costs via the demographic model. 
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7. Risk sharing as a supplement to demographic 
capitation payments 
This chapter analyzes the reduction of an insurer's incentives for selection as 
well as for efficiency if the four forms of risk sharing as described in chapter 
three, are used as a supplement to demographic capitation payments33 • For 
each form of risk sharing several variants are employed. In all cases the risk 
sharing is financed via a uniform percentage of the normative costs (see 
appendix). First section 7.1 presents the proportion shared expenditures for the 
risk sharing variants. Then section 7.2 compares the forms of risk sharing using 
the overall indicators of incentives for selection and efficiency. Given a certain 
overall level of incentives for efficiency, section 7.3 analyzes the incentives to 
select various subgroups. Given a certain overall level of incentives for selec-
tion, section 7.4 analyzes the incentives to improve efficiency for different types 
of care and for different subgroups. Section 7.5 contains the conclusions. 
7.1 Proportion shared expenditures 
Under proportional risk sharing the proportion shared expenditures equals the 
weight on the actual expenditures. Table 7.1 shows the proportion shared 
expenditures for some variants of the other three forms of risk sharing. Under 
risk sharing for high-risks for I % of the members, the proportion shared 
expenditures is 0.1134. If 8% of the members are designated, the proportion 
shared expenditures is 0.34. Under risk sharing for high-costs for 0.25 % of the 
members, the proportion shared expenditures is 0.13. In this case members with 
costs above Ofl. 60,236 are designated. If 4% of the members are designated, 
the proportion shared expenditures is 0.52 and the implicit threshold is Ofl. 
9,207. Under outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Ofl. 40,000, the propor-
H The main findings of this chapter can also be found in Van Barneveld et a!. (1999b). 
J~ Remember that under risk sharing for high risks it is assumed that an insurer designates 
those members with the highest costs in the previous year (see also chapter six). 
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tion shared expenditures is 0.09. About 0.6% of the members have costs above 
Oft. 40,000. If the threshold is lowered to Oft. 5,000, the proportion shared 
expenditures is 0.44 and about 7.3% of the members are designated. 
Table 7.1 Proportion shared expenditures pel' risk sharing variant 
RSHR (P) 1% 
PSE 0.11 
RSHC (P) 0.25% 
PSE 0.13 
Implicit threshold 60,236 
ORS (T) 40,000 
PSE 0.09 
% Designated 0.6 
2% 
0.17 
0.5% 
0.19 
43,287 
30,000 
0.13 
0.9 
3% 
0.20 
0.75% 
0.24 
34,197 
20,000 
0.19 
1.6 
4% 
0.24 
1% 
0.28 
28,344 
10,000 
0.31 
3.7 
8% 
0.34 
4% 
0.52 
9,207 
5,000 
0.44 
7.3 
N=47,21O. PSE=proportion shared expenditures. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing 
for high-risks. RSHC =demographic model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS =demographic 
model + outlier risk sharing. 
For risk sharing for high-costs and outlier risk sharing these results are in line 
with those of the theoretical analyses of chapter three. For risk sharing for high-
risks the empirical proportion shared expenditures appears to be substantially 
higher then the theoretical one. Part of this difference is due the higher correla-
tion between the costs in 1992 and 1993 than was assumed in the theoretical 
analysis (0.4 versus 0.3). Equation (3.1) of chapter three shows that a higher 
correlation leads to a larger proportion shared expenditures. However, this 
could not explain the whole difference. Apparently Equation (3.1) yields an 
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underestimation of the proportion shared expenditures. In Table 7.1 the results 
for the main forms of risk sharing should be read separately. It is not yet 
intended to compare the results of the main forms of risk sharing. Such a 
comparison will be made in the next section. 
7.2 Overall results 
This section compares the consequences of the four forms of risk sharing using 
the overall indicators of incentives for selection and efficiency. As shown in the 
previous chapter, under demographic capitation payments, the mean profit on 
preferred risks is Oft. 661 and the mean loss on non-preferred risks is Oft. 
2,152. Table 7.2 shows the mean result for both subgroups after the demo-
graphic model has been supplemented with risk sharing. After risk sharing for 
high-risks for I % of the members has been added to the demographic model, 
the mean profit on the preferred risks reduces to Oft. 487. The mean loss on 
the non-preferred risks reduces to Oft. 1,584. In comparison with ftat capitation 
payments, the incentives for selection are now reduced by 49%. If 4% of the 
members are designated, the reduction is 64 %. After risk sharing for high-costs 
for 0.25% of the members, the mean profit on preferred risks is reduced to Oft. 
505. The mean loss on non-preferred risks is reduced to Oft. 1,644. The 
incentives for selection are reduced by 48 % in comparison with ftat capitation 
payments. If 1 % of the members are designated, the reduction is 59%. After 
olltlier risk sharil/g with a threshold of Oft. 40,000, the mean profit on pre-
ferred risks is reduced to Oft. 549. 
The mean loss on non-preferred risks is reduced to Oft. 1,787. The incentives 
for selection are reduced by 43 % in comparison with ftat capitation payments. 
If the threshold is lowered to Oft. 10,000, the reduction is 62 %. 
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Table 7.2 Mean result for (non)-preferred risks and the reduction of the 
incentives for selection 
N DEMO RSHR RSHR RSHR RSHR 
(1 %) (2%) (3%) (4%) 
Preferred 76.5 661 487 411 375 342 
Non-pref. 23.5 -2,152 -1,584 -1,336 -1,220 -1,113 
Reduction' 0.31 0.49 0.57 0.61 0.64 
N DEMO RSHC RSHC RSHC RSHC 
(0.25%) (0.5%) (0.75%) (1 %) 
Preferred 76.5 661 505 454 417 392 
Non-pref. 23.5 -2,152 -1,644 -1,478 -1,357 -1,275 
Reduction' 0.31 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.59 
N DEMO ORS ORS ORS ORS 
(40,000) (30,000) (20,000) (10,000) 
Preferred 76.5 661 549 514 458 363 
Non-pref. 23.5 -2,152 -1,787 -1,671 -1,489 -1,181 
Reduction' 0.31 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.62 
N=47.2lO. DEMO=demographic model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. 
a) The reduction is expressed as a fraction in comparison with flat capitation payments (see also 
chapter five). 
Risk sharing also reduces an insurer's incentives for efficiency. Chapter four 
showed that under risk sharing for high risks or high-costs, the insurer's portion 
of this efficiency gain equals one minus the proportion shared expenditures if an 
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insurer reduces all expenditures by a certain percentage. Under outlier risk 
sharing the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain will be lower than one minus 
the proportion shared expenditures. Table 7.3 shows the insurer's portion of the 
efficiency gain if the insurer reduces all expenditures by 10 %. The latter figure 
is based on the findings in chapter four. 
Table 7.3 Insurer's portion of a ten percent overall efficiency gain (IPEG) 
RSHR (P) 1% 2% 3% 4% 8% 
IPEG 0.89 0.83 0.80 0.76 0.66 
RSHC (P) 0.25% 0.5% 0.75% 1% 4% 
IPEG 0.87 0.81 0.76 0.72 0.48 
ORS (T) 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 5,000 
IPEG 0.80 0.74 0.66 0.51 0.38 
N~47.21O. RSHR~demagraphic madel + risk sharing far high-risks. RSHC~demagraphic 
model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS =demographic model + outlier risk sharing. 
IPEG=insurer's portion of the efficiency gain. 
Under outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Dfl. 40,000, the insurer's portion 
of the efficiency gain is 0.80. If the threshold is Dfl. 5,000, it is 0.38. These 
results for outlier risk sharing are comparable to those of chapter four. 
In Table 7.2 and 7.3 the results for the main forms of risk sharing should still 
be read separately. In order to make a comparison between the main forms of 
risk sharing, these overall results are now placed in Figure 7.1. The x-axis 
shows the reduction of the predictable profits and losses as given in Table 7.2. 
The y-axis shows the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain as given in Table 
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Figure 7.1 Overall results for four main forms of risk sharing as a supple-
ment to demographic capitation payments 
7.3. The point (0.31; 1) represents demographic capitation payments without 
any form of risk sharing. The line between (0.31; 1) and (1; 0) represents all 
possible variants of proportional risk sharing. The points in the Figure show the 
variants of the other three forms of risk sharing. The Figure clearly shows that 
risk sharing for high-risks yields a better tradeoff between selection and 
efficiency than the other forms of risk sharing. Given a certain reduction of 
incentives for selection, the incentives for efficiency are higher. The other way 
around, given a certain level of incentives for efficiency, the reduction of the 
incentives for selection is higher. The performance of proportional risk sharing 
and outlier risk sharing is comparable with the former slightly better. Risk 
sharing for high-costs has an intermediate position. In the remainder of this 
chapter, the other (overall) indicators of incentives for selection and efficiency 
are used to evaluate the consequences of the four forms of risk sharing. The 
purpose is to investigate whether the conclusions above remain valid. 
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Table 7.4 The reduction of incentives for selection if small predictable 
profits and losses are irrelevant for selection 
<Xl <X, DEMO RSHR RSHR 
(2%) (4%) 
Reduction' 0% 0% 0.31 0.57 0.64 
Reductionb 10% 10% 0.32 0.58 0.65 
Reductionb 30% 30% 0.34 0.60 0.67 
Reduction' Ofl. 100 Ofl. 100 0.31 0.57 0.64 
Reduction' Ofl. 300 Ofl. 300 0.34 0.59 0.66 
RSHC RSHC ORS ORS 
(0.5%) (1 %) (30,000) (10,000) 
Reduction' 0 0 0.52 0.59 0.46 0.62 
Reductionb 10% 10% 0.53 0.60 0.47 0.62 
Reductionb 30% 30% 0.55 0.61 0.49 0.64 
Reduction' Dfl. 100 Ofl. 100 0.52 0.59 0.46 0.62 
Reduction' Ofl. 300 Ofl.300 0.54 0.60 0.49 0.63 
N=47.21O. DEMO=demographic model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high·costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. 
') See also Table 7.2. 
b) Persons with a small predictable profit are defmed as those for whom the cost prediction 
based on the demographic model minus that of the selection model is smaller than a, % of the 
cost prediction of the selection model. Persons with a small predictable loss are defined 
similarly with (X2 instead of ai' 
C) Small predictable profits and losses are defined in absolute rather than relative tenns, 
Allother overall illdicator of illcentives for selectioll 
Table 7.4 shows the results under the assumption that insurers ignore small 
predictable profits and losses. This does not appear to change the reduction of 
the incentives for selection very much. Moreover the relative performance of 
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the forms of risk sharing is not changed in comparison with Figure 7.1. 
Therefore the conclusion that risk sharing for high risks as well as risk sharing 
for high costs yield a better tradeoff between selection and efficiency than either 
outlier or proportional risk sharing is also true if insurers ignore small predict-
able profits and losses. 
Allother overall illdicator of illcelltives for efficiency 
As explained in chapter four the so-called weighted expenditures measure is an 
alternative overall indicator of an insurer's incentives for efficiency. 'Under risk 
sharing for high-risks and proportional risk sharing, this measure equals one 
minus the proportion shared expenditures. Under risk sharing for high costs or 
outlier risk sharing, it depends on the (implicit) threshold and the length of the 
cost interval after which an insurer is assumed to recalculate its incentives for 
efficiency with respect to future expenditures for a particular member in the 
remainder of a year. 
Table 7.5 shows the weighted expenditures for six thresholds and three lengths 
of the cost intervals. The length of the cost intervals is varied between Oft. 
1,000 and Oft. 10,000. The latter value is chosen because nearly all threshold 
amounts in the Table can be divided into parts of Oft. 10,000 and because 
larger cost intervals seem unrealistic. 
\ 
If the threshold is Oft. 60,000 and the length of the cost intervals is Oft. 
10,000, the weighted expenditures measure is 0.94. The lower the threshold and 
the smaller the cost intervals, the lower is the weighted expenditures measure. 
If the threshold is Oft. 5,000 and the length of the cost intervals is Oft. 1,000, 
it is 0.38. 
With this overall indicator of incentives for efficiency, risk sharing for high-cost 
with a certain implicit threshold performs better than olltlier risk sharing with 
the same threshold. The incentives for efficiency then are the same, but under 
risk sharing for high-costs the incentives for selection are lower. 
For instance, risk sharing for high-costs for 0.5% of the members implies a 
threshold of about Oft. 43,000 and a reduction of the incentives for selection of 
52% (see Table 7.1 and 7.2). Outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Oft. 
40,000 reduces the incentives for selection with 43% only (see Table 7.2). 
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Another example is risk sharing for high-costs for 0.75% of the members. This 
implies a threshold of about Oft. 34,000 and reduces the incentives for selection 
with 57% (see Table 7.1 and 7.2). Outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Oft. 
30,000 reduces the incentives for selection with 52 % only (see Table 7.2). 
Table 7.5 Weighted expenditnres 
T (Oft.)\k (Oft.) 1,000 5,000 10,000 
60,000 0.89 0.93 0.94 
50,000 0.86 0.90 0.92 
40,000 0.82 0.87 0.89 
30,000 0.77 0.83 0.85 
20,000 0.69 0.76 0.79 
10,000 0.56 0.64 0.66 
5,000 0.38 0.51 n.a. 
N =47 ,210. T=(implicit) threshold under risk sharing for high-cost or outlier risk sharing. 
k = length of the cost intervals below the threshold. 
Let us now compare risk sharing for high-costs with risk sharing for high-risks. 
If the length of the cost interval is near zero, chapter four showed that the 
weighted expenditures measure under risk sharing for high costs equals one 
minus the proportion shared expenditures. Thus it also equals the insurer's 
portion of the efficiency gain if the costs for each member is reduced by a 
certain percentage. Therefore, for small costs intervals, risk sharing for high-
risks remains preferable above risk sharing for high-costs. For instance, if the 
length of the cost intervals is Oft. 1,000 and risk sharing for high costs for 1% 
of the members is considered, the implicit threshold is lower than Oft. 30,000 
(see Table 7.1). Therefore the weighted expenditures measure is lower than 
0.77 (see Table 7.5) and the reduction of incentives for selection is 0.59. Risk 
sharing for high risks for 4 % of the members yields similar incentives for effi-
ciency (see Table 7.3), but the reduction of incentives for selection then is 0.64 
(see Table 7.2). 
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However, if the length of the cost interval is larger, risk sharing for high costs 
may become preferable above risk sharing for high risks. For instance, if the 
length of the cost interval is Dfl. 10,000 and risk sharing for high costs for 1% 
of the members is considered, the implicit threshold is about Dfl. 30,000, the 
weighted expenditures measure is about 0.85, and the reduction of incentives 
for selection is 0.59. Risk sharing for high risks for less than 2% of the 
members yield similar incentives for efficiency (see Table 7.3). In that case the 
reduction of incentives for selection is lower than 0.57 (see Table 7.2). 
Thus with the weighted expenditures measure as an overall indicator of incen-
tives for effIciency, which form of risk sharing yields the best selection-effi-
ciency tradeoff depends on the assumption how quickly an insurer recalculates 
its incentives for efficiency with respect to a member after some expenditures 
have occurred. 
Generally speaking this section showed that risk sharing for high risks and risk 
sharing for high costs yield a better tradeoff between selection and efficiency 
than either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. 
7.3 Selection of subgroups 
This section analyzes an insurer's incentives to attract or deter specific sub-
groups under the assumption that the regulator wants to retain an overall level 
of 80% for an insurer's incentives for efficiency". The easiest way to achieve 
this level of efficiency is to apply proportional risk sharing with a weight of 0.2 
on actual costs. This reduces the predictable profits and losses for each sub-
group by 20 %. As alternatives the regulator may apply risk sharing for high-
risks for 3 % of the members, risk sharing for high-costs for 0.5 % of the 
members or outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Dfl. 40,000 (see Table 7.3). 
35 The appendix shows additional results under the assumption that the regulator wants to 
retain 65 % of the overall incentives for efficiency. 
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Table 7.6 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of certain 
costs in 1991 
N DEMO RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(%) (3%) (0.5%) (40,000) (0.2) 
Total cost 1991 
0 14.3 883 662 661 768 706 
1-2,164 75.7 266 83 132 191 213 
2,165-4,651 5 -1,843 -1,524 -1,484 -1,708 -1,474 
4,652-17,918 4 -2,978 -1,371 -2,098 -2,504 -2,382 
> 17,918 1 -11,673 -2,684 -3,679 -6,899 -9,338 
Prescribed d1'llgs 1991 
0 28.4 711 516 514 614 569 
1-619 61.5 231 77 118 166 185 
620-1,098 5 -1,574 -1,471 -1,106 -1,405 -1,259 
1,099-2,451 4 -3,633 -2,152 -2,635 -3,045 -2,906 
>2,451 1 -12,118 -3,470 -5,894 -8,526 -9,694 
Paramedical services 1991 
0 83 212 130 152 178 170 
1-336 7 -491 -407 -424 -482 -393 
337-621 5 -694 -427 -418 -503 -555 
622-1,532 4 -1,063 -820 -939 -1,033 -850 
> 1,532 1 -6,403 -2,540 -3,791 -4,722 -5,122 
N=47,21O. DEMO=demographic model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=dcmographic model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. All results arc statistically significantly different from zero, two-sided t-
test. p<O.05. 
Althongh the previons section showed that risk sharing for high-risks then yields 
the greatest reduction of the overall predictable profits and losses, the results 
may be different with respect to different subgroups. Table 7.6 shows the 
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predictable profits and losses for the subgroups formed on the basis of certain 
costs in 1991. For instance, for those with the highest costs in 1991, the mean 
predictable loss is reduced to Ofl. 2,684 under risk sharing for high-risks, to 
Ofl. 3,679 under risk sharing for high-costs and to Ofl. 6,899 under outlier risk 
sharing. Under proportional risk sharing the predictable loss is Ofl. 9,338. 
Similar results are found for those with the highest costs for prescribed drugs in 
1991 and for those with the highest costs for paramedical services in 1991. 
For those without any costs in 1991 or those without costs for prescribed drugs 
or paramedical services, risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high 
costs yield similar remaining profits. These profits are lower than those under 
outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. 
Table 7.7 shows the subgroups formed on the basis of prior hospitalization data. 
For instance for those who were hospitalized in at least three of the four preced-
ing years, the remaining predictable loss under risk sharing for high risks is 
about Ofl. 2,600. Under risk sharing for high costs the remaining loss is about 
Ofl. 5,100. Under outlier risk sharing it is about Ofl. 8,100 and under propor-
tional risk sharing Ofl. 9,900. 
Table 7.8 shows the consequences for subgroups formed on the basis of health 
survey data. For almost all subgroups with people that suffer from certain 
chronic conditions, risk sharing for high-risks as well as risk sharing for high 
costs lead to larger reductions of the predictable losses than either outlier risk 
sharing or proportional risk sharing. For instance, for those suffering from a 
serious heart disease, risk sharing for high risks reduces the mean predictable 
loss to about Ofl. 1,900 and risk sharing for high costs reduces it to about Ofl. 
2,000. Under outlier risk sharing and under proportional risk sharing, the 
remaining loss is about Ofl. 3,400. For those suffering from cancer, risk 
sharing for high-risks reduces the mean predictable loss to about Ofl. 1,200 and 
risk sharing for high-costs to Ofl. 2,000. Under outlier risk sharing the remain-
ing loss is about Ofl. 3,500 and under proportional risk sharing it is Ofl. 4,500. 
For those without any chronic condition, risk sharing for high risks reduces the 
predictable profit to about Ofl. 320 and risk sharing for high costs reduces it to 
Ofl. 380. The profits after outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing are 
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about Oft. 450 and Oft. 420 respectively. 
Table 7.7 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of 
hospital admissions and diagnostic cost groups in previous years 
N DEMO RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(%) (3%) (0.5%) (40,000) (0.2) 
Dec ill 1992 
0 93.3 305 80 156 224 244 
I 2.3 -1,395 -781 -866 -1,173 -1,116 
2 1.8 -4,179 -1,472 -2,344 -3,160 -3,343 
3 0.9 -10,694 -1,382 -4,425 -7,420 -8,555 
4+5 0.2 -22,601 -1,734 -7,546 -12,391 -18,081 
Unknown' 1.5 -2,828 -947 -1,989 -2,430 -2,262 
Highest DeC in the period 1989-1992 
1 8.3 -417 -474 -414 -436 -334 
2 5.6 -1,584 -1,114 -1,133 -1,418 -1,267 
3 3.1 -5,732 -1,694 -2,614 -4,060 -4,586 
4+5 0.4 -12,159 -2,803 -5,090 -7,412 -9,727 
Unknown' 2,8 -623 -465 -673 -680 -498 
No. years with hospitalization 
ill the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 226 281 371 374 
1 15.5 -812 -620 -640 -755 -650 
2 3.7 -3,262 -1,558 -1,959 -2,575 -2,610 
3 or 4 1 -12,398 -2,593 -5,088 -8,143 -9,918 
N~47.21O. DEMO~demographic model. RSHR~demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC~deIl1ographic model + risk sharing for high·costs. ORS~demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. All results arc statistically significantly different from zero, two-sided t-
test, p<O.05. 
a) These persons were hospitalized but the diagnosis is not available. 
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Table 7.8 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of health 
survey data 
N DEMO RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(%) (3%) (0.5%) (40,000) (0.2) 
Presence of chronic conditions 
None 61.1 523 322 375 451 418 
At least one 38.9 -820 -504 -586 -708 -656 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -1,187 -1,305 -1,428 -1,127 
Heart disease 1.8 -4,330 -1,874 -2,034 -3,424 -3,464 
Hypertension 6.9 -1,123 -322' -538 -775 -899 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -1,617 -1,752 -2,398 -2,316 
Arthrosis 6.3 -755' -599 -770 -787 -604' 
Rheumatism 2.9 -1,411' -833 -1,072 -1,176 -1,129' 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -1,205' -1,954 -3,469 -4,482 
Use of hOllle help 6r nursing 
No 95.1 178 81 82 126 142 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -1,589 -1,608 -2,479 -2,790 
Use of alternative practitioner 
No 90.8 49' 55' 66 58' 39' 
Yes 9.2 -475 -529 -637 -553 380 
Education 
Low 58.3 -50' -44' -42' -50' -40' 
Medium 28.0 37' 31' 23' 32' 30' 
High 10.3 249 138 118' 192 199 
Unknown 3.4 -209' 91' 172' 10' -167' 
N=IO,553. DEMO=demographic model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. 
') The mean result is not statistically significantly different from zero, two-sided t-test, 
p>O.05. 
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Similar results are found for the subgroups formed on the basis of the use of 
home care. For the subgroups formed on the basis of the consultation of an 
alternative practitioner, the profits and losses are hardly changed by risk 
sharing. 
For the subgroups formed on the basis of education, the profits and losses do 
not differ statistically significantly from zero in most cases. 
Summarizing the results support the conclusion of the previous section that, 
given a certain overall level of incentives for efficiency, risk sharing for high 
risks and risk sharing for high costs yield greater reductions of incentives for 
selection than either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. 
7.4 Efficiency for types of care or for subgroups 
This section analyzes an insurer's incentives to improve efficiency for different 
types of care or for different subgroups of insureds under the assumption that 
the regulator wants to reduce the overall incentives for selection by 50 % in 
comparison with flat capitation payments". The easiest way to achieve this is 
to supplement the demographic capitation payments with proportional risk 
sharing with a weight of 0.3 on actual costs37 • This reduces the incentives for 
efficiency by 30% irrespective of the types of care or the subgroups of mem-
bers. Instead of proportional risk sharing the regulator may apply risk sharing 
for high-risks for about 1.5 % of the members, risk sharing for high-costs for 
0.5% of the members 6r outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Dfl. 20,000 
(see Table 7.2). Although section two showed that risk sharing for high risks 
yields the smallest reduction of the overall incentives for efficiency, the results 
may be different for different types of care or different subgroups. 
36 The appendix shows additional results under the assumption that the regulator wants to 
reduce incentives for selection by about 70% in comparison with flat capitation payments. 
J7 This weight (a) was found by solving the following equation: 0.5=0.31-.*(1-0.31), 
where 0.31 is the reduction already achieved by using the demographic model and 0.5 is the 
desired reduction after proportional risk sharing has been added to the demographic model. 
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Table 7.9 shows the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain under the assump-
tion that the costs for the type of care involved are reduced by 10 %. This 
percentage is based on chapter four. Under risk sharing for high-risks the 
. insurer keeps 83 % of the efficiency gains with respect to hospital and specialist 
care. Under risk sharing for high-costs or outlier risk sharing, the insurers' 
portion of the efficiency gain is 72 % and 52 % respectively. 
Table 7.9 Insurer's portion of a ten percent efficiency gain for specific types 
of care 
RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(1.5%) (0.5%) (20,000) (0.3) 
Hospital and specialists care 0.83 0.72 0.52 0.70 
Prescribed rllUgS 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.70 
Paramedical services 0.93 0.98 0.92 0.70 
N=47,21O. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-risks. RSHC=demographic 
model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS =demographic model + outlier risk sharing. 
If the insurer reduces the costs for prescribed dlUgS or paramedical services by 
10%, the insurer's portion of this efficiency gain is highest under risk sharing 
for high-costs: 94% and 98% respectively. For the other forms of risk sharing, 
the insurer also keeps a high percentage of the efficiency gain. Therefore these 
variants of risk sharing hardly seem to influence an insurer's incentives for 
efficiency with respect to prescribed dlUgS and paramedical services. 
Table 7.10 shows the insurer efficiency gain if the costs of some subgroups are 
reduced by 20%. This figure is based on chapter four. Risk sharing for high-
costs yields the largest insurer's portions of the efficiency gain and outlier risk 
sharing the smallest. For instance of the savings on those suffering from 
diabetes, the insurer keeps 89% under risk sharing for high-costs, 71 % under 
risk sharing for high-risks and 57% under outlier risk sharing. 
Except for those that suffer from cancer or a serious heart disease, risk sharing 
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for high-risks and risk sharing for high-costs retain more incentives for effi-
ciency than proportional risk sharing. For all subgroups outlier risk sharing 
performs worse than proportional risk sharing. Therefore it can be concluded 
that for many subgroups that an insurer may choose for the application of 
disease management principles, the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain 
under risk sharing for high risks or for high costs is higher than under outlier 
risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. 
The Table also shows the potential consequences of avoiding discretionary 
hospital admissions. The definition of a discretionary hospital admission is 
based on Lamers (1998). She defined high discretion diagnoses as those for 
which day case treatment may be an acceptable alternative for hospital admis-
sion. For persons that are put into a diagnostic cost group because they were 
hospitalized with a discretionary diagnosis, it is assumed that their total costs 
could have been reduced by 20% if the hospitalization in question had been 
avoidedJ8 . The results of this simulation are similar to those of a uniform 
reduction of hospital and specialist care. An explanation is that discretionary 
hospital admissions apparently are as predictable andlor expensive as other 
hospital admissions. 
Summarizing this section confirms that, given an overall level of incentives for 
selection, risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs retain more 
incentives for efficiency than either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk 
sharing. 
38 The reduction of 20% could not be based on findings in the literature review in chapter 
three. Therefore, as a sensivity analysis, this simulation has also been performed with reductions 
of 10% and 30%. This yielded similar results as those presented in Table 7.10. 
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Table 7.10 Insurer's portion of a twenty percent efficiency gain for specific 
subgroups 
RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(1.5%) (0.5%) (20,000) (0.3) 
Asthma 0.87 0.98 0.70 0.70 
Heart disease 0.68 0.76 0.41 0.70 
Hypertension 0.70 0.77 0.61 0.70 
Diabetes 0.71 0.89 0.57 0.70 
Arthrosis 0.84 0.89 0.68 0.70 
Rheumatism 0.80 0.99 0.68 0.70 
Cancer 0.47 0.65 0.38 0.70 
Avoiding discr. hosp.' 0.81 0.75 0.54 0.70 
N ~ to.553. RSHR~demographic modet + risk sharing for high-risks. RSHC~demographic 
model + risk sharing for high~costs. ORS =demographic model + outlier risk sharing. 
3) Under the assumption that the costs for members with a discretionary hospital admission are 
reduced by 20 %. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed the reduction of the incentives for selection and efficiency 
if the regulator employs various forms of risk sharing as a supplement to demo-
graphic capitation payments. For each of the four forms as described in chapter 
three, several variants were simulated by varying the relevant parameter". The 
main conclusion is that risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high 
costs yield better tradeoffs between incentives for selection and efficiency than 
either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. 
Given a certain overall level of incentives for efficiency, risk sharing for high 
risks and risk sharing for high costs yield greater reductions of the predictable 
39 Remember that for the empirical illustrations of risk sharing for high risks, it is assumed 
that an insurer designates those members with the highest costs in the previous year. 
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profits and losses. This can be illustrated by the following results. Without risk 
sharing the mean predictable loss for non-preferred risks was about Oft. 2,150. 
If the regulator wants to retain 80% of the incentives for efficiency, it may 
apply proportional risk sharing with a weight of 20% on the actual costs. This 
reduces the mean predictable loss to about Oft. 1,700. The regulator may also 
apply risk sharing for high risks for 3 % of the members, risk sharing for high 
costs for 0.5 % of the members or outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Oft. 
40,000. The latter variant yielded a similar predictable loss for the non-pre-
ferred risks as proportional risk sharing. However, the predictable loss under 
risk sharing for high risks or risk sharing for high costs is lower: about Oft. 
1,200 and Oft. 1,500 respectively. For preferred risks, the results are similar. 
The mean predictable profit without risk sharing is about Oft. 660. Under 
proportional risk sharing and outlier risk sharing, it is about Oft. 530 and Oft. 
550 respectively. Risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs 
yielded a greater reduction of the predictable profit. The remaining profit was 
about Oft. 380 and Oft. 450 respectively. 
In a similar manner, given a certain overall level of incentives for selection, 
risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs retain more incentives 
for efficiency than either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. This 
can be illustrated by the following findings. If the regulator wants to reduce the 
overall incentives for selection to 50% of those under ftat capitation payments, 
it may supplement the demographic capitation payments with proportional risk 
sharing with a weight of 30% on actual costs. This reduces the incentives for 
efficiency by 30% irrespective of the type of care or the subgroups involved. 
The regulator may also apply risk sharing for high risks for 1.5 % of the 
members, risk sharing for high costs for 0.5 % of the members or outlier risk 
sharing with a threshold of Oft. 20,000. An insurer's incentives for reducing 
the expenditures for hospital and specialists care appeared to be highest in the 
case of risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs. Under these 
forms of risk sharing, an insurer keeps about 83 % and 72 % of the efficiency 
gains respectively. Under outlier risk sharing the insurer keeps 52% only. 
Given that some countries currently apply demographic capitation payments 
without any form of risk sharing whereas others supplement them with outlier 
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risk sharing or proportional risk sharing, the policy relevance of these findings 
is that these countries may improve their payment system for competing health 
insurers either by implementing a form of risk sharing or by changing their 
form of risk sharing. 
The results of risk sharillg for high risks in comparison with risk sharing for 
high costs are mixed. There seem to be two main advantages of risk sharing for 
high risks in comparison with risk sharing for high costs. First, given an overall 
level of incentives for efficiency, it yields greater reductions of the large 
predictable losses for those with high prior costs, with many prior hospital 
admissions and with serious chronic conditions. Second, given an overall level 
of incentives for selection, it retains more incentives for efficiency with respect 
to hospital and specialists care and with respect to members that have unpredict-
able high expenditures. The main disadvantage of risk sharing for high risks in 
comparison with risk sharing for high costs is that, for limited extents of risk 
sharing, it retains less incentives for efficiency with respect to several subgroups 
that could be selected for the application of disease management principles. 
Therefore regulators that try to optimize the tradeoff between selection and 
efficiency have to ask themselves: how do we value an overall reduction of 
incentives for selection or efficiency in comparison with specific reductions? 
The answer to this question may depend on the tools for selection and efficiency 
that insurers are supposed to have, the potential gains of selection and efficiency 
for an insurer, and the (negative) effects if tools for selection and efficiency are 
employed. 
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Additional resnlts section 7.2 
In the empirical analyses the risk sharing is financed via a proportional reduc-
tion of the normative costs. Table A.7.1 shows the mean result for some 
subgroups based on demographic variables. Without risk sharing and under 
proportional risk sharing, the mean result for these subgroups is zero. 
Table A.7.1 Mean result in 1993 for subgronps formed on the basis of 
demographic variables 
Age 
5-19 
20-34 
35-49 
50-64 
65-74 
> =75 
Disabled 
No 
Yes 
N~47,21O. 
RSHR 
(3%) 
-38' 
-89 
8' 
153 
92' 
-5* 
-38' 
517 
RSHC 
(0.5%) 
-53 
-83 
-47' 
49' 
288 
204' 
-23' 
317 
ORS 
(40,000) 
-26' 
-51 
-10' 
45' 
136' 
57' 
-15' 
199' 
RSHR 
(8%) 
-67 
-106 
6' 
204 
154' 
-56' 
-45 
600 
RSHC 
(1.6%) 
-125 
-185 
-87 
124 
391 
678 
-34 
465 
ORS 
(20,000) 
-71 
-107 
-54' 
70' 
251 
374 
-23 
312 
') Not statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided t-test, p<O.05). For subgroups 
famled on the basis of gender or degree of urbanization, the mean results were not statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
The Table clearly shows that these forms of risk sharing may introduce some 
selection problems that are not present without risk sharing or under propor-
tional risk sharing, given that the risk sharing is financed via a uniform percen-
tage of the normative costs. For disabled persons and persons of 35 years or 
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older, insurers will be overpaid whereas for others they will be underpaid. 
Generally speaking the extent of the overpayment is small and for some age-
groups not statistically significantly different from zero. If the regulator wants 
to retain the mean result for the subgroups in Table A. 7.1 at zero, it has to use 
a more refined financing mechanism for the risk pool (i.e. such that risk sharing 
is budget-neutral for each of these subgroups). 
Suppose that insurers are aware of the new opportunities to select if the risk 
sharing is financed via a uniform percentage of the normative costs. Then the 
overall indicator of incentives for selection as applied in this chapter may have 
yielded an overestimation of the reduction of the incentives for selection. In the 
main text, it is assumed that an insurer distinguishes (non)-preferred risks by 
comparing its own cost predictions for its members with the cost predictions 
that are made by the regulator. Subsequently we looked at the profits and losses 
for preferred risks and non-preferred risks respectively. The division into (non)-
preferred risks was kept the same when risk sharing was introduced. However, 
under risk sharing for high risks or outlier risk sharing, an insurer may redefine 
its (non)-preferred risks". Following this approach gave the results of Table 
A.7.2. These results were calculated as follows: 
- It is assnmed that the costs predicted by the regulator for each individual are 
not changed by the introduction of risk sharing. 
- The estimation of the selection model by the insurer is changed such that it 
takes into account the applied form and variant of risk sharing. Under risk 
sharing for high risks, the members that are designated for risk sharing are not 
included in the estimation of the model. These members are labelled non-
preferred risks because it is assumed that the insurer has to pay a percentage of 
their normative costs to the regulator. Under outlier risk sharing the dependent 
variable is truncated at the threshold value. 
- It is assumed that the insurer perfectly predicts the percentage of the norma-
tive costs that it has to pay for the risk sharing and that the insurer lowers the 
predicted costs by the regulator for each individual by tlus percentage. 
- Subsequently it is assumed that the insurer defines preferred risks as those for 
40 Under risk sharing for high costs, it seems hard for an insurer to redefine its preferred 
and non-preferred risks. 
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whom the cost prediction based on its selection model is lower than the pre-
dicted costs by the regulator. For non-preferred risks, the opposite holds. 
- Finally the mean result for the (non)-preferred risks is calculated as well as 
the reduction of the incentives for selection in comparison with flat capitation 
payments. 
Table A. 7.2 Overall reduction of incentives for selection 
RSHR (p) 1% 2% 3% 4% 
Indicator in the main text 0.49 0.57 0.61 0.64 
With redefining (non)-preferred risks 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.55 
ORS (r) 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 
Indicator in the main text 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.62 
With redefining (non)-preferred risks 0.45 0.49 0.54 0.65 
N=47,21O. RSHR=demagraphic model + risk sharing far high risks. ORS=demagraphic 
model + outlier risk sharing. 
The conclusion is that the reduction of the incentives for selection may have 
been overestimated slightly in the case of risk sharing for high risks, but not in 
the case of olltlier risk sharing. Moreover this overestimation does not affect the 
main conclusions of this chapter41 • 
Additional results section 7.3 
Suppose that the regulator wants to retain about 65 % of the incentives for effi-
ciency. Then it may apply proportional risk sharing with a weight of 0.35 on 
actual costs. The regulator may also apply risk sharing for high-risks for 8 % of 
the members, risk sharing for high-costs for 1.6% of the members or outlier 
41 Nevertheless the usefulness of a refined financing mechanism for the risk pool may 
increase if demographic capitation payments arc improved by including more and better risk 
adjusters in the capitation formula. 
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risk sharing with a threshold of Oft. 20,000. Tables A. 7.3 through A. 7.5 show 
the consequences of these risk sharing variants for the incentives to attract or 
deter certain .subgroups. Roughly speaking the results are similar to those 
presented in the main text. Thus the conclusion in section 7.3 does not seem to 
depend on the extent of the risk sharing. 
Table A.7.3 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of 
certain costs in 1991 
N DEMO RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(%) (8%) (1.6%) (20,000) (0.35) 
Total cost 1991 
0 14.3 883 568 545 667 574 
1-2,164 75.7 266 14' 68 134 173 
2,165-4,651 5 -1,843 -927 -1,249 -1,506 -1,198 
4,652-17,918 4 -2,978 -735 -1,214 -1,939 -1,936 
> 17,918 1 -11,673 -1,591 -1,839 -4,571 -7,587 
Prescribed drugs 1991 
0 28.4 711 428 404 519 462 
1-619 61.5 231 17' 56 114 150 
620-1,098 5 -1,574 -1,192 -854 -1,125 -1,023 
1,099-2,451 4 -3,633 ' -1,478 -1,828 -2,504 -2,361 
>2,451 1 -12,118 -1,356 -3,379 -6,162 -7,877 
Paramedical services 1991 
0 83 212 89 114 151 138 
1-336 7 -491 -271 -384 -436 -319 
337-621 5 -694 -343 -325 -440 -451 
622-1,532 4 -1,063 -609 -709 -907 -691 
> 1,532 1 -6,403 -1,312 -2,294 -3,634 -4,162 
N~47.2tO. DEMO~demographic model. RSlm~demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. 
') The mean result is not statistically significantly different from zero, two-sided t-test, 
p>O.05. 
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Table A.7.4 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of 
hospital admissions and diagnostic cost groups in previous years 
N DEMO RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(%) (8%) (1.6%) (20,000) (0.35) 
Dec in 1992 
0 93.3 305 52 88 161 198 
2.3 -1,395 -479 -676 -963 -907 
2 1.8 -4,179 -845 -1,286 -2,301 -2,716 
3 0.9 -10,694 -1,039 -2,233 -4,914 -6,951 
4+5 0.2 -22,601 -767 -2,502 -7,663 -14,691 
Unknown 1.5 -2,828 -731 -1,231 -1,897 -1,838 
Highest Dec ill the period 1989-1992 
1 8.3 -417 -401 -414 -426 271 
2 5.6 -1,584 -743 -705 -1,111 -1,030 
3 3.1 -5,732 -1,117 -1,374 -2,842 -3,726 
4+5 0.4 -12,159 -1,620 -2,274 -4,956 -7,903 
Unknown 2.8 -623 -442 -577 -645 -405 
No. years with hospitalization 
in the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 161 183 287 304 
1 15.5 -812 -512 -476 -641 -528 
2 3.7 -3,262 -1,021 -1,231 -1,977 -2,120 
3 or 4 1 -12,398 -1,070 -2,584 -5,480 -8,059 
N =47,210. DEMO=demographic model. RSHR=demagraphic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. All results are statistically significantly different from zero, two-sided t-
test, p<O.05. 
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Table A.7.5 Mean result in 1993 for subgroups formed on the basis of 
health survey data 
N DEMO RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(%) (8%) (1.6%) (20,000) (0.35) 
Presence of chronic conditions 
None 61.1 523 253 277 380 340 
At least one 38.9 -820 -397 -434 -596 -533 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -727 -1,023 -1,278 -915 
Heart disease 1.8 -4,330 -1,727 -978 -2,269 -2,815 
Hypertension 6.9 -1,123 -216' -374 -615 -730 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -964' -1,354 -1,834 -1,882 
Arthrosis 6.3 -755' -370' -423 -704 -490' 
Rheumatism 2.9 -1,41 ]' -429' -860 -1,069 -917' 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -974' -1,369 -2,418 -3,642 
Use of hOllle help 61' nursing 
No 95.1 178 58 43' 109 115 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -1,133 -837 -1,714 -2,267 
Use of alternative practitioner 
No 90.8 49' 43' 57' 59' 32' 
Yes 9.2 -475 -412 -545 -572 -309 
Education 
Low 58.3 -50' -25' 4' -32' -33' 
Medium 28.0 37' 19' -58' 4' 24' 
High 10.3 249 104' 48' 129' 162 
Unknown 3.4 -209' -38' 263' 134' -136' 
N = to.553. DEMO=demographic model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-
risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for h.igh-costs. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. 
') The mean result is not statistically significantly different from zero, two-sided t-test, 
p>O.05. 
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Additionall'esuits section 7.4 
Suppose the regulator wants to reduce incentives for selection by about 70 % in 
comparison with flat capitation payments. To achieve this it may apply demo-
graphic capitation payments supplemented with proportional risk sharing with a 
weight of about 0.6 on actual costs". The regulator may also apply risk 
sharing for high-risks for 8% of the members, risk sharing for high-costs for 
4% of the members or outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Dfl. 5,000. Table 
A.7.6 and A.7.7 show the consequences of these risk sharing variants for an 
insurer's incentives to improve efficiency for specific types of care or for 
specific subgroups. 
Table A. 7.6 Insurer's portion of a ten percent efficiency gain for specific 
types of care 
RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(8%) (4%) (5,000) (0.57) 
Hospital and specialists care 0.63 0.30 0.20 0.43 
Prescribed drugs 0.66 0.79 0.66 0.43 
Paramedical services 0.71 0.85 0.69 0.43 
N=47,21O. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-risks. RSHC=demographic 
model + risk sharing for high-costs. ORS=demographlc model + outlier risk sharing. 
Roughly speaking the results are similar to those presented in the main text. A 
minor difference is that in Table A.7.7 the insurer's portion of the efficiency 
gain under risk sharing for high risks is now generally higher than under risk 
sharing for high costs. Thus the conclusion that, given an overall level of 
incentives for selection, risk sharing for high costs retains more incentives for 
efficiency with respect to several subgroups seems only true for limited extents 
of risk sharing. 
" This weight (a) was found by solving the following equation: 0.7=0.31-a*(1-0.31). 
where 0.31 is the reduction already achieved by using the demographic model and 0.7 is the 
desired reduction after proportional risk sharing has been added to the demographic model. 
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Table A,7,7 Insurer's portion of a twenty percent efficiency gain for 
specific subgroups 
RSHR RSHC ORS PRS 
(8%) (4%) (5,000) (0,57) 
Asthma 0,52 0.48 0,35 0.43 
Heart disease 0,39 0.26 0.16 0.43 
Hypertension 0.47 0.39 0.31 0.43 
Diabetes 0.37 0.33 0.27 0.43 
Arthrosis 0,53 0.47 0.31 0.43 
Rheumatism 0.44 0.47 0.30 0.43 
Cancer 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.43 
Avoiding discr. hosp.'O.58 0.24 0.10 0.43 
N = 10,553. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high-risks. RSHC=demographic 
model + risk sharing for high-costs. DRS =demographic model + outlier risk sharing. 
3) Under the assumption that the costs for members with a discretionary hospital admission are 
reduced by 20%. 
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8. Prior costs as an additional risk adjuster 
This chapter studies prior costs as an additional risk adjuster next to those of the 
demographic model". The results are compared with those of the four forms 
of risk sharing as a supplement to demographic capitation payments as presented 
in the previous chapter. Section 8.1 starts with a comparison of the total costs 
in the previous year as au additional risk adjuster with proportional risk sharing. 
Subsequently the costs in the previous year as far as these costs are above a 
certain threshold is used as an additional risk adjuster. By varying the threshold 
several variants of this risk adjuster are simulated. Although this risk adjuster 
clearly reduces an insurer's incentives for efficiency, previous studies did not 
analyze this effect. Section 8.2 presents the overall indicators of incentives for 
selection and efficiency. Section 8.3 compares prior costs as a risk adjuster with 
outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing. Section 8.4 compares prior 
costs as a risk adjuster with risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high 
costs. Section 8.5 contains the conclusions. 
8.1 A prior cost model versus proportional risk sharing 
The most simple way to include prior costs as a risk adjuster is to add the total 
costs in the previous year as an independent variable to the demographic model. 
Such a prior cost model has been estimated with the available data. The 
estimated coefficients can be found in the appendix (Table A.8.1). The R2-value 
of the prior cost model was 0.197 and the mean absolute result was Dfl. 2,000. 
Table 8.1 shows the mean absolute predicted result as well as the mean result 
for (non)-preferred risks. Because the estimated coefficient of prior costs is 
about 0.41, the results are compared with those of proportional risk sharing 
with a weight of 41 % on actual expenditures. Irrespective of the types of care 
or the subgroups, the insurer's portion of any efficiency gain will be 0.59 for 
both payment systems. So, roughly speaking, the incentives for efficiency are 
4J The main findings of this chapter can also be found in Van Barneveld et al. (1999c). 
185 
8 Prior costs as all additiollal risk adjuster 
reduced to about 60% in comparison with flat capitation payments. 
Tahle 8.1 Mean absolute predicted result and mean result for (non)-pre-
fen'ed risks 
OEMO PC PRS (0.41) 
MAPR 982 358 579 
Reduction' 0.34 0.76 0.61 
Preferred risks 661 119 390 
Non-pref. risks -2,152 -386 -1,270 
Reduction' 0.31 0.88 0.59 
N~47,21O. DEMO~demographic model. PC~prior cost model. PRS~demographic model + 
proportional risk sharing. MAPR=mean absolute predicted result. Preferred risks are those 
members for whom the cost prediction based on the selection model is lower than that of the 
demographic model. Others are non-preferred risks. 
l) Reduction in comparison with flat capitation payments. 
The mean absolute predicted result for the prior cost model is Ofl. 358. TItis is 
a reduction of about 76% in comparison with flat capitation payments. 
Supplementing the demographic 'model with proportional risk sharing yields a 
mean absolute result of Ofl. 579. This is a reduction of 61 % only. 
The mean result for (non)-preferred risks as an overall indicator of incentives 
for selection gives similar results. The mean profit for preferred risks under the 
prior cost model is Ofl. 119 and the mean loss on non-preferred risks is Ofl. 
386. This is a reduction of about 88 % in comparison with flat capitation 
payments. The demographic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing 
yields a reduction of these predictable profits and losses of 59 % only. 
Figure 8.1 summarizes the overall results in a graph. The x-axis shows the 
reduction of the mean absolute predicted result and the y-axis the insurer's 
portion of an efficiency gain. The graph strongly suggests that given the level of 
incentives for efficiency (about 60% in comparison with flat capitation pay-
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Figure 8.1 Overall results for the prior cost model and proportional risk 
sharing 
ments), prior costs as a risk adjuster reduces the incentives for selection more 
than proportional risk sharing. An explanation is that prior costs are more 
strongly correlated with potential selection tools of an insurer than actual costs. 
Let us now look at some subgroups that might be attracted or deterred by an 
insurer (Table 8.2). For those without any costs for prescribed drugs in 1991, 
the mean profit in 1993 was about Dfl. 710 for demographic capitation pay-
ments. If the total costs in the previous year are included as risk adjuster, the 
remaining profit is about Dfl. 350. If proportional risk sharing is used as a 
supplement to the demographic capitation payments, the remaining profit is 
higher, namely Dfl. 420. 
For the group of 1 % with the highest expenditures for prescribed drugs in 
1991, the mean loss under the prior cost model is about Dfl. 6,400. Under 
proportional risk sharing it is about Dfl 7,150. 
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Table 8.2 Mean result in 1993 for several subgroups 
N (%) DEMO PC PRS (0.41) 
Prescribed drugs in 1991 
0 28.4 711 352 420 
1-619 61.5 231 118 136 
620-1,098 5 -1,574 -787 -929 
1,099-2,451 4 -3,633 -1,743 -2,144 
>2,451 1 -12,118 -6,394 -7,149 
No. of years with hospitalization 
in the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 52 276 
1 15.5 -812 87' -479 
2 3.7 -3,262 10' -1,924 
3 6r 4 1 -12,398 -5,418 -7,315 
Presence of chronic conditions" 
None 61.1 523 252 309 
At least one 38.9 -820 -352 -484 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -635' -831 
Heart disease 1.8 -4,330 -1,316' -2,555 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -1,387' -1,708 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -2,550' -3,306 
Use of hOllle care" 
No 95.1 178 82 105 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -1,260' -2,057 
N=47,21O. DEMO=demographic model. PC=prior cost model. PRS=demographic model + 
proportional risk sharing. 
') N = 10,553 . 
. ) The mean result is not statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided I-test, p>O.05). 
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For those that were not hospitalized in the previous four years, the predictable 
profit when employing demographic capitation payments was about Dfl. 470. 
The prior cost model reduces this profit to about Dfl. 50. The remaining profit 
under proportional risk sharing is about Dfl. 280. 
For those with a hospitalization in at least three of the four preceding years, the 
predictable loss is about Dfl. 12,000 when using demographic capitation 
payments. 
For the prior cost model and for the demographic model supplemented with 
pro-portional risk sharing, the predictable losses are about Dfl. 5,400 and Dfl. 
7,300 respectively. Similar results are found for the subgroups formed on the 
basis of the health survey data. 
Summarizing the inclusion of the total costs in the previous year as an addi-
tional risk adjuster next to demographic variables yields a better tradeoff 
between selection and efficiency than supplementing demographic capitation 
payments with proportional risk sharing. 
In the remainder of this chapter the total costs in the previous year are included 
as far as these costs are above a certain threshold. By varying the threshold the 
level of incentives for selection and efficiency can be varied. Subsequently the 
results of prior costs as a risk adjuster will be compared with those of the four 
forms of risk sharing as studied in the previous chapter. 
8.2 Overall results 
This section presents the overall indicators of incentives for selection and 
efficiency for prior cost models with varying thresholds. Four different thresh-
old values are employed: Dfl. 40,000, Dfl. 20,000, Dfl. 10,000 and Dfl. 
5,000. Moreover the results are compared with those of the demographic model 
and the prior cost model without a threshold (i.e. T=Dfl. 0) as studied in the 
previous section. 
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8.2.1 Incentives for selection 
Table 8.3 presents the (weighted) mean absolute result. The R'-values and the 
mean absolute results are given in the appendix (Table A.8.2). The mean 
absolute predicted result is Dfl. 830 if the threshold is Dfl. 40,000. The lower 
the threshold, the lower is the mean absolute predicted result. If the threshold is 
Dfl. 5,000, the mean absolute predicted result is Dfl. 546. The Table also 
shows an example of the weighted mean absolute predicted result. In this 
example predictable profits and losses that are smaller than 20% of the costs 
predicted by the selection model are assumed to be irrelevant for selection. The 
weighted mean absolute predicted result varies between Dfl. 253 for the prior 
cost model and Dfl. 946 for the demographic model. Under the assumption that 
the weighing is right, the Table shows the overestimation of incentives for 
selection if the mean absolute predicted result is used as an indicator instead of 
the weighted mean absolute predicted result. 
Table 8.3 (Weighted) mean absolnte result for several prior cost models 
Model 
Relative 
DEMO 
PC(40,000) 
PC(20,000) 
PC(lO,OOO) 
PC(5,000) 
PC(O) 
MAPR 
982 
830 
726 
611 
546 
358 
WMAPR 
iX,=iX,=20%' 
946 
783 
671 
539 
465 
253 
Overestimation 
Absolute 
36 3.8% 
47 5.7% 
55 8.2% 
72 13.4% 
81 17.4% 
105 41.5% 
N~47.21O. Before estimating the models. the costs in 1992 have been multiplied by a factor 
such that the overall mean costs in 1992 equal those in 1993. MAPR=mean absolute predicted 
result. WMAPR~weighted mean absolute predicted result. DEMO~demographic model. 
pelT) ~prior cost model with a threshold of Dfl. T. 
J) Small predictable profits and losses are defined as those predictable profits and losses that are 
smaller than al % and az % of the predicted costs based on the selection model. 
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It shows that the overestimation - whether expressed in absolute or in relative 
terms - is higher as the capitation model increases in predictive power. This 
suggests that especially in the case of relatively good capitation formulae, the 
problem of selection is seriously overestimated by the conventional ways of 
measuring incentives for selection. 
Because the mean absolute predicted result is not available for the forms of risk 
sharing, Table 8.4 shows the mean result for (non)-preferred risks. With this 
indicator of incentives for selection, the prior cost models can be made compar-
able to the forms of risk sharing. 
Table 8.4 Mean result for (non)-preferred risks and the reduction of the 
incentives for selection in comparison with flat capitation payments 
N DEMO PC PC PC PC 
(%) (40,000) (20,000) (10,000) (0) 
Preferred 76.5 661 549 476 384 119 
Non-pref. 23.5 -2,152 -1,785 -1,548 -1,250 -386 
Reduction' 0.31 0.43 0.51 0.60 0.88 
N=47,21O. DEMO=demographic model. PC=prior cost model. Preferred risks are defmed as 
those members for \vhom the cost prediction based on the selection model is lower than that 
based on the demographic model. For non-preferred risks, the opposite holds. 
3) The reduction is expressed as a fraction in comparison with flat capitation payments (see also 
chapter five). 
For instance the overall incentives for selection under the prior costs model with 
a threshold of Dfi. 10,000 are reduced by 60% in comparison with flat capita-
tion payments. Table 7.2 of the previous chapter shows that risk sharing for 
high risks of about 3 % of the members, risk sharing for high costs for about 
I % of the members and outlier risk sharing with a tl1l'eshold that is somewhat 
higher than Dfl. 10,000 yield a similar overall level of incentives for selection. 
For proportional risk sharing the comparable variant is that with a weight of 
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0.42 on actual costs". 
8.2.2 Incentives for efficiency 
Table 8.5 shows the overall indicators of incentives for efficiency. The insurer's 
portion of the efficiency gain is calculated with the assumption that the costs of 
each member are reduced by 10%. The weighted expenditures measure is calcu-
lated with various lengths of the costs interval below the threshold. The 
insurer's portion of the efficiency gain varies between 0.59 if the threshold is 
zero and 0.86 if the threshold is Dfl. 40,000. As in the previous chapter, the 
higher the threshold and the larger the length of the costs interval below the 
threshold, the higher is the weighted expenditures measure. If the threshold is 
Dfl. 40,000 and the costs intervals are Dfl. 10,000, the weighted expenditures 
measure is 0.92. 
Table 8.5 Overall indicators of incentives for efficiency 
Model IPEG = WE WE WE 
WE(k~O) (k= 1,000) (k=5,000) (k= 10,000) 
PC (40,000) 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.92 
PC (20,000) 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.88 
PC (10,000) 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.84 
PC (5,000) 0.73 0.75 0.79 
PC (0) 0.59 
N~47,21O. IPEG~insurer's portion of the efficiency gain. WE(T;k)~weighted expenditures 
given a threshold of Dft. T and cost intervals of Dfl. k below the threshold. PC(T)=prior cost 
model with a threshold of Dn. T. 
Because it seems umealistic that, especially in the longer run, during a year an 
insurer will not recalculate its incentives for efficiency with respect to (future) 
" The weight 0.42 equals (0.6-0.31)/(1-0.3/), where 0.6 is the desired level of the 
reduction of incentives for selection and 0.31 is the reduction that is already achieved by using 
the demographic capitation payments. 
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expenditures for a member in the remainder of the year, large values for the 
length of the costs intervals below the threshold yield an overestimation of the 
incentives for efficiency. Therefore the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain 
is used as the overall indicator of incentives for efficiency. Based on this 
indicator of incentives for efficiency, the prior cost models can be made 
comparable to the forms of risk sharing. For instance the prior cost model with 
a threshold that is somewhat lower than Dft. 20,000 yields an insurer's portion 
of the efficiency gain of about 0.8. This value can also be reached with risk 
sharing for high risks of 3 % of the members, risk sharing for high costs for 
0.5% of the members and outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Dft. 40,000 
(see chapter seven, Table 7.3). 
The next section compares the consequences of prior costs as an additional risk 
adjuster with those of outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing. The 
reason for comparing a prior cost model with specifically these forms of risk 
sharing first is that they are nowadays applied in Belgium and The Netherlands 
(Van de Ven and Ellis, 1999). Although the previous chapter showed that risk 
sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs yield better tradeoffs 
between selection and efficiency, they are not applied in practice. 
8.3 Prior cost models versus outlier or proportional risk 
sharing 
Section 8.3.1 presents the overall results for the prior cost models as well as 
those of outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing. Section 8.3.2 
compares the predictable profits and losses for several subgroups given a certain 
overall level of incentives for efficiency. Section 8.3.3 compares the incentives 
for efficiency with respect to various types of care and with respect to various 
subgroups given a certain overall level of incentives for selection. 
8.3.1 Overall resnlts 
In Figure 8.2 the x-axis shows the reduction of the predictable profits/losses for 
(non)-preferred risks which is used as the overall indicator of incentives for 
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selection. The y-axis shows the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain which is 
used as the overall indicator of incentives for efficiency. 
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Figure 8.2 Overall results of prior costs as an additional risk adjuster and 
those of outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing 
The Figure suggests that prior costs as an additional risk adjuster yields a better 
tradeoff between selection and efficiency than either outlier risk sharing or 
proportional risk sharing. The lower the incentives for efficiency, the larger the 
advantage of prior costs as a risk adjuster seems to be. 
8.3.2 Selection of subgroups 
Suppose that the regulator wants to retain 80 % of the overall incentives for 
efficiency in comparison with flat capitation payments. Then it may apply a 
prior cost model with a threshold of Dfl. 15,000". Instead the regulator may 
apply outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Dfl. 40,000 or proportional risk 
~5 This threshold value was found via trial and error. 
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sharing with a weight of 0.2 on actnal costs. Table 8.6 shows the remaining 
predictable profits and losses for various subgroups that may be attracted or 
deterred by an insurer. The mean profit for those without any costs for pre-
scribed drugs in 1991 was about Dfl. 710 under the demographic model. Under 
the prior cost model the remaining profit is about Dfl. 590. Under outlier risk 
sharing and proportional risk sharing the remaining profit is about Dfl. 610 and 
Dfl. 570 respectively. For the group of I % with the highest expenditnres for 
prescribed drugs in 1991, the mean loss was about Dfl. 12,000 under the 
demographic model. The prior costs model reduces this loss to about Dfl. 
8,600. Under outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing the remaining 
loss is about Dfl. 8,500 and Dfl. 9,700 respectively. 
For those with a hospitalization in at least three of the previous four years, the 
remaining loss is about Dfl. 7,800 under the prior cost model. Under outlier 
risk sharing and proportional risk sharing the remaining loss is about Dfl. 8,100 
and Dfl. 9,900 respectively. The subgroups that are formed on the basis of the 
health survey data give similar results. For instance for those with at least one 
chronic condition, the remaining loss is about Dfl. 620 under the prior cost 
model. Under outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing it is about Dfl. 
710 and Dfl. 660 respectively. 
For those who use some form of home care, the remaining loss is about Dfl. 
2,200 under the prior cost model. Under outlier risk sharing and proportional 
risk sharing it is about Dfl. 2,500 and Dfl. 2,800 respectively. 
Summarizing for most subgroups the predictable profits or losses are slightly 
smaller in the case of prior costs than in the case of these forms of risk sharing. 
The appendix shows that, if the required level of incentives for efficiency is 
lower, the differences between prior costs as a risk adjuster and these forms of 
risk sharing are larger. 
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Table 8.6 Mean result in 1993 for several subgroups 
N DEMO PC ORS PRS 
(%) (15,000) (40,000) (0.2) 
Prescribed drugs ill 1991 
0 28.4 711 592 614 569 
1-619 61.5 231 161 166 185 
620-1,098 5 -1,574 -1,353 -1,405 -1,259 
1,099-2,451 4 -3,633 -2,860 -3,045 -2,906 
>2,451 1 -12,118 -8,624 -8,526 -9,694 
No. of years with hospitalization 
in the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 279 371 374 
1 15.5 -812 -571 -755 -650 
2 3.7 -3,262 -1,472 -2,575 -2,610 
3 or 4 1 -12,398 -7,757 -8,143 -9,918 
Presence of chronic conditionif 
None 61.1 523 416 451 418 
At least one 38.9 -820 -615 -708 -656 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -1,118 -1,428 -1,127 
Heart disease 1.8 -4,330 -2,342 -3,424 -3,464 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -2,351 -2,398 -2,316 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -3,977 -3,469 -4,482 
Use of home carea 
No 95.1 178 114 126 142 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -2,219 -2,479 -2,790 
N~47,21O. DEMO~demographic model. PC~prior cost model. ORS~demographic model 
supplemented with outlier risk sharing, PRS=demographic model supplemented with propor-
tional risk sharing. All results differ statistically significantly from zero (two-sided t-test, 
p<O.05). 
') N ~ 10,553. 
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8.3.3 Efficiency for types of care or for subgroups 
Suppose the regulator wants to reduce the overall incentives for selection by 
50% in comparison with flat capitation payments. Then it may apply a prior 
costs model with a threshold of Dfl. 18,000'6. Instead it may also apply outlier 
risk sharing with a threshold of Dfl. 20,000 or proportional risk sharing with a 
weight of 0.3 on actual costs (see chapter seven, Table 7.9). Table 8.7 gives the 
insurer's portion of the efficiency gain if the costs of some types of care are 
reduced by 10 % or the costs of some subgroups of insureds are reduced by 
20%. 
Table 8.7 Insurer's portion of a ten percent efficiency gain for specific types 
of care or a twenty percent efficiency gain for specific subgroups 
Types of care 
Hospital and specialists care 
Prescribed drugs 
Paramedical services 
Subgroups" 
Astluna 
Heart disease 
Diabetes 
Cancel' 
PC 
(18,000) 
0.73 
0.93 
0.95 
0.83 
0.68 
0.76 
0.66 
DRS 
(20,000) 
0.52 
0.88 
0.92 
0.70 
0.41 
0.57 
0.38 
PRS 
(0.3) 
0.70 
0.70 
0.70 
0.70 
0.70 
0.70 
0.70 
N~47,21O. PC~prior cost model. ORS~demographic model supplemented with outlier risk 
sharing. PRS =demographic model supplemented with proportional risk sharing. 
') N~ 10,553. 
Under the prior cost model the insurer retains 73 % of the savings with respect 
to hospital and specialists care. This is slightly more than the 70% under 
46 This threshold was found via trial and error. 
197 
8 Prior costs as all additiollal risk adjuster 
proportional risk sharing and substantially more than the 52 % under outlier risk 
sharing. For savings on prescribed drugs and paramedical services, the insurer's 
portion of the efficiency gain is also highest under the prior cost model. A 
similar result is found for members that suffer from astluna or diabetes. For 
those that suffer from a serious heart disease or cancer, the insurer's portion of 
the efficiency gain is similar under the prior cost model and proportional risk 
sharing. Under outlier risk sharing, it is considerably lower. Summarizing, 
given a certain overall level of incentives for selection, the prior cost model 
retains more incentives for efficiency than either outlier risk sharing or propor-
tional risk sharing. The appendix shows similar results for the situation that the 
regulator wants to reduce the overall incentives for selection with more than 
50%. 
The conclusion of this section is that including prior costs as an additional risk 
adjuster next to demographic variables yields a better tradeoff between selection 
and efficiency than supplementing demographic capitation payments with either 
outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. Because the previous chapter 
already showed that risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs 
also yield a better tradeoff than outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing, 
an obvious question is: does prior costs as a risk adjuster yield a better tradeoff 
between selection and efficiency than risk sharing for high risks or risk sharing 
for high costs? This question is addressed in the next section. 
8.4 Prior cost models versus risk sharing for high risks 01' high 
costs 
Section 8.4.1 presents the overall results of the incentives for selection and 
efficiency. Section 8.4.2 compares the remaining predictable profits and losses 
for several subgroups given a certain overall level of incentives for efficiency. 
Section 8.4.3 compares the remaining incentives for efficiency with respect to 
various types of care and various subgroups given a certain overall level of 
incentives for selection. 
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8.4.1 Overall results 
Figure 8.3 suggests that, given a relatively high level of incentives for effi-
ciency, risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs yield a better 
tradeoff than prior costs as a risk adjuster. However, for a lower level of 
incentives for efficiency, the opposite seems to hold. Remember that the desired 
overall level of incentives for efficiency depends on the weight that the regula-
tor assigns to reducing selection versus retaining efficiency (see chapter five). 
Insurer's portion of efficiency gains 
1 
0.75 
0.5 
0.25 
o 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Reduc1ion predlc1able profits/losses (non)·preferred risks 
I. RSHR +RSHC BPRS oPcl 
Figure 8.3 Overall results of prior costs as an additional risk adjuster and 
those of risk sharing for high-risks and risk sharing for high costs 
8.4.2 Selection of subgroups 
Table 8.8 shows the remaining predictable profits and losses for various 
subgroups of insureds. For those without any costs for prescribed drugs in 
1991, the mean profit under demographic capitation payments was about Dft. 
710. Under the prior cost model this profit is reduced to about Dft. 590. Under 
risk sharing for high risk and risk sharing for high costs, the remaining profit is 
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about Oft. 520 and Oft. 510 respectively. For the groups of 1 % with the 
highest expenditures for prescribed drugs in 1991, the mean loss under the prior 
cost model is about Oft. 8,600. Under risk sharing for high risks and risk 
sharing for high costs the remaining loss is about Oft. 3,500 and Oft. 5,900 
respectively. For those without a hospitalization in the previous four years, the 
mean profit under the prior cost model is about Oft. 280. Under risk sharing 
for high risks and risk sharing for high costs, it is about Oft. 230 and Oft. 280 
respectively. 
For those members that were hospitalized in at least three of the four preceding 
years, the mean loss is about Oft. 7,800 under the prior cost model. Under risk 
sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs, it is about Oft. 2,600 and 
Oft. 5,100 respectively. For the subgroups formed on the basis of the health 
survey data, the results are similar. For instance, for those suffering from 
cancer, the mean loss under the prior cost model is still about Oft. 4,000. 
Under risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high costs, it is about Oft. 
1,200 and Dft. 2,000 respectively. 
Summarizing, given some overall desired level of incentives for efficiency, risk 
sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high cost yield lower predictable 
profits and losses for the various subgroups than a prior cost model. For most 
subgroups risk sharing for high risks yields the lowest profits or losses. 
8.4.3 Efficiency for types of care or for subgroups 
If the regulator wants to reduce the overall incentives for selection to 50% in 
comparison with those under ftat capitation payments, it may apply a prior cost 
model with a threshold of Oft. 18,000. Instead it may also apply risk sharing 
for high risks for 1.5% of the members or risk sharing for high costs for 0.5% 
of the members. Table 8.9 shows the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain if 
the costs for some types of care are reduced by 10% or the costs for some 
subgroups of insureds are reduced by 20%. For the three types of care the 
insurer's portion of the efficiency gain under the prior cost model is similar to 
that under risk sharing for high costs. For hospital and specialists care it is 
higher under risk sharing for high risks. For prescribed drugs and paramedical 
services it is lower. 
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Table 8.8 Mean result in 1993 for several subgroups 
N DEMO PC RSHR RSHC 
(%) (15,000) (3%) (0.5%) 
Prescribed drugs in 1991 
0 28.4 711 592 516 514 
1-619 61.5 231 161 77 liS 
620-1,098 5 -I .574 - I ,353 - I ,47 I -1,106 
1,099-2,45 I 4 -3,633 -2,860 -2,152 -2,635 
>2,451 I -12,118 -8,624 -3,470 -5,894 
No. of years with hospitalization 
in the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 279 226 281 
I 15.5 -812 -571 -620 -640 
2 3.7 -3,262 -1,472 - I ,558 -1,959 
3 or 4 I -12,398 -7,757 -2,593 -5,088 
Presence of chronic conditions" 
None 61.1 523 416 322 375 
At least one 38.9 -820 -615 -504 -586 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -1,118 -1,187 -1,305 
Heart dis. 1.8 -4,330 -2,342 -1,874 -2,034 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -2,351 -1,617 -1,752 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -3,977 -1,205' -1,954 
Use of home carea 
No 95.1 178 114 81 82 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -2,219 -1,589 -1,608 
N=47.21O. DEMO=demographic model. PC=prior cost model. RSHR=demographic model 
+ risk sharing for high risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high costs. 
') N = 10.553. 
') The mean result does not differ statistically significantly from zero (two·sided t-test, 
p>O.05). 
201 
8 Prior costs as an additional risk adjuster 
For the subgroups the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain is highest in the 
case of risk sharing for high costs. With respect to asthma-patients it is lowest 
under the prior cost model. With respect to diabetes-patients and cancer-patients 
it is lowest under risk sharing for high risks. So which payment system retains 
most incentives for efficiency differs per type of care and per subgroup. As 
suggested by Figure 8.3, the appendix shows that, if the desired overall 
selection level is lower, prior costs as a risk adjuster retains more incentives for 
efficiency for the various types of care and for the various subgroups. 
Table 8.9 Insurer's portion of a ten percent efficiency gain for specific types 
of care or a twenty percent efficiency gain for specific subgroups 
Types of care 
Hospital and specialists care 
Prescribed drugs 
Paramedical services 
Subgroups" 
Asthma 
Heart disease 
Diabetes 
Cancer 
PC 
(18,000) 
0.73 
0.93 
0.95 
b.83 
0.68 
0.76 
0.66 
RSHR 
(1.5%) 
0.83 
0.90 
0.93 
0.87 
0.68 
0.71 
0.47 
RSHC 
(0.5%) 
0.72 
0.94 
0.98 
0.98 
0.76 
0.89 
0.65 
N=47,21O. PC=prior cost model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high risks. 
RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high costs. 
') N ~ 10,553. 
Summarizing the conclusion of this section is that the results for prior costs as an 
additional risk adjuster, for risk sharing for high risks and for risk sharing for high 
costs are mixed. Whether prior costs as a risk adjuster yields a better tradeoff 
between selection and efficiency than these forms of risk sharing depends on the 
desired overall level of incentives for selection and efficiency (Le. on the weight 
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the regulator assigns to reducing selection versus retaining efficiency) as well as on 
the weight the regulator assigns to specific reductions of incentives for selection 
and efficiency. 
8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed prior costs as an additional risk adjuster next to demographic 
variables. Several variants were simulated by varying the threshold above which 
the prior costs were included as a risk adjuster. The results were compared with 
those of the four forms of risk sharing of the previous chapter. 
The main conclusion is that prior costs as a risk adjuster yields a better tradeoff 
between selection and efficiency than either Oll/lier risk sharing or proportional risk 
sharing. This can be illustrated with the following findings. If the regulator wants 
to retain about 80% of the incentives for efficiency in comparison with f!at 
capitation payments, it may apply prior costs with a threshold of Of!. 15,000. This 
reduces the predictable profits and losses for (non)-preferred risks by about 55 % in 
comparison with f!at capitation payments. As alternatives the regulator may apply 
outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Of!. 40,000 or proportional risk sharing 
with a weight of 0.2 on actual costs. With these risk sharing variants the reduction 
of the predictable profits and losses for (non)-preferred risks is about 45 % only. 
Another illustration is as follows. Suppose the regulator wants to reduce the 
incentives for selection by about 70% in comparison with f!at capitation payments. 
Then it may apply prior costs with a threshold of Of!. 5,000. This reduces the 
overall incentives for efficiency by about 30 %. Instead of prior costs as a risk 
adjuster, the regulator may apply outlier risk sharing with a threshold of Of!. 5,000 
or proportional risk sharing with a weight of 60% on the actual costs. Under these 
variants of risk sharing, the overall incentives for efficiency are reduced by about 
40%. 
These empirical findings imply that countries that currently apply outlier risk 
sharing or proportional risk sharing may improve the tradeoff between selection 
and efficiency by using prior costs as an additional risk adjuster instead. 
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The previous chapter already showed that risk sharing for high risks and risk 
sharing for costs also yield a better tradeoff between selection and efficiency than 
either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. Therefore this chapter 
subsequently focused on the question which payment system yields the best 
tradeoff: prior costs as a risk adjuster, risk sharing for high risks or risk sharing 
for high costs? The answer depends on the weight tIle regulator assigns to an 
overall reduction of incentives for selection versus an overall retention of incentives 
for efficiency as well as the weights it assigns to specific reductions of incentives 
for selection and to specific retentions of incentives for efficiency. The main advan-
tage of prior costs as a risk adjuster in comparison with risk sharing for high risks 
or high costs is that, given a relatively low desired overall level of incentives for 
selection, it retains more incentives for efficiency. The main disadvantage of prior 
costs as a risk adjuster in comparison with these forms of risk sharing is that, given 
a certain desired overall level of incentives for efficiency, it leaves larger predict-
able losses for non-preferred risks. 
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Table A.8.1 Coefficients of the demographic and prior cost models 
DEMO PC 
Women Men Women Men 
5-9 410 497 195 312 
10-14 504 636 297 261 
15-19 349 747 179 485 
20-24 397 881 231 527 
25-29 381 1.290 115 707 
30-34 660 1,356 327 724 
35-39 730 1,117 470 655 
40-44 804 1,221 454 729 
45-49 1,192 1,359 567 749 
50-54 1,313 1,610 736 999 
55-59 1,809 1,679 1,025 891 
60-64 2,286 2,555 1,372 1,315 
65-69 4,409 2,794 2,836 1,556 
70-74 5,284 4,115 3,222 2,390 
>=75 6,242 5,144 4,040 2,988 
Very strongly urban 217 113 
Strongly urban 303 204 
Moderate 250 178 
Little urban 261 179 
Disabled 2,080 1,206 
Total costs in 1992 0.413 
N=47,21O. DEMO=demographic model. PC=prior cost model. Before estimating the model, 
the costs in 1992 have been multiplied by a factor such that the overall mean costs in 1992 
equal those in 1993. 
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Table A.8.2 Additional overall results for several prior costs models 
R2 MAR bT 
DEMO 0.047 2,250 n.a. 
PC (40,000) 0.157 2,180 0.69 
PC (20,000) 0.170 2,155 0.54 
PC (10,000) 0.181 2,126 0.47 
PC (5,000) 0.187 2,095 0.44 
PC (0) 0.197 2,000 0.41 
N~47,21O. DEMO~demographic model. PC~prior cost model. MAR~mean absolute result. 
bT=estimated coefficient of the costs in the previous year as far as these costs are above the 
threshold Dfl. T. The fraction of members with costs above the threshold is 0.5%, 1.6%, 
3.7%, and 7.7% for the thresholds Dfl. 40,000, Dfl. 20,000, Dfl. 10,000 and Dfl. 5,000 
respectively. 
Table A.8.3 Weighted mean absolute predicted result for some prior cost 
models 
a l a 2 DEMO PC PC PC 
(40,000) (10,000) (0) 
MAPR 0 0 982 830 611 358 
WMAPR' 10% 10% 973 818 592 307 
WMAPR' 20% 20% 946 783 539 253 
WMAPR' 30% 30% 898 725 470 215 
WMAPRb 100 100 978 825 605 334 
WMAPRb 200 200 962 807 582 318 
WMAPRb 300 300 925 768 535 301 
N~47,21O. DEMO~demographic model. PC~prior cost model. 
3) Small predictable profits and losses are defined in relative terms, i.e. those predictable profits 
and losses that are smaller than (XI % and (x, % of the predicted costs based on the selection 
model respectively. 
b) Small predictable profits and losses are defined in absolute lenns, i.e. those predictable 
profits and losses that are smaller than Dfl. C¥I and Dfl. ct2 respectively. 
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Table A.8.4 Mean result in 1993 for several snbgroups 
N DEMO PC ORS PRS 
(%) (1,500) (20,000) (0.35) 
Prescribed drugs in 1991 
0 28.4 711 444 519 462 
1-619 61.5 231 111 114 150 
620-1,098 5 -1,574 -1,005 -1,125 -1,023 
1,099-2,451 4 -3,633 -1,976 -2,504 -2,361 
>2,451 I -12,118 -6,578 -6,162 -7,877 
No. of years with hospitalization 
in the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 82 287 304 
1 15.5 -812 -22' -641 -528 
2 3.7 -3,262 -147 -1,977 -2,120 
3 or 4 1 -12,398 -5,582 -5,480 -8,059 
Presence of chronic conditions" 
None 61.1 523 290 380 340 
At least one 38.9 -820 -455 -596 -533 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -806 -1,278 -915 
Heart disease 1.8 -4,330 -1,484' -2,269 -2,815 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -1,578' -1,834 -1,882 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -2,695' -2,418 -3,642 
Use of home carea 
No 95.1 178 72 109 115 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -1,408' -1,714 -2,267 
N=47,21O. DEMO=demographic model. PC=prior cost model. ORS=demographic model + 
outlier risk sharing. PRS =demographic model + proportional risk sharing. 
') N = 10,553. 
') Not statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided t-test, p> 0.05). 
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Table A.8.S Insurer's portion of a ten percent efficiency gain for specific 
types of care 01' a twenty percent efficiency gain for specific subgroups 
PC ORS PRS 
(4,000) (5,000) (0.57) 
Types of care 
Hospital and specialists care 0.64 0.20 0.43 
Prescribed drugs 0.83 0.66 0.43 
Paramedical services 0.84 0.69 0.43 
Subgroups" 
Astlmla 0.69 0.35 0.43 
Heart disease 0.63 0.16 0.43 
Diabetes 0.66 0.27 0.43 
Cancer 0.62 0.13 0.43 
N=47,21O. PC=prior cost model. ORS=demographic model + outlier risk sharing. PRS=de-
mographic model + proportional risk sharing. 
') N = 10,553. 
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Table A.8.6 Mean result in 1993 for several subgroups 
N DEMO PC RSHR RSHC 
(%) (1,500) (8%) (1.6%) 
Prescribed drugs in 1991 
0 28.4 711 444 428 404 
1-619 61.5 231 111 17' 56 
620-1,098 5 -1,574 -1,005 -1,192 -854 
1,099-2,451 4 -3,633 -1,976 -1,478 -1,828 
>2,451 1 -12,118 -6,578 -1,356 -3,379 
No. of years with hospitalization 
in the period 1989-1992 
0 79.8 468 82 161 183 
1 15.5 -812 -22' -512 -476 
2 3.7 -3,262 -147 -1,021 -1,231 
3 or 4 1 -12,398 -5,582 -1,070 -2,584 
Presence of chronic conditions" 
None 61.1 523 209 253 277 
At least one 38.9 -820 -455 -397 -434 
Asthma 5.0 -1,408 -806 -727 -1,023 
Heart disease 1.8 -4,330 -1,484' -1,727 -978 
Diabetes 1.7 -2,895 -1,578' -964' -1,354 
Cancer 1.2 -5,602 -2,695' -974' -1,369 
Use of home care" 
No 95.1 178 72 58 43' 
Yes 4.9 -3,487 -1,408' -1,133 -837 
N=47,21O. DEMO=demographic model. PC=prior cost model. RSHR=demographic model 
+ risk sharing for high risks. RSHC=demographic model + risk sharing for high costs. 
") N = 10,553. ') Not statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided t-test, p > 0.05). 
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Table A.8.? Insurer's portion of a ten percent efficieucy gain for specific 
types of care or a twenty percent efficiency gain for specific subgroups 
PC RSHR RSHC 
(4,000) (8%) (4%) 
Types of care 
Hospital and specialists care 0.64 0.63 0.30 
Prescribed drugs 0.83 0.66 0.79 
Paramedical services 0.84 0.71 0.85 
Subgroups" 
Asthma 0.69 0.52 0.48 
Heart disease 0.63 0.39 0.26 
Diabetes 0.66 0.37 0.33 
Cancer 0.62 0.22 0.17 
N=47,21O. PC=prior cost model. RSHR=demographic model + risk sharing for high risks. 
RSHC =demographic model + risk sharing for high costs. 
') N = 10,553. 
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9. Conclusions and discussion 
9.1 Conclusions 
In the 1990s several European countries have introduced elements of regulated 
competition in their health insurance markets. The purpose of many of these 
reforms is to increase the insurers' incentives for efficiency and their respon-
siveness to consumers' preferences. A conunon element is the introduction of 
capitation payments through which the insurers are (largely) financed by the 
regulator. Commonly the regulator is the govermnent, but it may also be an 
employer or a group of employers. With the capitation payments the insurers 
should provide or purchase a specified set of health care services for their 
members during a certain period, mostly a year. In some countries the capita-
tion payments constitute the entire revenue of the insurers, but in most countries 
the insurers are allowed to quote an additional premium to their members. In 
the latter case the regulator usually requires an insurer to quote the same 
premium to each member that chooses the same insurance modality. A common 
problem in all countries is the implementation of adequate capitation payments. 
Currently employed capitation payments in Europe are mainly based on demo-
graphic variables only, which are relatively poor predictors of individual annual 
health care expenditures. Therefore, such capitation payments in combination 
with the premium rate restrictions provide insurers with strong incentives for 
preferred risk selection. In theory, the ideal solution for this problem is to 
include more and better predictors of individual annual health care expenditures 
in the calculation of the capitation payments. However, in most countries this 
appears to be very difficult in practice. As another solution for the problem of 
preferred risk selection, this study has analyzed various forms of risk sharing 
between the insurers and the regulator". Risk sharing implies that an insurer is 
reimbursed by the regulator at the end of the year for some of the expenditures 
for some of its members. With risk sharing the regulator might give up some of 
the insurers' incentives for efficiency in exchange for a reduction of their 
41 A sununary of this chapter together with a summary of the main empirical results can be 
found in Van Barneveld et al. (1999). 
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incentives for preferred risk selection. In the present study this tradeoff has 
been abbreviated as the tradeoff between selection and efficiency. Two central 
research questions were: which main forms of risk sharing can be distingui-
shed? and which main form yields the best tradeoff between selection and effi-
ciency, given demographic capitation payments and given the premium rate 
restrictions? These questions are interesting not only from a scientific point of 
view, but they are also highly relevant for health care policy in Europe. In the 
late 1990s some countries applied demographic capitation payments without any 
form of risk sharing (e.g. The Czech Republic, Germany and Switzerland). 
These countries might consider to implement some form of risk sharing. Some 
other countries have already implemented a form of risk sharing (e.g. Belgium 
and The Netherlands). These applications of risk sharing are limited to two 
forms: "outlier risk sharing" and "proportional risk sharing" (see chapter 
three)". Such countries might consider to change their specific form of risk 
sharing if other forms yield a better tradeoff between selection and efficiency. 
Besides Europe, the present study may also be relevant for other countries that 
have implemented regulated competition in their health insurance market(s) (e.g. 
the United States and Israel) or that are considering to implement such a regula-
tory regime (e.g. Taiwan). 
Some assumptions were made with respect to the health insurance market. 
These assumptions deal with the benefits package, the enrolment procedures and 
the premium rate restrictions. First it was assumed that the regulator has 
specified a benefits package that covers acute care like hospital care, physician 
services and prescribed drugs. The insurers are allowed to offer different 
modalities of this benefits package. For long-term care it is assumed that the 
regulator employs a separate regulatory regime apart from the competitive 
scheme for acute care. For types of care that are not covered by the long-term 
care scheme or by the specified benefits for acute care, the insurers are allowed 
to offer supplemental health insurance. This supplemental health insurance is 
unregulated. Second it was assumed that there is an open enrolment period each 
48 In 1996, in The Netherlands an extensive fonn of risk sharing for so-called fixed hospital 
expenditures has been introduced as well. This specific fonn of risk sharing has not been 
analyzed empirically to preserve the international character of the study. 
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year. This means that an insnrer has to accept anyone who wants to buy a 
modality of the specified benefits package. Third it was assumed that the 
insurers receive capitation payments based on demographic variables from the 
regulator and additional premiums from their members. With respect to the 
additional premiums, it was assumed that the regulator requires an insurer to 
quote the same premium to each member that chooses the same insurance 
modality. The study has been divided into two parts. The first part presented a 
conceptual framework for optimizing the tradeoff between selection and 
efficiency. The second part consisted of empirical analyses. 
9.1.1 Part one: conceptual framework 
Chapter two focused on the problem of preferred risk selection. It showed that 
an insurer can use many (subtle) tools for selection such as: the service of the 
insurer, the quality, reputation and service of its contracted health care pro-
viders, the design of insurance modalities as well as supplemental health 
insurance policies, selective advertising and direct mailing. Subsequently three 
negative effects of selection to society were mentioned: First for chronically ill 
the access to good health care may be hindered. Second efficient insurers might 
lose market share to inefficient insurers that are successful with selection. Third 
any resources used for selection can be seen as social welfare losses. So the 
prevention of selection is critical to the success of a regulated competitive 
individual health.' insurance market. Within the context of this study, the 
regulator may follow three strategies to prevent selection. First the regulator 
may use forms of procompetitive regulation, but on its own this can not be 
considered a promising strategy. Second the regulator can try to improve the 
capitation formula. In various countries this appears to be very difficult. Finally 
the regulator may introduce risk sharing between insurers and the regulator as a 
supplement to the capitation payments. This stUdy mainly analyzed the latter 
approach. 
In the literature various overall indicators of incentives for selection under 
various capitation formulae have been used: R'-values, the mean absolute result 
and the mean absolute predicted result. In chapter two it was argued that the 
latter indicator is more useful than the other two. As a refinement of the mean 
absolute predicted result, it was suggested to ignore small predictable profits 
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and losses. These may be irrelevant for selection because an insurer has to take 
into account its costs of selection and the (statistical) uncertainties about the net 
benefits of selection. If this is right, the so-called weighted mean absolute 
predicted result is a better overall indicator of incentives for selection. Applying 
the conventional and new indicators in a theoretical analysis suggested that - if 
small predictable profits and losses are indeed irrelevant for selection - the 
conventional indicators yield an overestimation of incentives for selection, 
especially in the case of relatively good capitation formulae. 
The overall indicators as mentioned above calmot be calculated in the case of 
risk sharing. Therefore, another overall indicator was proposed as well. This 
indicator is based on the sum of predictable profits and losses for an insurer, 
given the capitation formula of the regulator and certain cost predictions of the 
insurer itself. 
Besides the overall indicators, the mean result for various subgroups is used as 
an indicator of an insurer's incentives to select or deter such subgroups. 
Chapter three showed that many forms of risk sharing have been suggested in 
the literature, but that previous empirical studies were limited to separate 
analyses of two forms of risk sharing, each in a different setting. Subsequently 
a description of potential forms of risk sharing was given. Besides the period to 
which the risk sharing applies (usually one year), a description should at least 
cover the group of members for whom some risk is shared; the types of care 
for which the risk is shared, the extent of the risk that is shared and the price 
that insurers have to pay to share some risk. For the empirical analyses in the 
second part of the study, the following choices were made: an insurer is 
allowed to designate a certain percentage of its members (p) either at the start 
of a year (D=O) or at the end of a year (D=I). The risk sharing applies to all 
types of care within the specified benefits package. An insurer is entitled to 
receive a certain percentage (a) of the costs of a designated member as far as 
these costs are above a certain threshold (T). The risk sharing is financed via a 
proportional reduction of the normative costs. This percentage is set afterwards 
in such a way that the risk sharing is budget-neutral from the regulator's point 
of view. Further reducing the possibilities in such a way that each form of risk 
sharing has essentially one parameter, gave four main forms: 
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(1) Risk sharing for high risks (O<p<l; D=O; a=l; T=O). 
(2) Risk sharing for high costs (O<p< 1; D=I; a=l; T=O). 
(3) Outlier risk sharing(p=l; a=l; T>O). 
(4) Proportional risk sharing (p=l; O<a< I; T=O). 
Under these four forms of risk sharing, designated members pay the same addi-
tional premium as other members. Moreover, they may even be unaware that 
their insurer has designated them for risk sharing. 
By choosing different parameter values, one may get different variants of risk 
sharing. Optimizing the tradeoff between selection and efficiency not only 
includes the determination of the optimal form of risk sharing, but may also 
deal with determining the optimal variant of a certain form of risk sharing. 
Chapter /0111' focused on the efficiency-side of the tradeoff. It showed that an 
insurer can use several tools to improve the efficiency of care such as: utiliz-
ation management, disease management, (high-cost) case management, selective 
contracting with providers of care, financial incentives, negotiating lower fees 
and offering different insurance modalities. The potential savings that could be 
achieved by insurers are substantial. For instance, in California the adoption of 
managed care and managed competition has led to a broad decline of health 
care costs to employment groups which was followed by premium reductions of 
up to 10 percent. Introducing a utilization review program in a hospital has 
reduced inpatient .expenses by about 8 percent and overall medical expenses by 
about 4 percent. Furthermore there are several examples of successfully applied 
disease or case management techniques, for instance a reduction of about 40 
percent of the costs for patients with congestive heart failure and cost savings of 
15 to 35 percent for diabetics. 
The proposed method for calculating an insurer's incentives for efficiency is as 
follows. Under the assumption that - ceteris paribus - an insurer reduces certain 
costs through efficiency measures, its actual costs and most likely its risk 
sharing reimbursement will be lower. Therefore, such an efficiency gain can be 
split into H portion that is kept by the insurer and a portion that is taken by the 
regulator. The higher the insurer's portion of the efficiency gain, the higher its 
incentives to employ the activities that are necessary to achieve the cost savings. 
The insurer's portion of the efficiency gain can be calculated under various 
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assumptions about cost savings. For example: overall savings, savings for 
specific types of care and savings for specific groups of members. As an 
alternative overall indicator, the so-called weighted expenditures have been 
proposed. This indicator is relevant under the assumption that (some) incentives 
for efficiency are present as long as (a part of) the marginal expenditures for a 
member in a year are born by the insurer itself. As soon as it is certain that 
these marginal expenditures are fully born by the regulator, the insurer's 
incentives for efficiency with respect to this member are zero. It has been 
shown that, if the insurer quickly recalculates its incentives for efficiency with 
respect to a member after some expenditures have occurred, the weighted 
expenditures give a outcome similar as the insurer's portion of an overall 
efficiency gain. 
Chapter five combined the elements of the previous chapters into a systematic 
method for optimizing the tradeoff between selection and efficiency. As 
theoretical illustrations optimal proportional risk sharing variants were calcu-
lated, given some capitation formulae and given the preferences of the regulator 
with respect to reducing incentives for selection versus retaining incentives for 
efficiency. The theoretical illustrations in this chapter were restricted to propor-
tional risk sharing because the other forms of risk sharing could not be analyzed 
in this way. This provided a strong argument to perform empirical analyses of 
tradeoffs between selection and efficiency as well. 
9.1.2 Part two: empirical analysis 
Chapter six presented a description of the data set that was available, the 
methods used in the empirical analyses and the incentives for selection if the 
regulator employs demographic capitation payments without any form of risk 
sharing. The data set contained administrative data for six consecutive years 
(1988-1993) for about 47,200 members of one Dutch sickness fund. All 
members had the same insurance coverage and the same insurance modality. 
The data included demographic variables, the annual costs for several types of 
care and the diagnoses from hospital admissions. For a subset of about 10,500 
members, health survey data were available as well. The average health care 
expenditures per member were Dfl. 1,941 in 1993. In line with previous 
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studies, it was shown that under demographic capitation payments without any 
form of risk sharing, an insurer can easily identify subgroups that generate 
substantial predictable losses. For instance, for the group of 1 % with the 
highest costs (or the highest costs for prescribed drugs) in the preceding two 
years, the mean predictable loss is about Dfl. 12,000 per member. For those 
with a hospitalization in at least three of the four preceding years (about 1 % of 
the members), the mean predictable loss is also about Dfl. 12,000 per member. 
Based on the health survey data, members that suffer from a serious heart 
disease (about 1.8%), diabetes (about 2.7%) or cancer (about 1.2%) were 
distinguished. The mean predictable losses for these subgroups were about Dfl. 
4,300, Dfl. 2,900 and Dfl. 5,400 per member respectively. Finally for those 
that receive some form of home care (about 4.9%), the mean predictable loss 
was Dfl. 3,500 per member. Nevertheless, it was concluded that - globally 
speaking - demographic capitation payments already reduce incentives for 
selection by about one-third in comparison with flat capitation payments. So 
demographic variables are useful for calculating capitation payments, but 
certainly not sufficient. Ignoring small predictable profits or losses did not 
change this conclusion. 
Chapter seven analyzed the reduction of the incentives for selection and 
efficiency if the regulator would employ various forms of risk sharing as a 
supplement to the demographic capitation payments. For each of the four forms 
of risk sharing given in chapter three, several variants were simulated by 
varying the relevant parameter. Although the empirical distribution of individual 
annual health care expenditures differed statistically signlficantly from the 
theoretical lognormal distribution, the theoretical analyses in chapter three - that 
were based on the latter distribution - gave a good indication of the proportion 
of expenditures that would be shared between an insurer and the regulator. 
Moreover, the theoretical analyses of chapter four also gave a good indication 
of the two overall indicators of incentives for efficiency. The main conclusion 
of chapter seven was that risk sharing for high risks and risk sharing for high 
costs yield better tradeoffs between selection and efficiency than either outlier 
risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. The results for risk sharing for high 
risks and risk sharing for high costs are mixed. There seem to be two advan-
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tages of the first type of risk sharing. First, given a certain desired overall level 
of incentives for efficiency, it yields greater reductions of the large predictable 
losses for those members with high prior costs, many prior hospital admissions 
and serious chronic conditions. Second, given a certain desired overall level of 
incentives for selection, it retains more incentives for efficiency with respect to 
hospital care and with respect to members that have unpredictable high expendi-
tures. A disadvantage is that for limited extents of risk sharing, it retains less 
incentives for efficiency with respect to several subgroups that could be selected 
for the application of disease management principles. 
Chapter eight analyzed prior year's costs as an additional risk adjuster next to 
demographic variables. Several variants were simulated by varying the threshold 
above which the costs were included as a risk adjuster. Unlike other promising 
risk adjusters, a cost-based risk adjuster clearly yields a tradeoff between 
selection and efficiency just like risk sharing. In line with the theoretical 
findings in chapter two, it was shown that - if small predictable profits and 
losses are irrelevant for selection - the conventional indicators yield an 
overestimation of incentives for selection, especially in the case of relatively 
good capitation formulae. 
ObviouslY, it was interesting to compare the results of prior year's costs as a 
risk adjuster with those of risk sharing. The main conclusion was that prior 
year's costs as a. risk adjuster 'yield a better tradeoff between selection and 
efficiency than either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. In 
comparison with risk sharing for high risks or high costs, the results of prior 
year's costs as a risk adjuster are mixed. An advantage is that, given a relative-
ly low level of incentives for selection, it retains more incentives for efficiency. 
A disadvantage is that, given a certain desired overall level of incentives for 
efficiency, it leaves larger predictable losses for various non-preferred risks. 
The main conclusion of the study can be summarized as follows. Supplementing 
demographic capitation payments with risk sharing for high risks or high costs 
as well as using prior year's costs as an additional risk adjuster yield a better 
tradeoff between selection and efficiency than supplementing demographic 
capitation payments with either outlier risk sharing or proportional risk sharing. 
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9.2 Discussion 
9.2.1 Policy implications 
Given the large incentives for selection under demographic capitation payments, 
it is remarkable that some countries still apply such capitation payments without 
any form of risk sharing. In 1999 this appears to be the case in The Czech 
Republic, Germany and Switzerland. These countries may improve the tradeoff 
between selection and efficiency by implementing some form of risk sharing or 
by using prior year's costs as an additional risk adjuster. 
Some countries have supplemented their capitation payments with outlier risk 
sharing andlor proportional risk sharing. In 1999 Belgium employs proportional 
risk sharing, and The Netherlands employ a combination of outlier and propor-
tional risk sharing. These countries may improve the tradeoff between selection 
and efficiency by changing their present form of risk sharing into risk sharing 
for high risks or high costs. Another option is to abolish their form of risk 
sharing while introducing prior year's costs as an additional risk adjuster for the 
calculation of the capitation payments. 
In the Medicare program in the United States, at-risk health maintenance 
organiza-tions have received capitation payments based on demographic 
variables only, since the early 1980s. Although the possibilities for outlier risk 
sharing and proportional risk sharing have been discussed in the Medicare 
context, no form of risk sharing has been implemented. In the year 2000, the 
Health Care Financing Administration, which is responsible for the calculation 
of the capitation payments, will start using diagnostic information from previous 
hospitalizations as an additional risk adjuster. This will be a major step forward. 
A thorough evaluation of the then remaining incentives for selection seems 
worthwhile. In comparison with other studies such an evaluation could include 
several versions of the new indicator of incentives for selection (the so-called 
weighted mean absolute predicted result) that has been developed in chapter two 
and applied in chapter eight of the present study. If the remaining incentives for 
selection are still considered to be too large, supplementing the diagnoses-based 
capitation payments with some form of risk sharing may be a good way to 
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further reduce incentives for selection at the expense of some incentives for 
efficiency. 
Besides the Medicare sector, the conclusions of this study may also be relevant 
for the Medicaid sector and the private health insurance sector in the United 
States where there are many applications of capitation payments which are 
sometimes supplemented with risk sharing. 
In Israel some form of condition-specific risk sharing is being employed as a 
supplement to demographic capitation payments. This form of risk sharing 
covers five severe diseases and about six percent of the overall expenditures 
(Van de Ven and Ellis, 1999). This country could consider risk sharing for high 
risks or high costs as alternatives for its present form of risk sharing as well as 
prior year's costs as an additional risk adjuster. 
Taking for granted that, at least in the short run, for most countries mentioned 
above it will be very difficult to improve their demographic capitation pay-
ments, experimentation with risk sharing for high risks or high costs and/or 
with prior year's costs as a risk adjuster seems promising. In the longer run, 
even if demographic capitation payments are improved substantially, it seems 
likely that limited forms of risk sharing will still be useful. The findings of this 
study as well as those on improving demographic capitation payments seem to 
imply that there a,re many technical possibilities to combine small incentives for 
selection with large incentives for efficiency in a regulated competitive individ-
ual health insurance market. 
9.2.2 Limitations of the study 
This study assumed that - given the capitation payments and given the premium 
rate restrictions - the regulator's purpose with risk sharing is to reduce the 
insurers' incentives for selection while maintaining their incentives for effi-
ciency as much as possible. In related studies the purpose of risk sharing 
appears to be different (e.g. Beebe, 1992; Newhouse et aI., 1997; Keeler et aI., 
1998). For instance, an additional purpose may be to reduce the insurers' 
incentives for quality skimping, to reduce the insurers' financial risk, or to 
reduce incentives for adverse selection. 
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Quality skimping or so-called stinting is the reduction of quality below the mini-
mum level that is acceptable to society. This problem may even emerge in the 
theoretical case of 'perfect' capitation payments. Van de Ven and Schut (1994) 
have argued to employ a separate regulatory regime for types of care for which 
the problem of quality skimping is most relevant (e.g. long-term care for 
demented elderly) apart from the competitive regulatory regime for acute care. 
An insurer's financial risk is related to the unpredictability of health care 
expenditures. As a result of pure chance, the financial result of an insurer may 
vary over the years. For relatively large insurers chance is not a problem and 
relatively small insurers can deal with this problem via voluntary risk-rated 
reinsurance techniques (Bovbjerg, 1992). 
Adverse selection is caused by a consumer information surplus vis II vis the 
insurers. That is, consumers have more information about their health care risk 
than the information that insurers (are allowed to) use for discerning risk groups 
and setting premiums. If the insurers' incentives for preferred risk selection are 
reduced to such an extent that preferred risk selection is unprofitable, there may 
remain some opportunities for adverse selection but their extent is unknown. 
The potential consequences of adverse selection as a result of consumers' 
choices between various modalities of the specified benefits package, as siInu-
lated by Keeler et al. (1998), have not been analyzed here. However, the 
empirical analyses presented in chapter six through eight do provide - among 
others - an indication of an insurer's incentives to offer different insurance 
modalities of the specified benefits package in order to select good risks. 
Obviously, the conclusions of the present study are not necessarily valid if the 
purpose of risk sharing is different. In that case different tradeoffs have to be 
made. 
This study included fOllr main forms of risk sharing in the empirical analyses. 
All forms of risk sharing can be seen as mandatory reinsurance for the insurers 
with a regulated reinsurance premium. This is especially true for outlier risk 
sharing and proportional risk sharing that have a clear analogy with "excess-of-
loss" and "quota-share" reinsurance respectively. In addition, risk sharing for 
high-risks can be seen as a form of regulation that attempts to simulate, to some 
extent, the practice of refusing insurance to high-risk applicants for whom an 
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appropriate premium (capitation payment) cannot be calculated. This practice is 
common in a free health insurance market but is not allowed in a regulated 
competitive health insurance market with open enrolment. 
Forms of condition-specific risk sharing were not included in the empirical 
analyses. Such a form of risk sharing may have the advantage of automatically 
varying fractions of designated members per insurer. With risk sharing for high 
risks or high costs, the regulator has to decide which fraction of the members 
an insurer is allowed to designate. Of course this fraction may vary per insurer, 
although the question of how to vary it may be difficult to answer. Advantages 
of risk sharing for high risks or high costs are that they prevent discussions 
over which conditions should make members eligible for risk sharing and they 
prevent manipulation by insurers. Especially these advantages led to the choice 
to exclude condition-specific risk sharing from the empirical analyses. 
Because the main purpose of the study was to compare various main forms of 
risk sharing, the empirical analyses did not include some combinations of 
various main forms. Nevertheless, such combinations can be made, as is the 
case in The Netherlands in 1999, and may combine the best aspects of two or 
more separate forms of risk sharing. 
It is clear that the availability of specific data may influence the type of capita-
tion payments as well as the type of risk sharing to be used. This study assumed 
that the regulator .has an operational definition of so-called "acceptable expendi-
tures" within the context of the specified benefits package. This definition could 
become problematic if the specification of the benefits package becomes less 
detailed. In that case insurers have more opportunities to offer different insur-
ance modalities of the specified benefits package. 
In the empirical analyses the risk sharing is based on the total health care 
expenditures for a specified benefits package in a certain period (i.e. a year). If 
cost data are not available for all types of care within the specified benefits 
package, it might be possible to use imputed costs (based on volumes of health 
care use and imputed prices). Another option is to limit the risk sharing to types 
of care for which cost data are already available. For instance, the risk sharing 
could be limited to hospital care oniy (Beebe, 1992). 
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Finally, the precise form of the premium rate restrictions may influence the 
feasibility of risk sharing. This study assumed that an insurer has to quote the 
same premium to each member that chooses the same insurance modality. In 
1999 these extreme premium rate restrictions are employed in several European 
countries (Van de Ven and Ellis, 1999). If these restrictions are loosened by 
requiring a certain minimum and maximum premium per insurer, executing 
outlier risk sharing and proportional risk sharing is still straightforward. 
However, executing risk sharing for high risks or high costs may pose a 
difficulty with premium calculations. To calculate the premium for a member, 
an insurer has to know for which part of future expenditures of this potential 
member it is at risk. With risk sharing for high risks or high costs, this is 
unclear at the time the insurer has to calculate the premium. Under such 
premium rate restrictions, the regulator is confronted with a very complex 
tradeoff between access, selection and efficiency (Van de Ven et ai., 1999). If 
the premium rate restrictions are abolished, risk sharing may be used as a tool 
to reduce access problems. Without any premium rate restrictions, there is a 
tradeoff between access and efficiency and executing risk sharing for high risks 
or high costs may pose difficulties with the premium calculations of an insurer 
as mentioned above. 
9.2.3 Further research 
Further research on tradeoffs between the insurers' incentives for selection and 
efficiency in regulated competitive individual health insurance markets may 
focus on the following question: which combination of capitation payments and 
risk sharing yields the best tradeoff between selection and efficiency? Because 
market-oriented health care reforms including a regulated competitive health 
insurance market are being implemented in many countries, this question 
appears to be relevant in several settings. 
This study was limited to combinations of demographic capitation payments and 
four forms of risk sharing. In the empirical analyses it was assumed that the 
capitation payments are calculated in the same way as in the situation without 
risk sharing and that the risk sharing was financed via a proportional reduction 
of the normative costs. Different combinations of capitation payments and risk 
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sharing may include: 
- Other capitation payments such as capitation payments partly based on 
diagnostic information from previous hospitalizations andlor previously pre-
scribed drugs (Clark et aI., 1995; Ellis et aI., 1996; Lamers and Van Vliet, 
1996; Lamers, 1999; Weiner et aI., 1996). 
- Other forms of risk sharing such as condition-specific risk sharing andlor 
combinations of several main forms of risk sharing. 
- Different ways of calculating the normative costs on which the capitation pay-
ments are based, and thereby financing the risk sharing differently, e.g. 
calculating normative cost levels on truncated expenditures if outlier risk 
sharing is employed. 
For the empirical analyses in the second part of the study, a data set of Dutch 
sickness fund members has been used. So the empirical illustrations refer to a 
general population of all ages, although the higher-income groups mostly have 
private health insurance. Almost all health care expenditures covered by the 
Dutch Sickness Fund Act were included in the analyses, such as hospital care, 
specialists care, prescribed drugs, paramedical services, medical devices, some 
dental care, maternity care and sick-transport. Thus the analyzed benefits 
package is rather broad. The various combinations of capitation payments and 
risk sharing may be applied in different settings. Such different settings could 
include: 
- Different populations, e.g. the elderly only. This may be relevant in the Dutch 
private health insurance market where - in 1999 - most people of 65 years or 
older are covered under a heavily regulated health insurance scheme (WTZ) in 
which insurers bear no financial risk. It is also relevant for the Medicare sector 
in the United States which covers mainly the elderly. 
- Different benefits packages, e.g. for hospital costs only. This may be relevant 
for countries that lack the necessary data for all types of care included in the 
benefits package, but have the necessary information on hospital care. Another 
example is the current situation in the Dutch sickness fund sector where so-
called fixed hospital expenditures are almost fully shared between the regulator 
and the insurer. 
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For future evaluations of payment systems for competing health insurers, one 
may introduce varying weights on specific reductions of incentives for selection 
as well as for efficiency. This could be seen as an extension of the conceptual 
framework as presented in the first part of the study. The weights may depend 
on the tools for selection and efficiency that the regulator expects to be used by 
insurers and on the importance the regulator assigns to the (negative) effects of 
these tools. In different settings a different set of weights may be useful. 
Finally, it seems worthwhile to study implementation issues more closely than 
was done in this study. 
In sum, optimizing the tradeoff between selection and efficiency in the health 
insurance market is increasingly relevant for an increasing number of countries. 
Further research on this important issue deserves a high priority from both 
policy makers and health economists. 
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Risicodeling als aanvulling op imperfecte normuitkeringen voor 
ziektekostenverzekering: 
een afruil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid 
Achtergl'ond 
Sinds 1993 ontvangen ziekenfondsen normuitkeringen tel' financiering van de 
ziektekosten van hun verzekerden. De normuitkeringen komen uit een Algeme-
ne Kas die hoofdzakelijk gevuld wordt met de inkomensafllankelijke premies 
van de ziekenfondsverzekerden'. De normuitkering voor een verzekerde is 
gelijk aan de verwachte ziektekosten in het komende verzekeringsjaar op grond 
van enkele demografische kenmerken van de verzekerde in kwestie, het zoge-
naamde normatieve kostenniveau, minus een vast bedrag. Deze normuitkering is 
onafllankelijk van de werkelijke kosten van de verzekerde in het betreffende jaar 
en onafhankelijk van het ziekenfonds dat de verzekerde gekozen heef!. Het 
verschil tussen de totale kosten van een ziekenfonds en het totaal aan ontvangen 
normuitkeringen diem tot uitdrukking te komen in de zogenaamde nominale 
premie die het ziekenfonds in rekening brengt bij zijn verzekerden. De overheid 
eist daarbij dat een ziekenfonds dezelfde nominale premie vraagt aan al zijn 
verzekerden. WeI mag de nomina Ie premie per ziekenfonds verschillend zijn. 
Sinds 1996 mogen ziekenfondsverzekerden jaarlijks van ziekenfonds wissel en, 
waarbij voor de ziekenfondsen een acceptatieplicht geld!. Dat wil zeggen dat 
een ziekenfonds verplicht is ieder zich aamueldende persoon die recht heef! op 
een ziekenfondsvcrzekering te accepteren. Tot 1992 waren ziekenfondsverzeker-
den op grond van hun woonplaats verplicht aangesloten bij het ziekenfonds dat 
in hun regio werkzaam was. Daarnaast is in 1994 de contracteerplicht voor 
ziekenfondsen opgeheven. Dit betekent dat zij niet langeI' verplicht zijn met 
iedere individuele beroepsbeoefenaar (bijvoorbeeld: huisartsen, tandartsen en 
fysiotherapeuten) cen overeenkomst te hebben, maar dat zij nu zelf mogen 
beslissen met wie zij een contract afsluiten. In zo'n contract kunnen afspraken 
1 De Algemene Kas wordt beheerd door het College voor Zorgverzekeringen (voorheen de 
Ziekenfondsraad), 
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gemaakt worden over de prijs en kwaliteit van de te leveren zorg. Met bovenge-
noemde maatregelen heeft de overheid belangrijke stappen gezet in de richting 
van een gercguleerde concurrerende zorgverzekeringsmarkt met risicodragende 
zorgverzekeraars. Sinds 1988 is het overheidsbeleid - conform het advies van 
de commissie Dekker - erop gericht zorgverzekeraars en zorgaanbieders mede 
verantwoordelijk te maken voor doelmatigheid en kostenbeheersing in de 
zorgsector. De tot dan toe gehanteerde gedetailleerde overheidsregulering met 
betrekking tot het volume en de prijzen in de zorgsector, waarbij uitsluitend de 
overheid de verantwoordelijkheid droeg voor doelmatigheid en kostenbeheer-
sing, wordt niet langer opportuun geacht. Sindsdien wordt gestreefd naar 
gereguleerde concurrentie zowel tussen zorgverzekeraars als tussen zorgaanbie-
ders2. Hiervan wordt verwacht dat de zorgverzekeraars zich zuBen inspalmen 
om de doelmatighcid van de zorgverlening te bevorderen en dat zij in zuBen 
spelcn op de voorkeuren van hun verzekerden. Tot 1992 waren er geen (finan-
ciCle) incentives voor ziekenfondsen om de doelmatigheid van de zorgverlening 
te bevordcren en/of in te spelen op de voorkeuren van hnn verzekerden. De 
ziekenfondsen kregen namelijk acllteraf al hun uitgaven vergoed door de 
Algemene Kas en verzekerden konden nauwelijks van ziekenfonds wissel en. 
Een belangrijk obstakel bij de ingezette hervormingen is de implementatie van 
adequate normuitkeringen. De toepassing van demografische normuitkeringen in 
combinatie met de gehanteerde premieregulering leidt er namelijk toe dat de 
ziekenfondsen sterke incentives hebben om aan gunstige-risicoselectie te doel!. 
Dit is de selectie van verzekerden waarvan een ziekenfonds verwacht dat zij 
winstgevend zullen zijn. Demografische variabelen blijken relatief slechte 
voorspeBers van iemands toekomstige ziektekosten te zijn. Wanneer het 
nonnatieve kostenniveau van een verzekerde uitsluitend gebaseerd is op enkele 
demografische kenmerken, kan een ziekenfonds vrij eenvoudig een betere 
voorspelling van iemands toekomstige ziektekosten maken. Vervolgens kan een 
vergelijking van deze betere voorspelling met het normatieve kostenniveau 
aangeven of iemand een gunstig danwel een ongunstig risico vormt voor het 
2 Van 1988 tot 1994 omvatte dit streven zowel de kortdurende curatieve zorg zoals 
ziekenhuiszorg, specialistische hulp en huisartsenhulp als verschillende vonnen van Jangdurige 
zorg ("care") zoals verpleeghuiszorg en gehandicaptenzorg. Vanaf 1994 is het steeven beperkt 
tot de curatieve zorg. 
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ziekenfonds. Gunstige risico's worden gevormd door degenen voor wie het 
ziekenfonds zelf lagere uitgaven verwacht dan de verwachte uitgaven op grond 
van de demografische kemnerken die betrokken worden bij de berekening van 
de normuitkeringen. oit eerder onderzoek is bekend dat - gegeven demografi-
sche norrnuitkeringen - gezonde personen gunstige risico's en met name 
chronisch zieken ongunstige risico's vormen. Ben ziekenfonds zou op deze 
financiele incentives kunnen reageren door te trachten zoveel mogelijk gezonde 
verzekerden aan te trekken en chronisch zieken zoveel mogelijk te weren. -
Hoewel dergelijke risicoselectie voor een ziekenfonds profijtelijk kan zijn, heeft 
het vanuit maatschappelijk oogpunt uitsluitend negatieve effecten (zie hoofdstuk 
twee). Het bij de berekening van de normuitkeringen betrekken van meer en 
betere voorspellers van iemands toekomstige ziektekosten is een ideale oplossing 
voor dit probleem. Hiermee knnnen - in theorie - de incentives tot risicoselectie 
worden weggenomen met behoud van de incentives tot doelmatigheid. In de 
praktijk blijkt het echter nogal moeilijk te zijn om de berekening van de 
normuitkeringen te verbeteren. 
Gegeven demografische normuitkeringen en de premieregulering is risicodeling 
een andere oplossing voor het probleem van risicoselectie. Risicodeling tussen 
ziekenfondsen en de Algemene Kas impliceert dat ziekenfondsen sommige 
uitgaven voor sommigen van hun verzekerden achteraf vergoed krijgen door de 
Algemene Kas. Helaas vermindert risicodeling niet aileen de incentives voor 
ziekenfondsen om gunstige risico's te selecteren, maar ook de incentives voor 
ziekenfondsen om doelmatige zorg in te kopen. Bij risicodeling zal er dus een 
afruil plaatsvinden tussen incentives tot risicoselectie en incentives tot doelma-
tigheid. In deze studie wordt verondersteld dat de overheid met risicodeling 
beoogt de incentives tot risicoselectie zoveel mogelijk te verminderen, met 
zoveel mogelijk behoud van de incentives tot doelmatigheid. 
In de ziekenfondssector is sinds de invoering van de normuitkeringen in hoge 
mate gebruik gemaakt van risicodeling. Daarbij zijn tot nu toe twee vormen van 
risicodeling gehanteerd, te weten proportionele verevening en overschadever-
goeding (zie ook hoofdstuk drie)3. Andere vormen van risicodeling zijn even-
J Sinds 1996 wordl in de ziekenfondssector tevens cen vorm van risicodeling gehanteerd 
voar zogenaamde vaste ziekenhuiskosten ("het splitsingsmodel"), Vanwege het internationale 
239 
Samellvatting 
wei ook denkbaar. 
Doelstelling en relevantie 
In deze studie is onderzocht welke hoofdvormen van risicodeling onderscheiden 
kunnen worden en welke vorm het meest voldoet aan het bovengenoemde doel 
van risicodeling. Met andere woorden: welke vorm van risicodeling leidt -
gegeven de demografische normuitkeringen en de premieregulering - tot de 
beste afruil tussen incentives voor risicoselectie en incentives voor doehnatig-
heid? 
Deze vraag is niet aileen wetenschappelijk interessant, maar ook maatschappe-
lijk relevant. De overheid zou namelijk kunnen overwegen een andere vorm van 
risicodeling te hanteren indien zo'n vorm tot een betere afruil tussen selectie en 
doelmatigheid leidt dan de huidige vorm. 
In het streven naar gereguleerde concurrentie tussen zowel zorgverzekeraars als 
tussen zorgaanbieders is Nederland niet uniek. Verschillende Europese landen 
hebben in de jaren '90 soortgelijke hervormingen van de zorgsector in gang 
gezet. Ieder land loopt daarbij tegen dezelfde problematiek aan. De vraag welke 
vorm van risicodeling - gegeven demografische normuitkeringen en de premie-
regulering - tot de beste afruil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid leidt is dus niet 
aileen actueel in Nederland, maar ook in andere landen. Daarom is in de 
onderhavige studie gekozen voor een zoveel mogelijk internationaal karakter. 
De onderstaande veronderstellingen ten aanzien van de zorgverzekeringsmarkt 
maken daar onderdeel van uit. 
Veronderstellingen 
Ten eerste is verondersteld dat de overheid een zeker basispakket gedefinieerd 
heeft dat dekking geeft voor curatieve zorg zoals ziekenhuiszorg, specialistische 
hulp en voorgeschreven geneesmiddelen. De verzekeraars mogen verschillende 
polisvormen aanbieden met betrekking tot dit pakket voorzover deze aile 
voorgeschreven vormen van zorg omvatten. Voor vormen van langdurige zorg 
karaktcr van deze studie is hiennee in de empirische analyses van dit proefschrift geen rekening 
gehouden. Het toepassen van dezelfde analyses binnen het kader van het splitsingsmodel leidt 
Qverigens lot dezelfde conclusies (Van Barneveld et al.. 2000a; Van Barneveld et aI., 2000b). 
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wordt verondersteld dat de overheid een apart regime hanteert, los van de 
curatieve zorg4. Voor vormen van zorg die niet gedekt zijn via de langdurige 
zorg of het basispakket voor curatieve zorg, kunnen verzekeraars aanvullende 
verzekeringen aanbieden. De markt voor deze aanvullende verzekeringen is 
volledig vrij. Ten tweede is verondersteld dat er een jaarlijkse acceptatieplicht 
geldt voor de basisverzekering. Ten derde is verondersteld dat de verzekeraars 
normuitkeringen ontvangen waarvan de hoogte op grond van demografische 
variabelen wordt vastgesteld en daarnaast een nominale premie van hun verze-
kerden. De overheid eist dat een verzekeraar dezelfde nominale premie in 
rekening brengt bij iedere verzekerde die dezelfde polisvorm van het basispak-
ket heeft gekozen. 
De studie bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel is gewijd aan het opbouwen 
van een conceptueel kader voor het analyseren en optimaliseren van de afruil 
tussen selectie en doelmatigheid. Het twee deel presenteert empirische analyses. 
Conceptueel kader 
Hoofdstllk f\Vee richt zich op het probleem van risicoselectie. Het geefi aan dat 
een verzekeraar verschillende (subtiele) instrumenten voor selectie kan hanteren 
zoals: de service van de verzekeraar, de kwaliteit, reputatie en service van zijn 
gecontracteerde zorgverleners, het aanbieden van verschillende polisvormen van 
het basispakket en van verschillende aanvuIIende (ziektekosten)verzekeringen, 
selectief adverteren en 'direct mailing'. Vervolgens zijn drie negatieve maat-
schappelijke effecten van selectie beschreven. Ten eerste kan de toegang tot 
goede zorg voor met name chronisch zieken in gevaar komen. Ten tweede 
kunnen doelmatige verzekeraars marktaandeel verliezen aan ondoelmatige 
verzekeraars die succesvoI zijn met risicoselectie. Ten derde kunnen aile 
uitgaven aan risicoselectie gezien worden als maatschappelijke verliezen. 
Derhalve is het voorkomen van risicoselectie essentieel voor een succesvolle 
implementatie van een gereguleerde concurrerende markt voor individuele 
ziektekostenverzekeringen. Binnen de context van deze studie kan de overheid 
op drie manieren risicoselectie tegengaan. Ten eerste kan zij aanvullende 
4 Zoals de Aigemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (A \VBZ) in Nederland. 
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concurrentiebevorderende regelgeving hanteren, maar op zichzelf is dit geen 
veelbelovende aanpak. Ten tweede kan de overheid trachten meer en bet ere 
kenrnerken van verzekerden bij de berekening van de normuitkeringen te 
betrekken. In Nederland en in verschillende andere landen blijkt dit echter erg 
moeilijk te zijn. Ten slotte kan de overheid risicodeling tussen verzekeraars en 
de Algemene Kas introduceren. Deze studie analyseert hoofdzakelijk de 
laatstgenoemde strategie. 
In de literatuur worden verschillende indicatoren gebruikt voor het meten van 
de overall incentives tot risicoselectie bij verschillende nonnuitkeringenformu-
les: R'-waarden, het gemiddelde absolute resultaat en het gemiddelde absolute 
voorspelde resultaat. In hoofdstuk twee is betoogd dat de laatstgenoemde 
indicator zinvoller is dan de andere twee. Ter verfijning is voorgesteld sommige 
kleine voorspelbare winsten en verliezen te verwaarlozen. Zulke winsten en 
verliezen kunnen irrelevant zijn voor selectie omdat een verzekeraar ook 
rekening moet houden met de kosten van selectie en met (statistische) onzeker-
heden over de netto winst van selectie. Als dit juist is dan is het zogenaamde 
gewogen gemiddelde absolute voorspelde resultaat een betere indicator voor de 
overall incentives tot selectie. De toepassing van zowel de conventionele als de 
nieuwe indicatoren in een theoretische analyse laat zien dat - wanneer kleine 
voorspelbare winsten en verliezen inderdaad irrelevant zijn voor selectie - de 
conventionele indicatoren tot een overschatting leiden van de incentives tot 
select ie, met name in het geval van relatief goede normuitkeringenformules. 
De bovengenoemde indicatoren kunnen niet berekend worden in het geval van 
risicodeling. Daarom is nog een andere overall indicator voorgesteld. Deze is 
gebaseerd op de som van de voorspelbare winsten en verliezen voor een 
verzekeraar, gegeven de normuitkeringen en gegeven bepaalde kostenvoorspel-
lingen van de verzekeraar zelf. Naast deze overall indicator, wordt het gemid-
deld resultaat per subgroep van verzekerden gehanteerd als indicator voor de 
incentives om personen uit de betreffende groep aan te trekken of juist te 
weren. 
Hoofdsllik drie laat zien dat de internationale literatuur verschillende suggesties 
voor risicodeling bevat en dat voorgaande empirische studies naar risicodeling 
zich beperken tot afzonderlijke analyses van twee hoofdvormen in een verschil-
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lende context. Vervolgens is een beschrijving gegeven van mogelijke vormen 
van risicodeling. Naast de periode waarop de risicodehng betrekking heeft, 
omvat een beschrijving van risicodeling tenminste de groep van verzekerden 
waarop de risicodeling betrekking heeft, de typen zorg, de mate waarin het 
risico wordt gedeeld en de prijs die een verzekeraar voor de risicodeling moet 
betalen. Voor de empirische analyses zijn de volgende keuzen gemaakt: een 
verzekeraar mag zelf een bepaald percentage van zijn verzekerden (p) aanmel-
den hetzij v66r aanvang van het jaar (D =0) waarop de risicodeling van toepas-
sing is, hetzij aan het eind van dat jaar (D = 1). De risicodeling heeft betrekking 
op aile vormen van zorg die opgenomen zijn in het basispakket. Ben verzeke-
raar ontvangt een bepaald percentage (a) van de kosten van aangemelde verze-
kerden voorzover deze kosten boven een bepaald drempelbedrag (T) uitkomen. 
De risicodeling wordt gefinancierd door middel van een procentnele verlaging 
van de normkosten. Dit percentage wordt achteraf zodanig vastgesteld dat de 
risicodeling vanuit het oogpunt van de Algemene Kas budget-neutraal is. Vier 
hoofdvormen wordeu onderscheiden: 
(1) Hoge-risicoverevening (O<p< I;D=O;a=I;T=O). 
(2) Hoge-kostenverevening (O<p< I;D= I;a= I;T=O). 
(3) Overschadevergoeding (p = I;a = I;T > 0). 
(4) Proportionele verevening (p=I;O<a< I;T=O). 
Middels het kiezen van verschillende parameterwaarden ontstaan verschillende 
varianten per vorm van risicodeling. Het optimaliseren van de afruil tnssen 
selectie en doelmatigheid heeft dus niet uitsluitend betrekking op het bepalen 
van de optima Ie vorm van risicodeling, maar ook kan per vorm van risicodeling 
gezocht worden naar de optima Ie variant. 
In 1997 is een aangepaste variant van overschadevergoeding ingevoerd in de 
ziekenfondssector (T=4.500 gulden en a=0.9). De sinds 1993 gehanteerde 
verevening en nacalculatie komen gezamenlijk neer op de hier als vierde 
genoemde vorm van risicodeling'. 
, In Nederland,e beleid,kringen wordt sam, de term "hoge-ko,tenverevenillg" gebruikt voor 
de hief als derde genoemde vonn van risicodeling. Cruciaal is dat bij hoge-kostenverevening 
(vofm 2) cen verzekeraar cen voJledige vergoeding ontvangt VODe cen beperkt percentage van 
zijn verzekerden terwijl het bij overschadevergoeding (vonn 3) gaat om cen volledige vergoe-
ding van de kosten van cen verzekerde voor zover deze boven cen bepaaJd drempelbedrag 
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Onder aile vier de vormen van risicodeling kunnen aangemelde verzekerden 
dezelfde nomina Ie premie blijven betalen als overige verzekerden en kan 
aanmelding van de verzekerden voor risicodeling achter de schermen plaatsvin-
den. Risicodeling impliceert betalingen aan verzekeraars op grond de werkelijke 
uitgaven in het betreffende contractjaar voor hun aangemelde verzekerden. 
Risicodeling verschilt dus wezenlijk van normuitkeringen, omdat normuitkerin-
gen onafhankelijk zijn van de werkelijke uitgaven in het betreffende contract-
jaar. 
Hoofdsluk vier richt zich op de doelmatigheidskant van de afruil tussen selectie 
en doelmatigheid. Het geef! aan dat een verzekeraar verschillende instrumenten 
kan hanteren ter bevordering van de doelmatigheid van de zorg, zoals: utilizati-
on management, disease management, case management, selectieve contracte-
ring van zorgaanbieders, financiele incentives, onderhandelen over vergoedin-
gen en het aanbieden van verschillende polisvormen. De potentiele besparingen 
die een verzekeraar kan bewerkstelligen blijken aanzieniijk te zijn. Zo heeft 
bijvoorbeeld in Californie de toepassing van managed care en gereguleerde 
concurrentie geleid tot een verlaging van de kosten voor groepen werknemers, 
waardoor de premie met tien procent kon worden verlaagd. De introductie van 
een ntilization review programma voor ziekenilUiszorg heef! geleid tot een 
verlaging van de ziekenhuiskosten met ongeveer acht procent en van de totale 
kosten met ongeveer vier procent. Verder zijn er verschillende voorbeelden van 
succesvolle toepassingen van disease management of case management, bijvoor-
beeld een verlaging van 40 procent van de kosten van patienten met een 
hartinfarct en van 15 tot 35 procent voor diabetici. 
De voorgestelde methode voor de berekening van de incentives voor doelmatig-
heid van een verzekeraar is als voigt. Onder de veronderstelling - ceteris 
paribus - dat een verzekeraar bepaalde ziektekosten kan verlagen door middel 
van doelmatigheidsbevordering, zullen zijn kosten maar waarschijniijk ook de 
liitkomen (de zogenaamde overschade). Bovendien heeft de laalstgenoemde vorm van risicode-
ling betrekking op aile verzekerden. 
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vergoedingen die hij ontvangt in het kader van de risicodeling. lager zijn6. 
Daarom kan de doelmatigheidswinst gesplitst worden in een deel dat ten goede 
komt aan de verzekeraar en een deel dat ten goede komt aan de Algemene Kas. 
Hoe hoger het deel voor de verzekeraar. hoe hoger de incentives tot doelmatig-
heid. De doelmatigheidwinst van een verzekeraar kan bepaald worden onder 
verschillende veronderstellingen omtrent besparingen: besparingen op aile 
uitgaven. op bepaalde vormen van zorg. op bepaalde subgroepen van verzeker-
den. In het eerste geval ontstaat een overall indicator voor de incentives tot 
doelmatigheid. in de andere gevallen een specifieke indicator voor incentives tot 
doelmatigheid met betrekking tot bepaalde zorgvormen of subgroepen. 
De zogenaamde gewogen uitgaven zijn voorgesteld als alternatieve overall 
indicator voor de incentives tot doelmatigheid. Deze indicator is relevant onder 
de veronderstelling dat (sommige) incentives voor doelmatigheid aanwezig zijn 
zolang (een deel van) de marginale uitgaven voor een verzekerde in een jaar ten 
laste komen van de verzekeraar zelf. Zodra het zeker is dat deze marginale 
lIitgaven volledig ten laste komen van de Algemene Kas is de incentive voor 
doelmatigheid verdwenen. Aangetoond wordt dat beide overall indicatoren voor 
de incentives tot doelmatigheid vergelijkbare uitkomsten geven indien een 
verzekeraar rekening houdt met de uitgaven die gedurende het jaar plaatsvinden. 
Hooldstuk vijl combineert de elementen van de voorgaande hoofdstukken in een 
systematische methode ter optimalisering van de afruil tussen selectie en 
doelmatigheid. Als theoretische illustratie van de methode worden optimale 
varianten van proportionele verevening bepaald. gegeven bepaalde normuitke-
ringen en gegeven de voorkeuren van de overheid met betrekking tot het 
reduceren van selectie versus het behouden van doelmatigheid. De theoretische 
illllstraties in dit hoofdstuk beperken zich tot proportionele verevening. omdat 
de overige hoofdvormen van risicodeling niet op deze wijze geanalyseerd 
(i De ceteris paribus voorwaarde haudt onder meer in dat het bedrag dat de verzekeraar 
dient te betalen aan de Algemene Kas ter finaneiering van de risicodeling gelijk blijft. 
Bovendien is afgezien van cen mogelijke verlaging van de nonnuitkeringcll in de toekornst als 
gevolg van cen verlaging van de kostcn nu. In de huirlige Nederlandse situatie met meer dan 25 
ziekenfondsen zonder cen ziekenfonds met cen uitzonderlijk groat marktaandeel zijn dit 
redelijke veronderstellingen. 
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konden worden. Dit vormde een belangrijk argument om empirische analyses 
ten aanzien van de afruil ttlssen selectie en doelmatigheid uit te voeren. 
Empirische analyses 
Hoofdsllik zes geeft een beschrijving van het gegevensbestand, de methoden die 
worden gehanteerd en de incentives voor selectie indien er demografische 
normuitkeringen worden gehanteerd zonder enige vorm van risicodeling. Het 
gegevensbestand bevat administratieve gegevens voor zes achtereenvolgende 
jaren (1988-1993) van ongeveer 47.200 verzekerden van een ziekenfonds. De 
gegevens bestaan uit demografische kenmerken, de jaarlijkse kosten voor 
verschillende vormen van zorg en de diagnosen van ziekenhuisopnamen. Voor 
ongeveer 10.500 verzekerden zijn tevens gegevens uit een gezondheidsenquete 
beschikbaar. De gemiddelde ziektekosten in 1993 waren 1. 941 gulden. In 
overeenstemming met eerder onderzoek laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat - bij demo-
grafische normuitkeringen zonder risicodeling - een verzekeraar vrij eenvoudig 
subgroepen van verzekerden kan identificeren die voorspelbare substantiele 
winsten of verliezen genereren. Bijvoorbeeld, voor degenen die twee jaar 
geleden tot de 1 %-groep behoorden met de hoogste kosten (of de hoogste 
kosten voor voorgeschreven geneesmiddelen) is het voorspelbare verlies in het 
komende verzekeringsjaar ongeveer 12.000 gulden per persoon. Voor degenen 
die in temuinste drie van de voorgaande vier jaren een ziekenhuisopname 
hebben gehad (ongeveer 1 % van de verzekerden) is het voorspelbare verlies ook 
ongeveer 12.000 gulden per persoon. Met de gegevens uit de gezoudheidsen-
quete zijn verzekerden onderscheiden die achtereenvolgens een ernstige hart-
ziekte hebben (ongeveer 1.8%), diabetes (ongeveer 1.7%) of kanker (ongeveer 
1.2%). De gemiddelde voorspelbare verliezen per persoon in deze groepen ziju 
achtereenvolgens ongeveer 4.300 gulden, 2.900 gulden en 5.400 gulden. Ten 
slotle is het voorspelbare verlies voor degenen die wijkverpleging danwel 
thuiszorg (ongeveer 4.9%) ontvangen ongeveer 3.500 gulden per persoon. 
Desalniettemin wordt geconcludeerd dat demografische normuitkeringen de 
incentives tot risicoselectie met circa een-derde reduceren ten opzichte van 
ongedifferentieerde normuitkeringen'. Demografische variabelen zijn dus nuttig 
7 Dat wil zeggen eenzelfde nonnuitkering voor iedere verzekerde. 
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voor de bepaling van normuitkeringen maar zeker niet afdoende. Het verwaarlo-
zen van kleine voorspelbare winsten en verliezen belnvloedt deze conclusie 
nauwelijks. 
HoofdsllIk zevell analyseert de afname van de incentives tot selectie en doehna-
tigheid wanneer er verschillende vormen van risicodeling worden gehanteerd als 
aanvulling op demografische normuitkeringen. Voor elk van de vier hoofdvor-
men zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk drie, worden verschillende varianten 
gesimuleerd door het varieren van de relevante parameter. Alhoewel de 
empirische verde ling van individuele jaarlijkse ziektekosten statistisch significant 
afwijkt van de theoretische lognormale verdeling bleken de theoretische analyses 
in hoofdstnk drie, die gebaseerd zijn op laatstgenoemde verdeling, een goede 
indicatie te geven van het percentage van kosten dat gedeeld wordt tussen de 
verzekeraars en de Algemene Kas. Daarnaast geven de theoretische analyses in 
hoofdstuk vier een goede indicatie van de overall incentives tot doelmatigheid 
bij de vier hoofdvormen van risicodeling. De belangrijkste conclusie van 
hoofdstuk zeven is dat hoge-risicoverevening en hoge-kostenverevening tot een 
betere afruil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid leiden dan zowel overschadever-
goeding als proportionele verevening. De resultaten voor hoge-risicoverevening 
en hoge-kostenverevening zijn niet eenduidig. Er lijken twee voordelen te zijn 
van hoge-risicoverevening ten opzichte van hoge-kostenverevening. Ten eerste 
leidt dit, gegeven een zeker gewenst overall nivean van de incentives tot 
doelmatigheid, tot een grotere afname van de grate voorspelbare verliezen op 
verzekerden met hoge kosten in het verleden, veel ziekenhnisopnamen in het 
veri eden en ernstige chranische aandoeningen. Ten tweede zijn, gegeven een 
gewenst overall niveau van de incentives voor selectie, de incentives voor 
doelmatigheid met betrekking tot ziekenhuiskosten en onvoorspelbaar hoge 
kosten groter. Een nadeel van hoge-risicoverevening in vergelijking met hoge-
kostenverevening is dat er, bij een beperkte omvang van de risicodeIing, minder 
incentives voor doelmatigheid zijn met betrekking tot enkele subgroepen die 
wellicht in aamnerking zouden komen voor het toepassen van disease manage-
ment. 
Hoofdsluk aeil! beschouwt de kosten in het voorgaande jaar als aanvullend 
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verdeelkenmerk naast de demografische verdeelkenmerken voor de bepaling van 
de normuitkeringen. Verschillende varianten van dit verdeelkenmerk worden 
gesimuleerd door te varieren met het drempelbedrag waarboven de kosten als 
verdeelkernllerk worden meegenomen. In tegenstelling tot andere veelbelovende 
verdeelkernllerken leidt een kostengerelateerd verdeelkenmerk tot een afruil 
tussen selectie en doelmatigheid, net als de verschillende VOfIllen van risicode-
ling. In overeenstemming met de theoretische analyses in hoofdstuk twee, laat 
dit hoofdstuk zien dat - wanneer kleine voorspelbare winsten en verliezen 
irrelevant zijn voor selectie - de conventionele indicatoren tot een overschatting 
van de incentives voor selectie leiden, met name bij relatief goede normuitkerin-
genfonnules. Uiteraard is het interessant om de resultaten van kosten in het 
voorgaande jaar als verdeelkernnerk te vergelijken met de resultaten van 
risicodeling. De belangrijkste conclusie van dit hoofdsruk is dat de kosten in het 
voorgaande jaar als verdeelkernllerk tot een betere afruil russen selectie en 
doelmatigheid leidt dan zowel overschadevergoeding als proportionele vereve-
ning. In vergelijking met hoge-risicoverevening en hoge-kostenverevening zijn 
de resultaten van kosten in het voorgaande jaar als verdeelkenmerk niet eendui-
dig. Een voordeel van kosten in het verleden als verdeelkenmerk is dat, 
gegeven een relatief laag niveau van de gewenste incentives tot selectie, de 
incentives tot doelmatigheid hoger zijn. Een nadeel is dat, gegeven een overall 
niveau van de gewenste incentive tot doelmatigheid, de voorspelbare verliezen 
voor verschillende subgroepen groter zijn. 
Conclusie 
Uit de empirische analyses blijkt dat het aanvullen van demografische normuit-
keringen met hoge-risicoverevening of hoge-kostenverevening alsmede het 
hanteren van de kosten in het voorgaande jaar als extra verdeelkenmerk, tot een 
betere afruil tussell selectie en doelmatigheid leidt dan het aanvullen van 
demografische normuitkeringen met overschadevergoeding of proportionele 
verevelting. 
Beleidsimplicaties 
Deze conclusie is relevant voor Nederland en verschillende andere Europese 
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landen'. In 1999 hanteren sommige landen demografische normuitkeringen 
zonder enige vorm van risicodeling (bijvoorbeeld Duitsland, Tsjechie en 
Zwitserland). Deze landen kunnen de afruil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid 
wellicht verbeteren door een vorm van risicodeling te introduceren of de 
normuitkeringen mede te baseren op de kosten in het voorgaande jaar. Andere 
landen hebben hun demografische normuitkeringen aangevuld met overscha-
devergoeding en/of proportionele verevening (bijvoorbeeld Belgie en Neder-
land). Deze landen kunnen de afruil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid wellicht 
verbeteren door een andere vorm van risicodeling te gaan hanteren. Ben andere 
mogelijkheid is om de gehanteerde vorm van risicodeling te vervangen door de 
kosten in het voorgaand jaar als verdeelkerunerk. De conclusie is ook relevant 
voor bijvoorbeeld de Verenigde Staten, Israel en Rusland waar gereguleerde 
concurrentie wordt nagestreefd tussen zorgverzekeraars en voor bijvoorbeeld 
Taiwan dat overweegt een dergelijk ordeningsprinCipe op de zorgverzekerings-
markt te gaan hanteren. 
Brvan uitgaande dat het, op korte termijn, voor de meeste landen erg moeilijk 
zal zijn om hun demografische normuitkeringen sterk te verbeteren, lijkt het een 
goede stap om te gaan experimenteren met hoge-risicoverevening of hoge-
kostenverevening en/of met de kosten in het voorgaand jaar als verdeelkenmerk. 
Op langere termijn, zelfs wanneer demografische normuitkeringen sterk 
verbeterd worden, lijkt het aannemelijk dat beperkte vormen van risicodeling 
nog steeds nuttig kunnen zijn. De bevindingen van deze studie alsmede die 
omtrent het verbeteren van normuitkeringen lijken te impliceren dat er voldoen-
de teclmische mogelijkbeden zijn om beperkte incentives voor selectie te 
combineren met sterke incentives voor doelmatigheid in een gereguleerde 
concurrerende markt voor individuele ziektekostenverzekering. 
Beperkingen 
De hieronder genoemde beperkingen van de studie zijn toegespitst op de zie-
kenfondssector in Nederland. De studie veronderstelt dat het doel vall risicode-
8 Van de Ven en Ellis (1999) geven een overzicht van de praktijk van nonnuitkeringen en 
risicodeling in verschillende landen. 
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ling is om, gegeven de normuitkeringen en de premieregulering, de incentives 
voor selectie zo veel mogelijk te verminderen en de incentives voor doelmatig-
heid zoveel mogelijk te behouden. In ander onderzoek zijn andere beoordelings-
criteria gehanteerd. Bijvoorbeeld, in onderzoek in het kader van de Werkgroep 
Ontwikkeling Verdeelmodel (WOVM) wordt de zogenaamde verdelende 
werking van het gehele verdeelmodel ("nonnuitkeringen plus risicodeling") op 
ziekenfondsniveau vaak gehanteerd9 • Wi! men het verdeelmodel echter beoor-
delen op de incentivestructuur dan is met betrekking tot incentives voor selectie 
de "verdelende werking op subgroepniveau" het juiste beoordelingscriterium. 
Dit criterium geeft aan in hoeverre voorspelbare financieie resultaten voor 
bepaalde subgroepen van verzekerden afwijken van nul. In tegenstelling tot het 
criterium "verdelende werking op ziekenfondsniveau" is dit criterium, dat 
algemeen in de internationale literatuur wordt gehanteerd, niet gevoelig voor de 
toevallige risicosamenstelling van verzekeraarsportefeuilles en voor toevallige 
fluctuaties in het kostenniveau. Deze toevalsfluctuaties kunnen tot de verant-
woordelijkheid van de verzekeraars gerekend worden. Voor relatief grote 
verzekeraars is toeval geen relevant probleem en relatief kleine verzekeraars 
kunnen zich tegen eventuele nadelige gevolgen van toeval verzekeren via 
vrijwillige en risico-gerelateerde herverzekeringscontracten. Vanzelfsprekend 
zijn de conclusies van dit onderzoek niet noodzakelijk geldig indien het doel van 
de risicodeling anders is dan verondersteld. In dat geval moeten andere afwegin-
gen worden gemaakt. 
In de empirische analyses van de studie worden vier IlOojdvormen vall risicode-
ling onderscheiden. Elke vorm van risicodeling kan gezien worden als een 
verplichte herverzekering voor de verzekeraars met een niet (volledig) aan het 
risico gerelateerde herverzekeringspremie. Dit geldt met name voor overschade-
vergoeding en proportionele verevening die een duidelijke analogie hebben met 
respectievelijk "excess-of-loss" en "quota share" herverzekeringscontracten. In 
aanvulling daarop kan hoge-risicoverevening gezien worden als een vorm van 
regulering die - tot op zekere hoogte - het weigeren van hoge-risicoverzekerden 
') In Nederlandse beleidskringen lijkt dit cen belangrijk beoordelingscriterium te zijn voor de 
uitkomsten van cen verdeelmodel (zie ook Van Vliet, Lamers en Van de Ven, 1999), 
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waarvoor geen goede premie (normuitkering) bepaald kan worden, tracht te 
simuleren. Dit weigeren is gebruikelijk in een vrije verzekeringsmarkt, maar is 
niet toegestaan in een gereguleerde concurrerende verzekeringsmarkt met een 
periodieke acceptatieplicht. Omdat het vergelijken van hoofdvormen van 
risicodeling het prima ire doel van de studie was, zijn er geen combinaties van 
hoofdvormen empirisch onderzocht. Desalniettemin kunnen dergelijke combina-
ties worden toegepast en kunnen zij wellicht de beste aspecten van twee of meer 
hoofdvormen verenigen. 
Het moge duidelijk zijn dat de beschikbool'heid VOII gegevel/s van invloed kan 
zijn op de te hanteren normuitkeringenformule en de te hanteren vorm van 
risicodeling. Deze studie veronderstelt dat de overheid een definitie heeft van de 
zogenaamde "aanvaardbare kosten" binnen het kader van het gespecificeerde 
verstrekkingenpakket. In de ziekenfondssector is sinds de introductie van de 
normuitkeringen in 1993 nog steeds aan deze voorwaarde voldaan. Aan deze 
voorwaarde wordt in mindere mate voldaan wanneer de specificatie van het 
basispakket minder stringent is en wanneer ziekenfondsen verschillende polis-
vormen van het basispakket mogen gaan aanbieden. 
Ten slotte kan de precieze vOl'm VOII premieregulerillg van invloed zijn op de te 
hanteren vormen van risicodeling. Deze studie veronderstelt - conform de 
situatie in de ziekenfondssector sinds 1993 - dat een ziekenfonds dezelfde 
nominale premie moe! vragen aan iedere verzekerde. Indien deze extreme vorm 
van premieregulering zou worden gewijzigd in de voorwaarde van een zekere 
minimum- en maximumpremie per ziekenfonds, is overschadevergoeding en 
proportionele verevening nog steeds mogelijk. De implementatie van hoge-
risicoverevening of hoge-kostenverevening zou moeilijkheden kunnen opleveren 
bij premiecalclllaties door een ziekenfonds. Voor het bepalen van de premie 
voor een verzekerde moet een ziekenfonds weten voor welk deel van de 
toekomstige ziektekosten het financieel verantwoordelijk is. Bij hoge-risicover-
evening of hoge-kostenverevening is dit niet geheel duidelijk op het moment dat 
het ziekenfonds de premie moet vaststellen. Met de genoemde vorm van 
premieregulering is er sprake van een ingewikkelde afruil tussen selectie, 
doelmatigheid en toegankelijkheid (Van de Ven et aI., 1999). Indien geheel 
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wordt afgezien van enige vonn van (premie)regulering, is er sprake van een 
afruil tussen toegankelijkheid en doelmatigheid en kunnen hoge-risicoverevening 
en hoge-kostenverevening ook problematisch zijn in verband met premiecalcula-
ties door een ziekenfonds. 
Nader onderzoek 
Nader onderzaek met betrekking tot de ziekenfondssector zou zich kunnen 
rich ten op de volgende vraag: welke combinatie van normuitkeringen en 
risicodeling geeft de beste afruil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid? Deze studie 
beperkt zich tot combinaties van demografische normuitkeringen en vier vormen 
van risicodeling. In de empirische analyses is verondersteld dat de normuit-
keringen op eenzelfde wijze worden vastgesteld als in de situatie zander 
risicodeling en dat de risicodeling wordt gefinancierd door een procentuele 
korting op de normkosten. Verschillende combinaties van normuitkeringen en 
risicodeling zauden gevormd kunnen worden door: 
- Het hanteren van andere normuitkeringen, bijvoorbeeld normuitkeringen die 
mede gebaseerd zijn op diagnose kosten groepen en/of farmacie kosten groepen 
(Clark et a!., 1995; Ellis et a!., 1996; Lamers en Van Vliet, 1996; Lamers, 
1999; Weiner et a!., 1996). 
- Het hanteren van andere vormen van risicodeling, bijvoorbeeld combinaties 
van verschillende hoofdvormen. 
- Het anders vaststellen van de normkosten waarop de normuitkeringen zijn 
gebaseerd en daardoor het hanteren van een andere financiering van de risicode-
ling. Bijvoorbeeld door het berekenen van normatieve kostenniveaus op afge-
kapte kostengegevens indien een vorm van overschadevergoeding wordt 
gehanteerd. 
De empirische analyses in deze studie zijn gebaseerd op een gegevensbestand 
van een ziekenfonds. De empirische illustraties gelden derhalve voor een 
algemene populatie van aile leeftijden, alhoewel de hogere-inkomensgroepen in 
Nederland veelal een particuliere ziektekostenverzekering hebben. De verschil-
lende combinaties van normuitkeringen en risicodeling kunnen worden toegepast 
binnen verschillende kaders. Zo'n kader kan bijvoorbeeld gegeven worden door 
de populatie waarop het een en ander betrekking heef!. Gedacht kan worden aan 
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toepassingen binnen het kader van de particuliere ziektekostenverzekering. In 
deze sector worden sinds 1989 de meeste 65-plussers die geen aanspraak maken 
op een ziekenfondsverzekering of publiekrechtelijke ambtenarenregeling, 
verzekerd via de Wet Toegang tot Ziektekostenverzekering (WTZ). De WTZ 
heen betrekking op circa 15 % van de particulier verzekerden en circa 35 % van 
de totale schade op de particuliere verzekeringsmarkt. Met betrekking tot deze 
uitgaven dragen de verzekeraars geen eukel financieel risico (Van de Ven et aI., 
1996). 
Voor toekomstige evaluaties van verdeelmodellen zouden verschillende gewich-
ten gelntroduceerd kunnen worden voor specifieke reducties van incentives voor 
selectie en doelrnatigheid. Dit kan een uitbreiding vormen op het conceptuele 
kader zoals gepresenteerd in het eerste deel van de studie. De gewichten zouden 
af kunnen hangen van de instrnmenten voor selectie en doelrnatigheid waarvan 
de overheid verwacht dat ze gehanteerd zullen worden en van het belang dat de 
overheid hecht aan de (negatieve) gevolgen van deze instrnmenten. Tot slot 
verdient het aanbeveling nader onderzoek te laten doen naar de uitvoeringsas-
pecten van verschillende vormen van risicodeling. 
Samenvattend, het optimaliseren van de afrnil tussen selectie en doelmatigheid 
op de zorgverzekeringsmarkt is in toenemende mate relevant voor Nederland 
alsmede voor een toenemend aantal andere landen. Nader onderzoek naar deze 
belangrijke afruil verdient een hoge prioriteit van beleidmakers en gezondheids-
economen. 
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